Stalin's War on Ukraine - M.MOAM.INFO (2025)

Emre Kazim. 188 Ballad of ...... Sadik Pasha gave Mickiewicz a horse named ... and take two greyhounds with him – Karakus and Dumane – and hunt for hares.”.

The City of Gdańsk www.gdansk.pl

N E W EE AA SS TT EE R N E U R O P E I S A CC OO LL LL AA BB O R A T I V E P R OO JJ EECCTT BBEETTWWEEEENN TFHORUERE P O L I S H P A R T N E R S The City of Gdańsk www.gdansk.pl Lower Silesia www.dolnyslask.pl

A city with over a thousand years of history, Gdańsk has been a melting pot of cultures groups. trade has A city withand overethnic a thousand yearsThe air of tolerance and wealth built onLocated in of history, Gdańsk has been a south-westenabled culture, science, and the arts to flourish in the city for centuries. Today, melting pot of cultures andmeeting ethPoland, Gdańsk remains a key place and major tourist attraction ern in Poland. nic groups. The air of tolerance Lower Silesia is a region that has historical ties to While the city boasts historic sites of enchanting beauty, it also has a major and wealth built on trade has German, Polish and Czech culture. Throughout historic and socialenabled importance. In science, addition and to its 1000-year history, the cityhas is the place where culture, the centuries, the region been at the centrethe of Second War well as Today, the birthplace of Solidarność, the Solidarity movement, significant historical events such as the Protestant the arts toWorld flourish in broke the cityout foras centuries. Gdańskled remains key place and major and Reformation, the Silesian Wars, Industrialisation and which to the afall ofmeeting Communism in Central Eastern Europe.

tourist attraction in Poland. While the city boasts both World Wars. After the Second World War the region became part of the territory of Poland. The historic sites of enchanting beauty, it also has a The European Solidarity Centre capital and largest city of Lower Silesia is Wrocław, major historic and social importance. In addition www.ecs.gda.pl located on the Oder River. Today Wrocław is one to its 1000-year history, the city is the place where of Poland’s largest and most dynamic cities with a the Second World War broke out as well as the birthplace of Solidarność, the Solidarity movement, rapidly growing international institution profile and combining is regarded The European Solidarity Centre is a multifunctional which led to the fall of Communism in Central and as one of the most important commercial, educascientific, cultural and educational activities with a modern museum and Eastern Europe. tional and tourist sites in the country.

archive, which documents freedom movements in the modern history of Poland and Europe. Centre wasSolidarity established in Gdańsk on November 8th 2007. Its new buildingCollege was opened in The European Centre The Jan Nowak-Jeziorański 2014 on the anniversary of the August Accords signed in Gdańsk www.ecs.gda.pl of Eastern Europebetween the workers’ union “Solidarność” and communist authorities in 1980.www.kew.org.pl The Centre is meant to be an agora, a space The European Solidarity for people and ideas that build and develop a civic society, a meeting place for people who hold Centre is a multifunctionThe College of Eastern the world’s future dear. The mission of the Centre is to commemorate, maintain and popularise al institution combining Europe is a non-profit, the heritage and message of the Solidarity movement and the anti-communist democratic opscientific, cultural and non-governmental founposition in Poland and throughout the world. to on inspire educational activities with a modern museum and Through its activities the Centre dationwants founded Febarchive, which civic, documents movements in new cultural, trade freedom union, local government, national and European initiatives with a uniruary 9th 2001 by Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, a former the modern history of Poland and Europe. The head of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe and versal dimension. Centre was established in Gdańsk on November a democratic activist. The foundation deals with 8th 2007. Its new building was opened in 2014 on cooperation between the nations of Central and The Jan College of Eastern Europe the anniversary of the August Accords signed in Nowak-Jeziorański Eastern Europe. The aims if its charters are to carry www.kew.org.pl Gdańsk between the workers’ union “Solidarność” out educational, cultural and publishing activities, and communist authorities in 1980. The Centre is and to develop programmes which enhance the meant to be an agora, a The space for people and Europe transformation in the countries of Eastern foundaEurope. College of Eastern is a non-profit, non-governmental ideas that build and develop a civic society, a meetThe organisation has its headquarters in Wrocław, tion founded on February 9th 2001 by Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, a former ing place for people who hold the world’s future Poland, a city in western Poland, perfectly situated head of commemorate, the Polish section of Radio Free Europe and a democratic activist. dear. The mission of the Centre is to in the centre of Europe and with a deep understandfoundation deals with between the nations of Central maintain and popularise theThe heritage and message ingcooperation of both Western and Eastern Europe. of theEastern SolidarityEurope. movement the ifanti-communist and Theand aims its charters are to carry out educational, cultural and publishdemocratic opposition in Polandprogrammes and throughout ing activities, and to develop which enhance the transformation in the countries the world. Through its activities the Centrehas wants of Eastern Europe. The organisation its to headquarters in Wrocław, Poland, a city in western inspire new cultural, civic, trade union, local governPoland, perfectly situated in the centre of Europe and with a deep understanding of both Westment, national and European initiatives with a uniern and Eastern Europe. www.neweasterneurope.eu versal dimension.

Dear Reader,

This year marks a decade since the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1808 reaffirming the commitment of the international community to Georgia’s territorial integrity and promoting the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict by peaceful means. However, only a few months later, in August 2008 a war erupted between Georgia and South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Russia, resulting in the victory of the latter and expulsion of the Georgian military from both territories. As a result, Russia and a handful of other states officially recognised the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, stating that they will never be a part of Georgia. The rest of the international community, however, continues to adhere to the UN resolution, not recognising these regions as independent states. A decade onward, despite this lack of international recognition not only do both territories continue to exist, but are also not sole examples of para, or de facto, states that operate on the so-called post-Soviet territory. Even more, within their boundaries there are countless societies and communities whose livelihoods are surely affected by their states’ unusual status in international relations. Yet they continue to lead their lives, just like people in other states and areas. The following stories presented in this issue tackle the complexity of para-states in post-Soviet space. Our authors analyse their complex status and position but also take you beyond geopolitics. They focus on elements that elude the everyday policymaker or analyst. They look at culture, identity and entrepreneurship. And while generally it is our editorial policy to follow international norms, some of the authors are from these unrecognised places and may refer to their homes as a country or state. After all, as Thomas de Waal writes in his opening essay, “political scientists insist that statehood is a political definition and can exist without recognition”. While any resolution to these conflicts seems presently unimaginable, getting to know the realities on the ground could be a first step towards progress. However, we should also heed the warning in Ziemowit Szczerek’s essay, which argues that the spectre of separatism still haunts the region and could easily appear in the Western Balkans or even Central Europe, especially if the West gives up on its role in the region. With this in mind, we wish you an enjoyable read and invite you to join us online at www.neweasterneurope.eu. The Editors

Contents Opinion and Analysis 7

Uncertain territory. The strange life and curious sustainability of de facto states Thomas de Waal The international order has never been tidy or complete, always having lands with contested sovereignty. The breakdown of empires is the most common catalyst for producing new aspirant states. The post-Soviet space is especially rich in these territories, which includes Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria, along with two more recently established shadowy entities in eastern Ukraine.

New separatisms. Or what could happen if the West disappeared from Eastern Europe? Ziemowit Szczerek

Two bottles of whiskey and a small location was all Azat Adamyan had to start with. Today, the pub Bardak (Russian for “mess”) is one of a kind in the city of Stepanakert – the capital of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh. His success has led him to branch out into other business ventures.

How to set up your own para-state Paweł Pieniążek Reflecting on the recent examples of parastate-building, it raises the question how possible is it to build a new entity that would survive the tumultuous winds of history. As history suggests, in order to emerge and endure para-states need to follow a well-trodden path to independence and several simple rules.

Donbas coal bonanza Michał Potocki

Culture in a conflicted region Anton Ochirov

Peace is still far from reach A conversation with Leyla and Arif Yunus

Georgia’s separatist regions at a standstill Agnieszka Tomczyk

The red shoes of Transnistrian women Marina Shupac

A recognised pub in an unrecognised state Knar Babayan

Domestic violence and human trafficking are some of the key issues facing Transnistrian women, but while local NGOs focus on victim support, the patriarchal attitudes towards women in society remain mostly untouched.

De facto states and Non-recognition. A special series from the Black Sea Institute A series of essays related to the topic of de facto state states, separatism and non-recognition by researchers from the Black Sea Institute.

The model student, the latecomer and the bully. NATO relations in Eastern Europe Dominik P. Jankowski The next NATO summit will be held on July 11 – 12th 2018 in Brussels. It provides the alliance with an opportunity to uphold or – if needed – potentially update the decisions regarding its relationship with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia.

A house divided. Orthodoxy in post-Maidan Ukraine George Soroka Religious institutions in Ukraine are presently embroiled in an internecine battle between Orthodox factions that stand alongside a gaping ideological divide.

Will the long-awaited justice prevail in Ukraine? Kateryna Pryshchepa

Art, Culture and Society 149 On mythical identities of mythical countries A conversation with Miljenko Jergović

156 Mickiewicz reactivated Grzegorz Nurek

History and Memory

104 The far right’s disproportionate influence Nina Boichenko

161 Renaming streets. A key element of identity politics Anna Wójcik and Uladzislau Belavusau

111 Sport, geopolitics and Russia. A short history Anna Maria Dyner

167 Memory of independence. A gap-filling exercise Mateusz Mazzini

Interviews 117 From Putin’s Russia to a non-Putin’s Russia An interview with Gleb Pavlovsky “Putin’s power is, in its essence, informal. He has not built any rational bureaucracy that would allow him to be replaced by somebody else after he leaves.”

124 The Odesan myth and the Ukrainian façade An interview with Professor Borys Khersonskyy

Stories and Ideas 130 Veterans of the Bosnian War struggle for their rights Lidia Kurasińska For nearly a year, veteran combatants from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been protesting in front of the government building in Sarajevo, demanding financial aid and access to free medical services.

144 Witnessing another Putin victory Wiktoria Bieliaszyn

2018 is the year Poland celebrates its 100 years since regaining independence. However, not all of today’s Polish territory was a part of Poland a century ago.

Eastern Café 178 Between an axis of convenience and a return to the past Marcin Kaczmarski 182 Eurasia and geopolitical thought Emre Kazim 188 Ballad of a common soldier Piotr Pogorzelski 192 Russia’s wars on Ukraine Wojciech Siegień 196 Confronting the Romanian church’s cumbersome past Alin Constantin 201 Russia and the Balkans. Navigating a minefield of opportunities Millie Radović

EDITOR AND PUBLISHER The Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław [emailprotected], www.kew.org.pl

Zamek Wojnowice ul. Zamkowa 2, 55-330 Wojnowice, Poland CO-EDITOR European Solidarity Centre [emailprotected], www.ecs.gda.pl

Content with the notation (CC) is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. All attempts are made to give proper and appropriate attribution to the author and source. Circulating texts without the Editors’ permit is strictly forbidden. The Editors bear no responsibility for the content of advertisements. Copyright © by the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław (Kolegium Europy Wschodniej im. Jana Nowaka-Jeziorańskiego we Wrocławiu), 2018 Texts and opinions published in New Eastern Europe do not necessarily reflect the views of the funders, publishers and editors. New Eastern Europe is co-financed by the Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage.

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Uncertain territory The strange life and curious sustainability of de facto states T H O M A S D E WA A L

The international order has never been tidy or complete, always having lands with contested sovereignty. The breakdown of empires is the most common catalyst for producing new aspirant states. The post-Soviet space is especially rich in these territories, which includes Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria, along with two more recently established shadowy entities in eastern Ukraine. We all have a postal address, where a letter or a postcard can be sent. A house number, a street, a town and a country give each of us a personal geography that allows anyone in the world to communicate with us. Except some of us do not. A small category of people in the world do not have an international postal address because their countries do not belong to the world’s postal system – and by extension the common international space. They are global anomalies and their residents are in many ways second-class world citizens. How do we define the status of these de facto states and, more importantly, the people that live there? Life in a de facto state (or an unrecognised, quasi- or para-state or a number of other definitions discussed below) entails invention and subterfuge. To get back to the first example, of sending and receiving a letter, considerable invention is needed to work with the global postal service. For years, Turkish Cypriots had a mysterious

Opinion and Analysis

Uncertain territory, Thomas de Waal

postal address, Mersin 10, referring to a town in Turkey through which mail could be routed to the non-recognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In analogous fashion, a letter to Abkhazia passes through the friendly Russian city of Sochi. Life in limbo Some people in separatist parts of Ukraine are now cut off almost completely. International postal deliveries are currently suspended to Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk. In Transdniestria, which is also often called Transnistria, the two sides in the dispute have found a working interim solution, proving that collaboration can deliver results – and letters. In March I sent my daughter a postcard from the post office in the Transnistrian capital of Tiraspol. The card depicted a view of the Dniester River with a church and a war memorial commemorating the Transnistrians’ sacrifices in the Great Patriotic War. I paid 9.80 Transnistrian roubles for a stamp, but as my card was going to England, the lady behind the counter affixed a Moldovan stamp worth 9.50 lei to it. The card arrived in London five days later, post-marked “Tiraspol, Moldova.” Postal communication is not such a big issue in the era of email. Other obstacles blocking the interaction of citizens of de facto states with the outside world are more serious. Many find it hard to travel abroad, This prolonged pursue post-graduate studies or even make simple ficondition of limbo, nancial transactions. One Transnistrian businessman to me how his payments to clients have to in which one or described be routed via three banks. two generations These problems are primarily political in nature. have now grown Most territories of this kind exist as a result of conflict. When the political conflict that created them is resolved, up, raises questions their status is regularised – sometimes fortunately that are almost through negotiations (as in Colombia, the Philippines, metaphysical. Indonesia), in other cases by violence (as in Chechnya and Sri Lanka) that may presage more conflict in the future. Things become more interesting however, when the violence is over but the conflict is unresolved, such that the irregular status is long-lasting, the temporary has become permanent. Turkish Cypriots have been living in this irregular condition for almost half a century, Abkhaz and Transnistrians for 25 years. This prolonged condition of limbo, in which one or two generations have now grown up, raises questions that are almost metaphysical. The issue of how to send and receive letters to and from Abkhazia was the starting point for Letters to Max,

Uncertain territory, Thomas de Waal

Opinion and Analysis

the documentary by the French film-maker Eric Baudelaire. We see how Baudelaire posts letters from Paris to the de facto foreign minister of Abkhazia, Maxim Gvindjia and how he takes an interest first in whether the letters arrive at all (they mostly do) and how postal officials have marked them (mostly, writing “Via Georgia” on the envelope). Baudelaire’s first letter to Gvindjia reads, “Dear Max, Are you there?” Gvindjia laughingly replies, “Yes, I’m here.” The meaning of “here” and “there” is both banal and profound. It takes us beyond the political controversy to a deeper philosophical issue of how certain people insist that they live in a certain kind of “here” and how their claims fit with the rest of the world’s insistence about what deserves to be “there”. What terms should we use to describe this reality? Or to put it another way, in what jurisdiction does Max Gvindjia live? To call modern-day Abkhazia a “state” is already controversial, but political scientists insist that statehood is a political definition and can exist without recognition. The term “quasi-state” is derogatory and not satisfactory to describe somewhere that has functioned on its own for a quarter of a century. “Self-proclaimed” does not mean much, as most states proclaim themselves as such before others accepted them – think of the United States on July 4th 1776. Contested sovereignty Then we come to the thorny issue of recognition. “Unrecognised” is a useful term, but not accurate to describe Abkhazia (recognised by Russia and three other states), northern Cyprus (recognised by Turkey), let alone the special case of Kosovo (not a member of the United Nations but recognised in early 2018 by 116 countries, listed in a special website called “Kosovo Thanks You”). Besides, as James Ker-Lindsay has emphasised in an article published in 2015, recognition is primarily an act of political intention which tells us more about international consensus than international law. Membership of the UN is a commonly accepted definition of statehood, but not an all-encompassing one (ask the people of Kosovo and Taiwan what they think of it). In the end, the status of a contested territory is mostly defined by negatives. It is a place which is in the awkward category of not belonging to most agreed international structures or organisations. You do not find it in the drop-down box when you fill out an international online form. (In most of the world, that alphabetical list of countries begins with Afghanistan, except in Russia where it begins with Abkhazia).

Opinion and Analysis

Uncertain territory, Thomas de Waal

Map by Andreï-Bogdan Sterescu

That is why “de facto state” is probably the best and most neutral term. “De facto” describes a condition in which there is internal self-government and elements of domestic statehood but international rejection of its claims to de jure legitimacy. The international order has never been tidy or complete, always having lands with contested sovereignty. The breakdown of empires is the most common catalyst for producing new aspirant states, springing up like flowers in the cracks of paving stones after rain. The post-Soviet space is especially rich in these territories. As well as the four enduring de facto states of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria, there are now two more recently established shadowy entities in eastern Ukraine. Only one would-be separatist state, Chechnya of the 1990s, failed. Compare this to the situation a century ago. A recent map depicts no fewer than 27 “ephemeral states” that proliferated in the ruins of the Russian empire during the Russian Civil War from 1917 to 1921. Today only souvenir hunters or a tiny group of nationalist nostalgists remember these statelets, whose names sound as unlikely as the Marx Brothers’ fictional Freedonia. They included the Republic of Uhtua (run by Karelian Finns), the Free Territory (an anarchist state in eastern Ukraine), the Cossack-run Kuban People’s Republic and the Gilan Soviet Republic on the Iranian shore of the Caspian Sea. Each was the project of an ethnic group or political faction in the borderlands between states in crisis. All these “ephemeral states” took on the symbolic trappings of nationhood. They all had flags of course,

Uncertain territory, Thomas de Waal

Opinion and Analysis

but also postage stamps, coats of arms and banknotes. All of them crashed and burned relatively quickly, when Bolshevik military might swept them away. The four post-Soviet breakaway territories share some of the same exotic features as their predecessors from a century ago. They all exhibit the most reliably familiar aspect of small and unrecognised states, over-compensating for lack of real state power with The four post-Soviet an abundance of state symbolism. All of them have breakaway territories devised elaborate national symbolisms in the form of all exhibit the most flags, crests and anthems. Abkhazia has exotic stamps. Transnistria has its own currency, the Transnistrian reliably familiar rouble, giving it control of its own monetary policy. aspect of small and It has even invented plastic coins in different shapes specifically with blind people in mind, which sell for unrecognised states, high prices on Ebay. This is the softer side of a harder over-compensating for ideology – all of these territories are in the grip of a lack of real state power big national idea, founded on struggle, military victory and sacrifice in the conflicts of the 1990s and memori- with an abundance alised in sculptures, parades and heroic celebrations. of state symbolism. Patron states It is important to understand that these places are not scary mafia lands (as Chechnya in the 1990s or current-day Donbas in many ways are). The main impression a visitor to Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh or Transnistria has is of normality. Stepanakert, Sukhum(i) and Tiraspol are well-functioning cities with all the trappings of normal life in modern Europe: uniformed traffic police, schools and hospitals, shops and cafés and television stations. Indeed, petty crime rates are generally lower here than in many de jure states. You have to focus quite hard on your surroundings to work out that things are different here. For me the main clue is that it is so non-commercialised, that the advertising hoardings are always selling local products. You can buy global brands here individually, but there are no international chains, no McDonalds or Starbucks. Sometimes there is an approximation that almost takes you in – for example, Turkish Cyprus has a chain called Burger City which is a sort of imitation of Burger King. How have these de facto states endured? The post-1945 European consensus that violence and territorial re-conquest in Europe is unacceptable provides one part of the answer. The support of a “patron state” – Russia, Armenia (in the case of Karabakh) or Turkey (Turkish Cyprus) – is a more crucial factor. All of these entities

Opinion and Analysis

Uncertain territory, Thomas de Waal

are heavily reliant on their patrons for both economic assistance and security. They range in their levels of dependence. Laurence Broers has compared in impressive detail the three very different types of political economy which enable Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia to benefit from a client-patron relationship. Yet there are nuances here. The relationship with the patron state is more complex than most outsiders think and the disparaging description of these territories as “puppet states” is wide of the mark. Abkhazia and South Ossetia both survived the 1990s, despite minimal support from Moscow and, in the case of Abkhazia, punitive economic sanctions from Russia. From Sukhumi to Tiraspol, the patron state is accepted as the provider of both security and financing. But within that context the de facto state routinely chooses as its leader the politician who defies Moscow on certain issues. Voters in Abkhazia in 2004 and in Transnistria in 2011 chose Sergei Bagapsh and Yevgeny Shevchuk respectively as their presidents in defiance of Moscow’s favoured candidates, Raul Khajimba and Anatoly Kaminsky. In 2011 even tiny South Ossetia gave Moscow an unpleasant shock by attempting to elect an opposition candidate, Alla Dzhiyoeva, as its Post-Soviet de leader. In parallel, Turkish Cypriots routinely choose facto states have as their leaders politicians who stand up to the govin Ankara. not become rogue ernment The interesting story here is how these post-Soviet de states, even though facto states have not become rogue states, even though the option was fully the option was fully available to them. Instead, in cases available to them. which deserve more study from political scientists, they appear to have decided to build de facto institutions of statehood and make contracts with their citizens. They do this not with any realistic hope of international legitimacy but as the best method of survival. It is a partial success story. Although poverty and emigration remain huge problems, all four de facto states have progressed far from being the shadowy territories they were in the 1990s. Yes, there is criminality and contraband here. Transnistria, in particular, is a haven for smugglers. But it keeps that status in large part due to the collusion of its recognised-state neighbours, Moldova and Ukraine. Within certain limits, there is also a kind of democracy here. As Donnacha Ó Beacháin, an associate professor at the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University, has described, elections in the unrecognised states are circumscribed by certain conditions (certain groups are not allowed to engage in high politics, there is a consensus on issues concerning the conflict) but are also highly competitive. Abkhazia, in particular, has an independent media and strong civil society. Overall, it is hard to make a strong causal connection between all these attributes of de facto states and their condition of non-recognition. In a challenging

Uncertain territory, Thomas de Waal

Opinion and Analysis

PhD thesis, Giorgio Comai makes the case that the four post-Soviet de facto states, economically weak and dependent on a patron state, can be compared to small recognised states, such as Palau and the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean. “Non-recognition is the symptom, not the cause,” of their problems, Comai argues. Other small states in Africa and Asia, or even the European “micro-states” of Andorra and Liechtenstein, arguably exhibit many of the same features as do Abkhazia or Transnistria. Waiting for an idea I recently asked a Transnistrian native what was the biggest problem for him about living in an unrecognised, de facto state. His answer was “instability” and “uncertainty”. “What will happen tomorrow?” he asked rhetorically. “What will Moldova and Ukraine do? Will my kids’ school close, will the border close? It is too unpredictable. I can’t predict three or five years ahead.” This uncertainty looks set to endure. Transnistria and the other de facto states are weak states reliant on strong patrons but not unique in the world in that condition. In my view, the chief reason for persistent limbo lies in the peculiar dysfunctional relationship between the de facto state and the third corner of the triangle in each case, the “metropolitan “parent” or “base” state, the de jure claimant on each territory in Baku, Chișinău, Nicosia or Tbilisi. Although they hate to admit it, the profile and policies of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and Northern Cyprus, are all largely defined by Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and the Republic of Cyprus. They exist in relation to their missing partner, their shadow, their doppelganger. Separate but connected, each side exerts a – mostly negative – veto on the development of the other. International engagement with these de facto states is very inconsistent. At one extreme is Turkish Cyprus, where there is international tourism, students from around the world study at its universities and there is trade and traffic across the Green Line into southern Cyprus. At the other extreme is Nagorno-Karabakh, which is deeply isolated from the world, getting very few international visitors and where virtually the only international organisation working there is the International Committee of the Red Cross. Transnistria tends more towards the Cyprus case, having an even more sophisticated trade regime with the European Union than Turkish Cypriots do. South Ossetia is nearer to Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia is somewhere in the middle. These contrasts have almost nothing to do with an international strategy (something which would be a welcome innovation) and everything to do with the

Opinion and Analysis

Uncertain territory, Thomas de Waal

policies set by the governments of metropolitan states (with Tbilisi being a partial exception), which the rest of the world sets as its main criterion for interaction. Karabakh is isolated because Baku wants it so and is prepared to punish internationals who dare to visit and work there. Turkish Cyprus is more open because the government in Nicosia is more relaxed about what happens there. It is a case of double uncertainty. A Transnistrian, Abkhaz or Turkish Cypriot feels vulnerable in a world where his or her state is unrecognised and at the mercy of much bigger global forces. A Moldovan, Georgian or Greek Cypriot feels the insecurity of seeing a territory under the control of hostile forces. In governmentcontrolled Azerbaijan, Cyprus and Georgia, a displaced person or refugee born in the de facto state and unable to return home there watches as his or her homeland is defined as the national state of others. As in all conflicts, the dysfunction, mutual punishment and uncertainty are likely to endure as long as the two sides fail to identify a common strategic interest in working together to resolve it. When there is progress, the de facto states will reveal more of their hidden agendas and buried identities, shed some of their more radical posturing, and begin to diverge more strongly from one another. Some of them will surely disappear altogether. That idea could be an integration project – the most likely eventual outcome for Cyprus and Moldova. It could be a civilised divorce, which ends up in a confederation or even managed secession, as in Kosovo, so long as it honours the rights of displaced persons who lost their homes. Currently, the reality of these places is sustained by an idea that was born in conflict. They continue to produce postage stamps and sculpt war memorials in a protracted response to that violent rupture in the past. Another stronger new idea is needed for that reality to change. Thomas de Waal is a senior associate with Carnegie Europe, specialising in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region.

New separatisms Or what could happen if the West disappeared from Eastern Europe? ZIE M O W IT SZC Z E R E K

In Central and Eastern Europe, the West used to play a revolutionary role while Russia was that of a reactionary usurper. Today, the West has been hoisted by its own petard and the roles of the two powers in the region have reversed. The West was once the defender and champion of the rights for those who suffered from unfavourable geopolitical arrangements after the Second World War. At least, it played this role in the territories where it competed with the Soviet Union and later the post-Soviet autocracies which emerged after the post-Cold War chaos of the 1990s. The West helped bring down communism in the region and its remains which were trying to survive in Russia and Serbia. It defended the rights of Kosovo’s Albanians, Muslim Bosniaks and Croats attacked by Serbs. Before that it was the main defender of the residents of the Eastern bloc, and all the nations that wanted to free themselves from Soviet rule. Today, the situation is entirely different. The legend and semblance of the rebel, which acts against a deeply conserved and outdated order, has now been taken up by Russia. In this role the Kremlin tries to disrupt, if not destroy (which is impossible), the systems that were established by the West. Russia can only abuse this order because it knows, all too well, that compared to the West its resources and capacities are limited. However, it has proved that revolutionary tactics suit it perfectly well. In the eyes of those who are not particularly happy with the western order, Russia plays the same role now that the West played in the past.

Opinion and Analysis

New separatisms, Ziemowit Szczerek Apostle of freedom

While Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were hammering the Soviet Union – which was already on the edge of collapse – Russia tried to respond by taking action against the states created by the West. It managed to break Transnistria away from Moldova (together with the majority Russian-speaking population), and almost succeeded in doing the same in Gagauzia. The latter is inhabited by the Turkishspeaking population whose ethnic flag was carried – just like in Transnistria – by the Russian-speaking “Soviet people”. They could not accept the Moldovan order and saw an embodiment of nationalism in the ethnic profile of the new state. In Lithuania, Moscow tried to repeat the same scenario with regards to the Polish-speaking minority. However, the Polish National-Territorial Region, envisioned as an autonomous region in south eastern Lithuania that self-proclaimed in 1990, did not receive the Polish government’s support. At that time Poland was governed by the first non-communist elite, representing the more liberal wing of the former democratic opposition that adhered to western ideals. Yet, in Lithuania the Polish National-Territorial Region, which never gained much popularity in Poland, is still perceived as a missed opportunity of the pro-Russian, Polish minority. In the 1990s, the West was the apostle of freedom for many in Eastern Europe. In the name of western ideals, countries like Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia proclaimed their independence. Western values were also well received in the western parts of Ukraine, which became the engine for Ukraine’s independence. They also played a role in the former Yugoslavia when the Serbs first started interfering with some of the other Yugoslav republics which ultimately led Serb war crimes. The West stood against the Serbs, supporting the Bosniaks, Croats and later the Kosovo Albanians. In this way, the West played the role of the revolutionary, supporting the destruction of the existing order and the establishment of new independent states in place of the former Yugoslav federal republics. In the case of Kosovo, which was not a federal republic, the West had no choice but to support the separatists. Eventually, it recognised the Republic of Kosovo even though it was based on the excuse that Kosovo was a “special case”. Such statements were made with a heavy heart and it was probably expected that the Kosovo precedent would bring many problems for western institutions in the future. The West, however, refused to recognise other breakaway territories like Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and (at the time) Adjara. After having recognised Kosovo’s independence, the West hardened its position. It announced that no more “Pandora’s boxes” would be opened and no borders would change. Hence, Kosovo was not to be joined by the Serbian Preševo Valley (inhabited by Albanians), southern Montenegro or north-eastern Macedonia.

New separatisms, Ziemowit Szczerek

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Northern Kosovo, which is located north of the Ibar River and mostly inhabited by Serbs, was also to stay in Kosovo, while Bosnia and Herzegovina, created under western aegis, was not under any circumstances to be separated from its Serbian part, Republika Srpska – despite the fact that it hardly made any sense to maintain the status quo against the will of the majority of the populations living there. Against Pax Occidentalis When Russia recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence from Georgia, and when it annexed Crimea and supported the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics in Ukraine, it had everything prepared. By doing so it has gently suggested to Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo that if the need arises, it may also support their aspirations against Pax Americana (or more broadly, Pax Occidentalis). Admittedly, the West makes it easy for the Kremlin in places like Central Europe, which is still one of the most important geopolitical games that Russia plays. Not only does the region condition the Kremlin’s position in its relations with the West, Russia is also deeply rooted here and it knows the context very well. Russia knows how it can damage western interests, despite its limited resources. Russia also understands the West’s weaknesses. It knows when it is best to hit, like when it made an offer to Budapest Central Europe to help Hungary regain control over Ukraine’s Zakar- is still one of the pattia region (formerly Carpathian Ruthenia) which most important has a significant Hungarian minority. Russia recognises the Hungarian humiliation still geopolitical games felt since the 1920 Trianon Treaty that was imposed that Russia plays. by the West and deprived Hungary a significant part of the territory (including Zakarpattia). Consequently, Hungary lost its strong position in Central Europe. Russia also knows that anyone who manages to reverse (even to a small degree) the effects of Trianon will be seen in Hungary as a saviour on a white horse. Naturally, it is also acutely aware of the separatist tendencies in Zakarpattia. They are both pro-Russian and pro-Hungarian. Thus, the proposal addressed to Hungarians to “partition” Ukraine at a time when Ukraine was struggling to keep its pro-western vector was a genius move. However, not all of Russia’s hits are well targeted. Russia misfired when it allegedly offered Poland a chunk of western Ukraine. With this proposal, the Kremlin did not take into account the fact that in Poland nostalgia for its former territories in the East (Kresy) is much weaker than assumed. It also plays no role in Poland’s foreign policy.

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New separatisms, Ziemowit Szczerek

But there have been successful hits. One clear example can be seen in Republika Srpska where the majority of Serbs do not want to share a state with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina is made up of two entities that do not have much in common, yet this is the system imposed on it by the West. The West, in turn, demands that before Bosnia is generously accepted to the European table, something unlikely must happen, namely unification. Russia is more realistic in this regards. It knows that unification cannot take place under the current circumstances. It also knows that even if there would be some kind of miraculous, peaceful co-existence between the two entities of the federation, it would mean stagnation and a blunt existence. Thus by supporting Bosnia’s division, Russia guarantees itself a permanent foot in the European doorway, all against the West’s well-intentioned, albeit completely unrealistic, plan. The situation is quite similar in Northern Kosovo. Kosovo Serbs, whose territory borders Serbia proper, do not understand why they should be living in a state

New separatisms, Ziemowit Szczerek

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that is ethnically and religiously foreign (and often hostile) to them, and not within the borders of their own homeland. From their point of view, they are forced into this situation for an abstract reason. The Serbian-Kosovo border was marked along old administrative borders that did not depict any real ethnic relations in the region. Thus, in Northern Ko- In Northern Kosovo sovo Russia is viewed again as a country that can give Russia is viewed support and hope. again as a country In Macedonia, Russia supports right-wing parties. The EU, which is more attractive for the country than that can give Russia, does not fully understand the complexities of support and hope. Macedonia’s identity issues. Macedonia has a tense relationship with Greece (a member of both the EU and NATO) which has blocked its access to the West for some delusional reasons related to the country’s name. What is more, Russia recognises Macedonians’ fear related to the growing number of Albanians settling there. Serbia, currently whipped and constantly preached to by the West, experienced a sense of humiliation. A move to join the EU is often seen there as a sad necessity. The pro-European left and liberal narrative is interpreted as being self-serving – this is not just the opinion of a paranoid political right. Russia understands Serbia and skilfully nudges the areas that divide Serbs and the West. Double standards Treating Eastern Europe as a problem and questioning whether it was a good idea to let the countries of the former Eastern bloc join the West only reinforces the Russian narrative. The liberal and leftist, pro-Western circles in Eastern Europe (yes, we still have them here; in fact, the highest support for populist parties in countries like Poland is at a similar level to France or the Netherlands) know very well that they need the West. It is thanks to the West that countries in this region can reach the economic and modernisation goals they desire. However, from the point of view of Eastern Europeans it is easy to see that the West employs double standards. This is evident by the fact that far-right groups in Western Europe are devalued, while similar groups in Central and Eastern Europe are used to argue “disappointment” and emphasise the presence of widespread racism in the region. Such indictments are launched without much examination of the root causes behind the current situation; and if continued it could inevitably lead to a collapse of the European project as a whole. The latter, if it happens, will not be just the West’s fault. It will be strongly aided by the Kremlin’s narrative.

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New separatisms, Ziemowit Szczerek

Looking at European matters from the perspective of “what can the East give to the West” is a naïveté. The East is a periphery while the West is a centre. Thus, the right approach to a partnership-based common Europe – assuming the West does not want to lose Central and Eastern Europe – should be based on supporting the periphery’s drift towards the centre. This support should especially go to sensible economic initiatives that would allow Eastern European states pursue their own forms of development. Only by doing this will the West stop adding more fuel to local populists and the Kremlin. Without the West? What would the region look like if the West withdrew from the region – both militarily and politically? In lieu of the West, comes Russia. This spectre is permanently haunting the region. It may not be the most powerful one but it is a significant one nonetheless. Certainly, Russia would allow Serbia to take northern parts of Kosovo; it would aid the collapse of Bosnia and encourage Republika Srpska to join Belgrade. The remaining parts of Bosnia, Kosovo and probably Albania would turn into artificially maintained countries located on the region’s periphery, which would remain in constant peril. Russia would turn a It is certain that blind eye to the pacification of Albanians by Macedonia. the Kremlin would Without the West, the Kremlin could even back exploit the minorities Hungarians against Romania, which is (like Poland) traditional supporter of the West and unfriendly in Hungary, Slovenia atowards Russia. The Hungarian minority, especially and Serbia in the Székelys who live in Transylvania, could start deorder for them to manding autonomy. In the new geopolitical context, could even start talking about independence and act as satellites. they a return to Hungary. Russia would most likely support these demands. While it is unclear which side Russia would support in a dispute between Hungary, Slovenia and Serbia, it is certain that the Kremlin would exploit the Hungarian minorities in those countries in order for them to act as satellites. In this scenario Hungary and Serbia (who currently happen to be friends, Serbia’s Vucić and Hungary’s Orbán have a model-like friendship) are geopolitically doomed for conflict, if they are to be governed by nationalists. The same could be said about Poland and Ukraine. Should the populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) come to power at the time as the West withdraws from Eastern Europe, German irredentism could become an issue in Poland’s western parts. Such a move would probably be backed by

New separatisms, Ziemowit Szczerek

Opinion and Analysis

Russia, which would, most likely, have a decent relationship with an AfD government. It is of course difficult, if not impossible, to imagine Germany claiming these territories, yet it should not be ruled out that the issue could be used to generate tension with Poland. Eastern Europe may not always feel the most comfortable with the West. Yet without it, things would look much worse. This is the most important point to understand, but it is also important that the West, while playing its games with the East, should remember not to shoot itself (or us) in the foot. Translated by Iwona Reichardt Ziemowit Szczerek is a Polish writer and journalist. He is the author of numerous books on Eastern and Central Europe. His recent book Międzymorze (Intermarium) was published in 2017.

How to set up your own para-state PAW E Ł PIE NIĄ Ż E K

Reflecting on the recent examples of para-state-building, it raises the question how possible is it to build a new entity that would survive the tumultuous winds of history. As history suggests, in order to emerge and endure para-states need to follow a well-trodden path to independence and several simple rules.

The 1980s saw the gradual erosion of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia which, in consequence, led to the disintegration of both states. As they began to burst at the seams, a wave of armed conflicts swept through these territories with different groups looking to regain control over disputed lands. Within the former Soviet republics, separatist entities began to declare independence. In the 1990s alone, ten para-states emerged in the former Soviet bloc, out of which four have survived to this day. The most recent additions to the list of unrecognised states include the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics which came into being in 2014 as a result of the war in east Ukraine. Reflecting on past examples of para-state building efforts raises the question how one goes about creating a new entity that would survive the tumultuous winds of history. What follows is a guide on how to create a lasting state from scratch. Preparing for the “zero hour” First rule: all aspiring founders of a para-state should find a vulnerable region. Each country has an area that is distinct and does not match the rest – it is the

How to set up your own para-state, Paweł Pieniążek

Opinion and Analysis

weakest link. Differences can be based on language, religion, ethnic makeup, as well as economic, social, political or historical background. Each of the above can serve as a nucleus for a brand new identity. Second rule: Build a narrative. If you have already found at least one feature which distinguishes your region you can start to come up with new differences. It can even be something far-fetched – something that people do not think about in their daily lives. One example would be a popular type of livelihood in the region, some local natural resource, or even a special type of plant that is unique to the region. What is important is A government to turn these differences into an advantage and, at the legitimacy crisis same time, emphasise the discrimination people have is always a good experienced based on their distinct position. Nostalgia is also very important for the narrative. occasion for The desire to return to the past – or, more precise- separatist forces ly, its ideological reinterpretation – is a factor driv- to secede. ing many societies in the world. Slogans like “Make [insert country name] great again”, “We won’t kneel down in front of anyone”, and its twin “Rising from our knees” have always had a mobilising power as the postulate of regaining dignity is part of every revolt. A glorious past, grievances and the promise to regain greatness are major keys to success. Before the “zero hour” comes, you need to have visuals ready. Flags, symbols and the image of a strongman leader are always a great start. He – it is nearly always a he – should have a threatening but approachable face that people would fear and admire at the same time. The visuals have to be easy to identify with – they can be attached to cars and balconies, displayed on windows or printed on t-shirts. Local musicians – some out of honest dedication, others because of opportunism – will eagerly write songs glorifying the fight, resistance and pride that everyone can sing and play loudly. Third rule: Take advantage of an upheaval. A government legitimacy crisis is always a good occasion for separatist forces to secede or for other states to mobilise separatist movements, often a one-off opportunity. This can be a mass protest, preferably a revolution or war, in which the government side is losing. Seizing the opportunity becomes even easier now as – according to Dominic Tierney, a professor at Swarthmore College and author of a number of books on US war involvement – almost 90 per cent of new conflicts are civil wars. Intrastate revolutions and crises successfully destroy institutions and thus the reach and effectiveness of the state. This is when separatists, equipped with arms, can turn against weakened government forces; and if the state is weak enough, they can take control without a fight.

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How to set up your own para-state, Paweł Pieniążek Taking over

Fourth rule: find a big brother. Unless you have been sent by a foreign power to create a puppet regime, it is important to have the support of an influential state in advance. Ideally, the separatist region would share a border with this state. It makes logistics easier for transporting troops – especially in case the big brother does not want to openly manifest its support – and providing all kinds of goods once the new state is subject to a blockade. Help from abroad can prove to be crucial when the adversary has a significant military advantage – for example, when they have an air force and the separatists do not. In that case, anti-aircraft weapons are needed. Then it is time to take control of the territory. This is when a stall for time begins. Remember that the government will eventually get back on its feet, and again claim rights to the whole country. Therefore, the operation has to be well-planned and effective. Everything depends on the existing armed forces or the still forming “people’s resistance”. They should quickly take control of the local branches of the security apparatus: police stations, military bases and armouries, then the rest of the state sector. Armed fighters should quickly install checkpoints so that “undesirable elements” do not sneak into the newly formed state. With time, thanks to the checkpoints, the separatists will be able not only to control the territory but also make a living; for example, by introducing customs or fees for crossing. If the new government does not despise corruption, every border and control point will be a jackpot. Unrecognised and partially-recognised states which came into being on the territory of the former Eastern bloc 1990 – 1994

Gagauzia (currently autonomous region of Moldova)

1990 –

Pridniestrovian Moldovian Republic (aka, Transnistria, Moldova has claims)

1991 – 2000

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (currently the Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation)

1991 – 1992

The Dubrovnik Republic (currently part of Croatia)

1991 –

Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (currently known as Republic of Arstakh, Azerbaijan has claims)

1991 – 1995

Republic of Serbian Krajina (currently part of Croatia)

1991 –

Republic of South Ossetia (Georgia has claims)

1992 – 1995

Republika Srpska (currently part of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

1993 – 1995

Republic of Western Bosnia (currently part of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

1999 –

Republic of Abkhazia (Georgia has claims)

2008 –

Kosovo (Serbia has claims)

2014 –

Donetsk People’s Republic (Ukraine has claims)

2014 –

Luhansk People’s Republic (Ukraine has claims)

2014 –

Republic of Crimea (just after declaring independence was annexed by Russia, Ukraine has claims)

How to set up your own para-state, Paweł Pieniążek

Opinion and Analysis

The next step is to build a loyal media network, for the new state needs its propaganda machine. Traditional media still has the greatest impact on local populations so it has to become the first target. Shortly after that, they will need to focus on the internet which will enable access to the cause’s sympathisers around the world. It will influence public opinion and perhaps even encourage foreign fighters to join the struggle. If some countries supporting our rebels also speak the same language, the issue is simple. They need to cut off the signals of television channels and radio stations of the previous host country and redirect the waves to their own media. But this is only part of the process. The new “people’s government” will have to create its own mass media so that every citizen knows who rules in the area. Following such an intense media bombardment, the level of support for the new authorities and hate towards the old ones will significantly rise, and those few still criticising the takeover of power will either quieten down or begin to doubt everything they hear and see. Propaganda makes the impossible possible. Prisons may be packed, but democracy will be flourishing as those imprisoned are all agents and spies – often recruited by foreign regimes – or extremists and terrorists. Martial law can still be considered temporary although no one is planning to end it within the next several years (or longer). Are fighters using civilians as human shields to hide their tanks? Propaganda will explain that innocent civilians were perfidiously shelled by enemy weapons. Building the state Now comes the time to create the institutions. These are crucial and will allow the new entity to create an efficient para-state system, enjoying popular support. First, the new government will be interested in the security apparatus, especially the security services. The number of external enemies will only be topped by the number of internal ones. That is, plotters looking for an occasion to become slightly eccentric life-long leaders, beloved by the crowds, who will go down in history of the new state and, above all, make a lot of money. Other services such as waste collection, maintaining infrastructure, working schools and hospitals are also important. It is these institutions that will convince those most resistant that, in the end, it is not so bad. It is easy to preserve the continuity of institutions. Many bureaucrats working for local administrations will happily change the flags and placards on their office doors and continue their work uninterrupted. The next step is to legitimise the power. By this time, everything should more or less be working – the media support the government, and the electoral commission

Opinion and Analysis

How to set up your own para-state, Paweł Pieniążek

is as loyal as a personal guard. Therefore, it is time to formally legitimise the new reality. If the para-state is to pretend to be a democracy, it is good to begin with an independence referendum so that nobody can claim that the people did not want it. Then the leader has to receive legitimacy. It is simple: all it takes is to hang posters with the face of the new ruler and to have him featured in almost every news story; and to ban any potentially threatening political opponents from taking part in the election. At the same time, no serious contender will be allowed to run an election campaign. The citizens will soon believe that Nothing creates a they cannot live without their beloved leader and that sense of community they owe him everything. will also need a cult of victimhood, as nothas much as injustice. ingYou creates a sense of community as much as injustice. While earlier it could have been imaginary, after the first clashes with government forces, concrete examples now exist to back up the narrative. Having victims who sacrificed their lives for the new entity will strengthen the foundations of the community and will take the conflict to a higher level. Finally, the new authorities have to give the inhabitants what they were lacking under the former rule. It will cross the Ts and dot the Is. It is time to realise some of the promises that have brought the separatist movement into existence. Effective institutions are a strong asset, but what is needed is righting earlier wrongs. If people used to complain about high bills, you need to lower them. If they were forced to do something, you need to force them to do the opposite thing. Give the citizens the sense that they have acquired something that has long been beyond their reach. Now, the only thing that is left is for the new government of the unrecognised state to hope that the big brother will not abandon it and will be generously contributing sacks of money to the state budget. Or that it will not immerse into a crisis similar to the one which helped bring to life the self-proclaimed state. Translated by Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska Paweł Pieniążek is a Polish journalist based in Syria. He has reported on the protests in Russia, the Ukrainian EuroMaidan revolution, the war in Donbas, the refugee crisis, and the Kurds’ fight against the Islamic State. His book, Greetings from Novorossiya, was recently published in English.

Donbas coal bonanza M ICH A Ł PO T O C K I

The self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics operate in line with mafia rules. The extraction, export and sale of coal – the region’s key resource – have helped the two para-states survive. It has also become a fuel for local power struggles, all under the blind eye of the European Union. The self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR, LNR) are often compared to Transnistria, another unrecognised quasi-state supported by Moscow and used as a tool to destabilise Moldova. Such a comparison, however, is a mistake. Transnistria – to put things simply – is organised around the Transnistrian business conglomerate Sheriff, which controls the majority of companies, some government agencies and local political parties. In contrast, the DNR and LNR, covering one-third of Ukraine’s Donets Black Coal Basin, operate according to mafia rules. This is an important point to keep in mind while analysing the functioning of the economy of the para-states. The story of the coal mines belonging to Rinat Akhmetov’s holding, which were taken over by the separatists at the beginning of 2017, is the best illustration of the situation. Akhmetov, who hails from the Donets Black Coal Basin, is the wealthiest Ukrainian and in his best period was the richest oligarch in the former Soviet Union. For years the oligarch, with a dark past and Tatar roots, had concentrated his political activity on Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions. He was its sponsor and one of its de facto general managers. From de facto recognition to blockade When in 2014 Yanukovych fled the country under pressure from the protesting Ukrainians, Akhmetov engaged in a risky game which could have cost him dearly.

Opinion and Analysis

Donbas coal bonanza, Michał Potocki

On the one hand, sitting in his byzantine mansion in Donetsk’s botanical garden, he called for Ukraine’s unity. On the other, he quietly supported the pro-Russian separatist movements. He hoped they would become controllable leverage allowing him to maintain a powerful position in the new post-Maidan Ukraine where calls for controls over oligarchic wealth were still ripe. In time, it turned out that the new Kyiv government had not seriously considered its own calls for deoligarchisation and Akhmetov began to negotiate with Petro Poroshenko, the president elected in May 2014 in the wake of the protests. At the same time the separatists controlled by Russia, while still protecting his mansion from plunder, gradually became a burden for Akhmetov. Today, the deal with Poroshenko is clear and it seems that Akhmetov will quietly support the president’s re-election efforts. One of the reasons is Akhmetov’s expulsion from Donetsk. His companies on the separatist territories initially operated in a double legal regime. The mines were outside of Ukraine’s control, yet they paid taxes to Kyiv and paid its workers in hryvnia (Ukraine’s national currency); the extracted coal was sent to Ukraine and foreign markets as a Ukrainian product, while the mine’s management was fully controlled by the holding’s centre in Kyiv. As the political scientist Oleksandr Nykonorov, a leading expert on Donbas separatism who died in a tragic car accident in September 2017, explained to me, Russia limited the operational freedom of the self-proclaimed authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk to smaller companies. These were plundered by the commanders of various pro-Russian armed and paramilitary units in the initial phase of the conflict. The big businesses, on the contrary, enjoyed Moscow’s protection and, as the German Bild reported, Akhmetov’s representative even took part in the sessions of the Russian secret “government” for Donbas. The situation changed in 2017, when the government in Kyiv, under pressure from the right-wing opposition, established a trade embargo with the occupiedDonets Black Coal Basin. Earlier, when the blockade was still being advocated by activists and did not enjoy the government’s support, the separatists requested – with a green light from the Kremlin – that all factories operating on their territory pay taxes to the separatist budget. When Akhmetov refused, his mines were stormed by armed men who announced they were taking control of his companies. Complex web At the same time, however, the management of the mines was transferred to the Luhansk branch of Vneshtorgservis. The company is registered in Tskhinvali –

Donbas coal bonanza, Michał Potocki

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South Ossetia’s capital – and is commonly associated with Serhiy Kurchenko. In Yanukovych’s times, Kurchenko was known as the president’s banker, one of the young wolves in his circle who ruthlessly took control of different sectors of the economy. After Yanukovych’s fall, Kurchenko moved to Moscow but never stopped doing business in Donbas. South Ossetia is not an accidental location. Since 2008 Russia has recognised it as an independent state. The rest of the world – excluding Nauru, Nicaragua and Venezuela – treats it as a breakaway Georgian province. But having a pariah status in international affairs has its advantages. In no other place could Kurchenko have set up such a busi- Vladislav Surkov ness. And that is why South Ossetia is the only place admitted the crucial in the world that recognised the independence of the importance of South DNR and LNR. Besides Vneshtorgservis, Tskhinvali hosts another Ossetia in opening key institution for the separatists: the Mezhdunarodny the DNR and LNR Rashchyotny Bank. Separatist companies have their to the world. accounts in this bank, through which they finalise transactions. South Ossetian officials publically acknowledge the bank’s purpose while Vladislav Surkov – the Kremlin’s curator of the separatists – admitted the crucial importance of South Ossetia in opening the DNR and LNR to the world. The chain is simple. South Ossetia recognises the republics in order to do business and trade with them. Russia recognises South Ossetia so it can do there what it cannot openly do in Donetsk and Luhansk. On a note, Russia has not recognised the independence of the DNR and LNR. Through Tskhinvali, the money earned by the self-proclaimed republics are legalised within the Russian banking system. Recently, it has been suggested that this go-between also may work the other way round and Russia may start sending weapons to Donbas through South Ossetia. In the meantime, the captured mining companies are being overexploited. Workers are occasionally paid with vouchers for the workplace cafeteria and there is no proper maintenance of the mines, which leads to a high risk of damage and even crumbling throughout Donbas. The coal that is mined is transported to Russia and further re-exported with the profits going into the pockets of Kurchenko and the separatist officials such as Oleksandr Melnychuk, the former vice minister of fuel, energy and coal industry of the LNR. Melnychuk, largely unknown before the war, together with his brother and associates created a network of companies over a short time, registered them all over the world from Cyprus, Hong Kong, Saint Kitts and Nevis, to Poland, the United Kingdom, Russia, Ukraine and the LNR. Their businesses have one aim: to facilitate the sale and export of Donbas anthracite or hard coal.

Opinion and Analysis

Donbas coal bonanza, Michał Potocki

The coal is transported to the Russian port city of Rostov-on-Don, or by train located at the Russian-Ukrainian border. From the port it goes by ship to Georgia, Romania or Turkey. By rail, it is transported through Russia and Belarus and later to Poland and further West to several other EU countries like Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Italy. An investigation that we carried out in Poland together with my colleague Karolina Baca-Pogorzelska The separatists exploit and published with the Polish daily Dziennik Gazeta found that several companies’ boards officially the fact that in the EU Prawna include people connected with the separatists; not only there are no mines Melnychuk, but also the head of the local structures with anthracite. of the Donetsk Republic organisation in Shakhtarsk, which plays the role of the ruling party in the DNR. Initially, the coal entered foreign markets as a Ukrainian product. Later, certificates marked the country of origin as unknown. Recently, Russia has been increasingly appearing on the certificates. The separatists exploit the fact that in the EU there are no mines with anthracite – a type of coal used mainly in industry – and thus there are no tariffs and little regulations related to its import. Formally, the EU has not introduced an embargo on trade with the separatists, although some legal experts point out that such practices are in breach of the ban for financing separatist organisations. The Polish authorities and the European Commission explain the shady imports with the lack of embargo. Ukraine launched a criminal case against the sales. But the most decisive reaction came from the United States. In January and February 2017, Melnychuk and some of his companies, including the Poland-registered Doncoaltrade, were added to the list of people and businesses subject to sanctions. Their assets were frozen and they can no longer export to the US. Melnychuk himself was banned from entering the country. If there was political will, the EU could have done the same, if only at Poland’s request. For the time being, however, there is no will, neither in Brussels nor in Warsaw. Struggle for influence Melnychuk discarded his shares in the Ugolnye Tekhnologii company, which was the main anthracite exporter until Kurchenko’s companies began to dominate the market. The Russian government oversaw the operation. The person responsible for the process was the vice minister of economic development, Sergey Nazarov, who was born in Gukovo, at the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nazarov also heads the Russian inter-departmental commission co-ordinating humanitarian aid to Donbas.

Donbas coal bonanza, Michał Potocki

Opinion and Analysis

The press officer of the economic development ministry acknowledged in an interview with Dziennik Gazeta Prawna that the government in Moscow aids the DNR and LNR in exporting their products abroad. Nazarov himself openly talked to Bloomberg about the volumes of coal re-exported this way. However, the question of what share of the profits from the trade returns to the separatist budgets and how much is appropriated by the company owners remains unanswered. According to Ukrainian officials, coal sales account for 60 per cent of the selfproclaimed republics’ income. Journalists working for such media as Ukrainian Novoye vremya, Liga.biznes.net and Russian Novaya gazeta, reported that those overseeing the process shared the profits for each tonne of Luhansk coal sold with then LNR leader, Ihor Plotnytsky. There is no evidence to suggest that the old rules have changed. After several months of Leonid Pasichnyk’s rule, his associates should have taken control of at least part of the coal trade profits. The struggle for influence in the economy is often brutal. In 2015 the Luhansk secret services physically assaulted the minister for fuel, energy and coal industry, Dmytro Lyamin. As people familiar with the case reveal, Lyamin did not want to grant the representatives of power structures access to the financial flows from the anthracite trade. Officially, the reason was his alleged links to Ukrainian authorities. The “detention” was recorded and broadcast by separatist media.

Opinion and Analysis

Donbas coal bonanza, Michał Potocki

In February this year, the DNR conducted even more arrests. Twenty-two officials were detained, including Eduard Holenko, the minister for energy. The official reason was corruption, but the nature of both regimes suggests that someone influential must have become interested in the profits from the coal trade. According to the DNR’s official data, industrial production fell by 70 per cent between 2013 and 2015, while coal extraction decreased by 67 per cent between 2013 and 2016. In all of this, these conflicts will continue to exacerbate as the share of the pie is diminishing due to bad management and lack of investment. Translated by Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska. Michał Potocki is the op-ed editor of the Polish daily Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. He is the co-author of two books about contemporary Ukraine: Wilki żyją poza prawem. Jak Janukowycz przegrał Ukrainę (Wolves Live Outside the Law. HowYanukovych Lost Ukraine) and Kryształowy fortepian. Zdrady i zwycięstwa Petra Poroszenki (The Crystal Piano. Betrayals and Victories of Petro Poroshenko).

Culture in a conflicted region A N T O N O CH I R O V

The Republic of Abkhazia is a partially-recognised small state located in the South Caucasus between the Russian and Georgia. In 2014 the first contemporary art initiative of its kind emerged here – the cultural project SKLAD.

The history of Abkhazia is complex, multifaceted and quite dramatic. A small area on the Black Sea, historically located between the large empires: Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman and Russian. This explains the multi-ethnic population living in this subtropical coastal zone, the numerous historical and cultural monuments and international trade, but also the number of conflicts. The most recent conflict was the Georgian-Abkhaz War of 1992 – 93, the result of which was the declaration of independence by the former as an autonomous republic. Those events, directly related to the collapse of the Soviet Union, are known in the republic as the Patriotic War of the People of Abkhazia. As a result of the war, Abkhazia, an economically developed territory in the Soviet era, suffered considerable damage. It experienced serious destruction of infrastructure, an outflow of the population and an international blockade. The blockade from the Russians was eased only in the early 2000s. In 2008 the Russian Federation recognised the independence of Abkhazia (other states who recognise Abkhazia include Venezuela, Nicaragua and the island nation of Nauru). Nevertheless, Abkhazia remains unrecognised on the international level due to the policies of the United States and the European Union, who declare support for the territorial integrity of Georgia.

Opinion and Analysis

Culture in a conflicted region, Anton Ochirov Origins

Once a place of active cultural, intellectual, scientific and commercial exchange, Abkhazia reduced its cultural activities after the war. For more than 15 years there was not a single cinema in the republic; the “houses of culture” (doma kultury) built throughout the 20th century remained closed in the villages, and neighbouring Georgia made it difficult for Abkhazian artists to travel abroad. Gradually the country restored its cultural potential. The Abkhazian Theatre put on its performances in St Petersburg, various music festivals took place in Sokhumi (the capital of the republic) and renowned international opera stars visited the country. Yet the number of international cultural ties and contacts remain small and they are mainly limited to Russia. In 2014 a project called “Young artists of Abkhazia / young artists of Basel (Switzerland)” took place in Abkhazia. The author of the project and the organiser of the visit of a group of students from Switzerland to Abkhazia was Dagmar Reichert, a professor at Zurich University of Arts. In November of 2014, a group of six Abkhaz artists visited Basel, where another joint exhibition was held. “The gallery where our exhibition took place was part of the programme Regionale 15 and hundreds of people came to the opening. The artworks turned out to be very diverse with classical paintings, graphics and photos, as well as many different installations and videos. The Swiss approached Artas Foundation the Abkhazian theme in a very sensitive way and their believes art is a own works were even nostalgic. Particularly impressive the audio installation based on Abkhazian songs, human need and was translated into three languages. It reminded all of us could be a uniting of our home and introduced another culture and the activity in post- oldest language to a Swiss audience,” said Tatiana Erconflict areas. gunova, a participant of the exhibition and the future curator of the SKLAD initiative. The Zurich-based Artas Foundation (opened in 2011) is a Swiss non-profit foundation specialising in art in conflict regions. The foundation conducts the postgraduate programme called “Art and International Cooperation” at the Zurich University of Arts, and perceives art as a purely peacekeeping cultural practice. The foundation believes art is a human need and could be a uniting activity in post-conflict areas. In the context of co-operation with the Zurich fund, the SKLAD cultural space appeared on the map of Sukhumi in October 2015. It hosted the First Exhibition of Contemporary Art in Abkhazia (“The Circumstances of Place and Time”) and was the third joint exhibition of Abkhaz and Swiss artists. The exhibition space was

Culture in a conflicted region, Anton Ochirov

Opinion and Analysis

originally a warehouse of the Abkhazian Theatre – where the name of the space comes from (the English word for SKLAD is “warehouse”). Initially, it seemed like only one exhibition would be held there. But gradually the renting of the space became long-term. The Artas Foundation helped raise funds to pay for the rent of the SKLAD cultural site, and it has now existed for more than two and a half years. “We found a convenient place, invited several artists to participate, got support from friends and art lovers, gathered materials and equipment from everywhere, cleaned up the hall ourselves and practically without any budget created this event,” the curator of the exhibition Asida Butba said. In search of something new The initial feedback was not as expected. The audience, which understands art in a traditional way, failed to comprehend the presented works and perceived them as unprofessional and strange. Some pieces turned out to be too problematic for the perception of the Abkhazian audience, as they allude to unhealed wounds connected with issues of borders, disputed territories and wars. On the other hand, the exhibition space with its contradictory, emotional, chaotic, diverse and free creativity, turned out to be quite attractive to some visitors. The curators said that many visitors came to spend their free time here. “The free creativity of this exhibition that many of the visitors did not like made it possible to speak without censure. When artists works show only the objects that are in line with one institution or a certain viewpoint, it is hard to imagine how the cultural process can go any further,” said Butba. “I think there are a number of young people who are sick of using this ‘archaic’ language, but there is no other language. They are not criminals and they do not want to be businessmen, but they have nowhere to go. There are some thoughtful people who do not adhere to any particular direction: artists who need a certain environment.” Some works at the exhibition deserve special attention, for instance, Borderlands, the work of a young Swiss anthropologist named Aron Rossman-Kiss. His piece was a 12-minute slideshow of photographs taken during trips to border regions of different countries. The Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian border, the Greek-Turkish border, the borders of Kosovo, Cyprus and Kurdistan, the borders of the refugee camps in Greece and Bulgaria – they were all painfully similar to each other. “The main thing I learnt from this project is an even greater reassurance that art is very broad and we must not stick to one framework. We must understand that apart from painting and sculpture, there are other tools, forms and ways of

Opinion and Analysis

Culture in a conflicted region, Anton Ochirov

expression that can also get to the feelings of a person,” said Beslan Tarba, a young Abkhazian artist. At the end of 2015, a second exhibition opened at SKLAD. It was a personal exhibition of the Sukhumi sculptor, artist and personal puppet theatre master named Arkhip “Sipa” Labakhua. Labakhua is known for a series of charming urban sculptures depicting the characters of Abkhazian writer Fazil Iskander. These sculptures fit organically into the space of Sukhumi and are major tourist attractions. The ideas of Labakhua’s exhibition, however, were ambiguous: the artist’s playing with a half-empty hall, different lighting sources, mannequins, small graphic sheets and space-unifying theatricalised symbolic game passed unnoticed in the mass media. Perceptions The 2016 exhibitions at SKLAD were largely determined by the proposals of the Swiss partners. The projects were mostly interactive and playful and were connected both to the social and communicative functions of art (“Caution, painted!”) and to various game practices within the art field (“Outdoor Games”). The project “Institute of the Visionauts”, implemented in co-operation with the Berlin architectural bureau Raumlabor, should be particularly highlighted. This project included research in the sphere of urban environment. It included interactive dream mapping with the participation of Sukhumi residents as well as artistic intervention in the urban space. For a few days, the half-abandoned Guma railway station in the centre of the city was turned into a laboratory of utopian practices. Paradoxically, the project became rather controversial, pointing out problematic issues of perception. Many citizens really thought that all those dreams about a better city they shared with the Berlin architects would come true and were disappointed to find out that it was only art. At the same time, SKLAD is quite active online. It is present on many social media sites. People can subscribe to the mailing list and SKLAD’s website has pages in English. Yet it is still quite difficult to get accurate feedback. It is often unclear what exactly attracts or repels visitors. Throughout its existence, SKLAD has performed a kind of field experiment – even when it did not have enough resources or manpower to analyse and record the results. People who work with SKLAD do it without any payment. So the initiative also takes on the peculiar role of the school of “cultural urban activism.” In 2017 the international residence for artists was opened at SKLAD. For the first time the Republic of Abkhazia appeared in international artistic and cultural databases. The curators of SKLAD, unexpectedly for themselves, received a storm

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Opinion and Analysis

of applications from around the world, including Western Europe, the US, New Zealand, Canada, Hong Kong, Thailand and Russia. In total, there were more than 100 applications. Unfortunately, due to the current financial and organisational limitations only two participants could have been chosen. The SKLAD programme could not cover travel expenses for the participants, and they only provided assistance during their stay in the country, such as an interpreter, transportation, exhibition space, assistance in obtaining a visa and organising artistic events. Nevertheless, such a high interest in the country leads to a curious and even critical look at the activities of the Abkhaz authorities. The importance of broad international recognition is declared as a core priority of the country, yet it is not easy for outsiders to come to the country. This is not just because of bureaucracy, but also because there is no one to rely on in the country – almost no one speaks English. As a result, international contacts are limited and significant moments of interactions between ordinary people are often missed. Memory, untitled The residence project was initiated by Rossman-Kiss. He proposed a unifying theme for the first year of work – “archive”. It is connected to the story of the national archive that was burned down by Georgian troops when they occupied Sukhum during the Georgian-Abkhaz war. The destruction of the state archive is a tragic moment in the history of Abkhazia and is perceived as an attempt to deprive the Abkhazians of The destruction of their memory. the state archive is Within the framework of the residence programme, is perceived as an Rossman-Kiss implemented the first participatory art project in the history of Abkhazia – a multimedia instal- attempt to deprive lation titled Memory, Untitled dedicated to the destiny the Abkhazians of of the destroyed national archive. Direct participation their memory. of the audience in the process of the work minimises the distance between the audience and the artist, between art and life. The residents of the country were invited to send their memories – anything that was significant for them and connected with Abkhazia. This call was regularly broadcasted by one of the partners of SKLAD, the Sukhum-based SOMA FM radio station. “The world deserves to know Abkhazia and Abkhazia deserves to know the world. Abkhazia will only benefit if it opens to the world. A metaphoric reconstruction of an archival space incorporates memories submitted by locals through an open call, historical videos, audio and photographic footage as well as descrip-

Opinion and Analysis

Culture in a conflicted region, Anton Ochirov

Photo courtesy of SKLAD artistic initiative

The SKLAD cultural site in Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia.

tions of dreams. Underlined by a multi-layered soundtrack, this complex material is dispersed between two screens, three monitors, shelves and library catalogue cards and card holders; the different methods of classification and presentation echo multiplicity of voices and materials found in any archive. The space created is intimate and universal, comforting and troubling – thus allowing visitors to explore it freely depending on their own interests and rhythm.” This is how the Swiss artist described his multimedia project. Memory, Untitled was one of the most important international exhibition projects implemented on the site of SKLAD. It also clearly pointed out the main problems of perception of contemporary art in the para-state. Even when working with local material, art communicates using its own language and this language may be incomprehensible for the unprepared viewer, even if he is involved in the creation of the work. Even though a large-scale multimedia installation created a complex active environment that affected the perception of the viewer directly, the viewer did not have the language to build the connections between the objects inside the installation and his or her own feelings from the exhibition space. It turned out that

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Opinion and Analysis

the Sukhum audience generally lacks the habit of feeling and perceiving the environment as such: they simply move from one object to another, examining them. It soon became evident that the Abkhaz audience is used to the traditional museum exhibition format, therefore it is difficult for them to comprehend the interactive multimedia style. A solution could be found in the archiving of the exhibition material. For example, the memories that people sent for the project have a lot of value and could be printed as a book. They contain military memories, dreams, memories of parents and loved ones, memories of the sea and even memories of food. Contemporary art can change formats without losing its meaning, and also become even more accessible. The second exhibition on the topic of “archive” Deletion Marks is faced similar problems. Elisabeth Deys and Tareq dedicated to the Daoud (France/Switzerland/Turkey) whose application was reviewed by the curators of SKLAD within complex relationship the framework of the residence programme, choose between Turkey to work on an important topic for Abkhazian soci- and Abkhazia. ety – repatriation. The tragic events of the Caucasian War in the late 19th century led to the forced migration of many of the Abkhaz people – a phenomenon known as “muhajirism”. As a result, the Abkhaz-Adyg diaspora – which is a part of the Cherkess diaspora – have been living in Turkey and the Middle East (mostly Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine) for four generations. Deys and Daoud engaged themselves in research art. Their project, titled Deletion Marks, was dedicated to the complex relationship between Turkey and Abkhazia. The artists visited Abkhaz villages in the Turkish provinces of Duzce and Sakarya where they talked to locals about their historical memory and filmed it. In Abkhazia the authors of the project met with those who returned from Turkey, people with both Abkhazian and Turkish citizenship. The findings were presented during an exhibition at SKLAD. The complexity of the project’s conceptual language ultimately led to an extremely low attendance of this exhibition, which made it necessary to rethink the importance of the topics raised in society. There is a lot of discussion about repatriation in Abkhazian society, but very little interest in real life. What does this mean? At least it demonstrates a strong discrepancy between the declared desires and reality. Putting Abkhazia on the map One can say that SKLAD occupies a unique place in the cultural life of a country that is recognised by only a handful of other states. Despite its short existence, its

Opinion and Analysis

Culture in a conflicted region, Anton Ochirov

reliance on activists and minimal funding, it has become known for participating in significant international projects that have the potential to put Abkhazia on the map. Indeed, due to its non-political nature and adherence to cultural values, SKLAD has been able to achieve much more for the state than the authorities ever could. SKLAD encounters both a conservative public that it is not very interested in contemporary or experimental art, as well as the misunderstanding of local officials. This is not something unexpected. The society is rapidly changing and consists of people with very different cultural backgrounds and often antagonistic viewpoints. The unique thing about SKLAD is that it has emerged from the demand for a separate cultural environment in post-war Sukhumi. The initiative, in the end, had to create this environment alone, using both the democracy of contemporary art and the significance of its international relations. Engaged in non-profit activities, civic social and cultural activism, SKLAD certainly faces funding challenges (support from cultural funds, at the moment, only covers rent and materials for the exhibitions). The solution for these problems lies in expanding the number of like-minded people who would support the initiative and in spreading more information about their activities. The question of the transformation of a local platform into of a full-fledged republican art institution remains open. In fact, the example of the SKLAD institution reveals the many difficulties and challenges facing civic institutions in such a young, troubled and partially-recognised state. Translated by Natalia Smolentceva Anton Ochirov is a poet and a member of the editorial board of Translit – a literary criticaljournal. He is the author several books and poetry series. He lives in Sukhumi, Abkhazia.

A recognised pub in an unrecognised state KNA R B A B AYA N

At eight o’clock every evening Azat Adamyan kick starts his motorcycle – which he named Charlotte – and drives to work. The 27-year-old from Stepanakert (the capital city of the de facto state of Nagorno-Karabakh) is the founder and only employee of Bardak, the one and only pub in Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh, also known as Artsakh, is the de facto unrecognised republic located in the South Caucasus. For more than 20 years Artsakh Armenians have lived in a state of “neither war, nor peace”. In 1988, the Armenians of Karabakh, which at that time was part of Soviet Azerbaijan, went to the streets demanding to join their motherland Armenia. After Karabakh declared its independence in 1991, the first Karabakh-Azerbaijan war broke out. It ended in 1994 with a ceasefire agreement. However, even after the agreement, incidents and clashes continued. On April 2nd 2016 a new conflict escalated with Azerbaijan – one that was called the Four Day War. It also ended with a ceasefire, yet the situation on the border continues to be tense. “It was 2016. The Four Day War had just ended. I volunteered as a fighter in a hot spot,” Adamyan says. “For about two months, I was on the front line. When I returned, my friends and I would often meet to talk about our experiences. We would get together in a small place that used to be an internet café. Gradually I re-

Opinion and Analysis

A recognised pub in an unrecognised state, Knar Babayan

alised that our young people need a place where they can meet in an informal setting, discuss issues that they are concerned about and simply hang out.” Mess Two bottles of whiskey, which Adamyan received as a gift, and a small location which was a literal mess was all he had to start with. This “mess” in the end gave the bar its name: Bardak (translates as “mess” in Russian). Adamyan admits that the name has become a sort of filter for the pub’s visitors. When people hear the name, many decide to stay away from it. This is also good, in a way, as it alleviates any need for strict control. Those who do come to Bardak are more or less familiar with the pub’s culture and feel at ease here. “At first, when I was designing the tables and chairs, I had to take into account the mentality and preferences of the local population. I put together small tables for 4 – 5 people,” Adamyan says. “People in Karabakh are not used to sitting in cafés or pubs at a table with strangers. It took time to get used to this culture. In less than a year after opening, I removed the small tables and put three large tables out instead. By then, the locals were used to sitting next to strangers and foreigners. I try to introduce everyone to each other. At first they are a little embarrassed, but once things lighten up a little, people often try to communicate with each other and enjoy their time together, even if they don’t speak the same language.” Everything in the pub was made by Adamyan himself. He had few resources to invest, but had the desire to do something on his own and show young people that one does not need a lot of money to start a business. “Many complain that there is nothing in Artsakh. But what could be better? Not much exists here, so all it takes is to figure out what people are lacking and fill this void. You don’t need a turnover of a million dollars from the beginning. I know many young guys who have recently established small and medium-sized businesses,” he says. According to official statistics from 2016, the unemployment rate in Nagorno-Karabakh is still high – 15.8 per cent (data for 2017 has yet to be released). Adamyan’s pub was difficult to locate at first (it is quite far from the city centre), but now anyone in Stepanakert can easily find Bardak thanks to Google Maps. Adamyan says that at first he tried to contact Google in order to correctly map the location of the pub. When marking “Stepanakert”, Google automatically sets the country as Azerbaijan. After the pub started getting popular and when patrons would geotag their location, Adamyan received an email from Google confirming that the location of the pub would now be listed as “Stepanakert, Armenia.”

A recognised pub in an unrecognised state, Knar Babayan

Opinion and Analysis

Photo: Knar Babayan

Azat Adamyan, owner of the Bardak pub in Stepanakert.

Adamyan hung this email on the pub’s door, as a reminder. It is crucial for him that Stepanakert was mentioned by Google as a city in Armenia. “After the official location of the pub on the Google Maps was set, we saw a growing number of foreign visitors including members of the Armenian Diaspora from all over the world, and tourists from Russia, Ukraine, Poland and Germany. Last year most of the Armenians were from Syria.” According to official figures, 22,500 tourists visited Karabakh in 2017. Since the Four-Day War in 2016, the number of tourists has declined drastically compared to previous years. Expanding the business Even though Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh do not have diplomatic relations with Turkey (one of the reasons is the historical massacre of 1.5 million Armenians in Ottoman Turkey) and all interstate borders with it are closed, most of the goods sold on the Armenian market are still imported from Turkey. Adamyan tells the story of how he once asked a seller if the t-shirts he had chosen to promote his pub were good quality. The response he got was: “You can be sure they are; this is a Turkish product, high quality.”

Opinion and Analysis

A recognised pub in an unrecognised state, Knar Babayan

This led Adamyan to the idea of opening up a local t-shirt production business that would not use Turkish fabric. “There was no problem to find help. My mother and sister are both tailors. What took longer was to find non-Turkish fabric,” Adamyan says. “We were lucky enough to get our hands Azat Adamyan’s on fabric from Egypt and we began making t-shirts branded t-shirts under the name Adamyan’s.” With profit from the pub, he bought some sewing are sold exclusively machines and 10 metres of fabric. With the sales from in Stepanakert and the first batch of t-shirts he was able to purchase more he is now looking material. Today, his branded t-shirts are sold exclusively in Stepanakert. Adamyan has sent samples of for international the t-shirts to Russia and France and is now waiting partners to expand for proposals for co-operation. “What makes these t-shirts unique is not only that his business. they are locally produced, but that they also have creatively combined inscriptions in English and Karabakh that are usually a play on words. The most popular one has been the Armenian interpretation of the wellknown brand Lavis – LAVըս՞, which translates as ‘How are you?’” Extreme tourism Adamyan has been playing the violin since the age of seven. After attending music school he went for compulsory military service for two years. After the demobilisation in 2010 he became the first violinist of the Chamber Orchestra of Artsakh. “My father played the accordion when he was young and even wanted to become a musician. But music always remained a hobby for him. Of the five siblings, I was the only one who got a musical education. I was very skinny and the accordion was too heavy for me, so I chose the violin,” Adamyan recalls. As a teenager, he became fond of hard rock music and abandoned the violin. He says he is a music lover. He loves all musical genres and it has never stopped him from playing classics. After 15 years of playing the violin professionally, Adamyan left the chamber orchestra and decided to dedicate himself to mountaineering by establishing the FreeStep trekking club. “A sedentary lifestyle is not for me – I love movement. I love trying new things and travelling. I have long been interested in mountaineering and extreme tourism, I even went to trainings in Yerevan.” Today Charlotte (his motorbike) drives Adamyan to a field four kilometres outside of Stepanakert. His latest idea is to set up a camp site here and plans to

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Opinion and Analysis

organise tent outings on the weekends. “Karabakh is the perfect place for camping. Starting with these sites we will then develop extreme tourism. I rented about 10,000 square metres of land on the river bank. I plan to build a camp on one side and turn the rest into an orchard.” Adamyan is confident that nothing in the conflict zone can prevent him from opening a business. Here the problem is different: one first needs to understand the local market. Sometimes you see a new pharmacy opening up and then after things start going well for it, someone else immediately opens another pharmacy right next to it, hoping to emulate that success. And then a third one pops up. In the end, all the pharmacies start to fail. Adamyan believes that one has to be willing to try something new and take some risks. Yet for various reasons, many young people prefer not to follow Adamyan’s example. They seek opportunities abroad, often temporarily working in countries of the former Soviet Union (particularly, Russia). Some come back. But few, like Adamyan, are willing to invest in developing the local economy. Translated by Natalia Smolentceva Knar Babayan is a journalist and documentary photographer from Karabakh.

Peace is still far from reach A conversation with Leyla and Arif Yunus, Azerbaijani human rights activists. Interviewer: Valentin Luntumbue VALENTIN LUNTUMBUE: I would like to begin by talking about the beginning of your engagement in the last hours of the Soviet Union, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the rise to power of Heydar Aliyev?

LEYLA YUNUS (LY): We are both historians and we began our work during the Soviet times. I was a member of the underground movement of national minorities against the Soviet regime and we were working with an underground newspaper, published in Moscow, called Express Khronika. The chief editor was Aleksandr Podrabinek. They had correspondents in different countries including Georgia, Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine; and we were responsible for Azerbaijan, together with Arif. Then in 1988, I was one of the founders of Azerbaijan’s Popular Front, a national democratic movement, and I was the only women on the board. After Heydar Aliyev came to power, we did not see any more possibilities to work and we faced horrible repression in 1995 – 96. Aliyev arrested more than 300 officers of the ministry of defence and around 400 officials from the ministry of interior. In 1995 I created the Institute for Peace and Democracy as

a non-governmental organisation and we started to work on several issues. First, of course, was the human rights situation with the political prisoners. I created a list of political prisoners – from Soviet times till today – and we were monitoring allegations of torture. One major issue we started working on was trying to get a peaceful resolution to the Karabakh conflict. We later worked on migration issues. When we saw Islam growing in the country, Arif started researching religion. Then we joined the international campaign to ban landmines. And, moreover, we also created the only women’s crisis centre in Azerbaijan under the umbrella of our institute. Without official support, the institute operated from my deceased parents’ flat – we lived in another flat. In 2011, a bulldozer destroyed the whole building which included all our records, our library, our equipment and our computers. Nevertheless we continued our work, and in 2011 we created the first and only common Azerbaijani-Armenian website Public Dialogue. The government was very angry over this, but we continued to work until we were arrested.

Peace is still far from reach, Interviewer: Valentin Luntumbue Let’s talk about your work on the Karabakh conflict. You both advocated building bridges between Armenians and Azerbaijanis…

ARIF YANUS (AY): We went to Armenia to take part in the international Chatham House conference under the auspices of the European Union. LY: Before 2003, before Ilham Aliyev (current president of Azerbaijan and son of Heydar Aliyev– editor’s note) took power it was possible to organise meetings in Baku and invite Armenians to Baku and discuss openly. It was also possible to go to Karabakh. When Ilham rose to power, he barred citizens from Armenia from entering into Azerbaijan and organising international peace conferences. This is why we created Public Dialogue online, because there was no way to meet in Baku in person. It was possible to meet in Armenia (where Arif went) or in Georgia. So, the idea of Ilham Aliyev is, like all dictators, that he needs an enemy to tell the nation that they must unite together against this threat. In Soviet times we had enemies – the Germans and then the Americans and so on. Today, if you look at any authoritarian regime you will see that they have an enemy. We also monitor student textbooks. In history books for 10 – 12 year-olds, for instance, it is written that Azerbaijan has been enemies with Armenia forever. The authorities create this kind of propaganda that begins in schools. They write that in the 7th century, when Islam was divided between Sunnis and Shias, the Armenians were the ones who were responsible. Can you imagine? In chil-

Opinion and Analysis dren’s books! They have created a situation where there is no possibility for a peaceful solution with Armenia. In 1992 we had the chance to win the war, Abulfaz Elchibey was Azerbaijan’s president at the time and Heydar was stationed in Nakhichevan (an Azerbaijani exclave, the Aliyev clan’s region of origin). Azerbaijani troops had spent a lot of money, bought a lot of tanks and so on and were coming to take Lachin (in Nagorno-Karabakh). The then Armenian president, Levon TerPetrosyan, contacted Heydar Aliyev and said “let’s sign an agreement that Armenian troops do not attack Nakhichevan and Azerbaijani troops will not attack Armenia from the border with Nakhichevan”. And Heydar agreed and signed. More Armenian troops disengaged from the border with Nakhichevan and headed to Lachin which caused additional deaths on the Azerbaijani side. I wrote that during the Second World War we demanded that Britain and the US attack the Germans, but here we have the same nation – Azerbaijani from the mainland and Azerbaijani from Nakhichevan – yet they signed that agreement. It was the main reason why, at the end of 1992, we could not win. When Heydar Aliyev seized power, he was more afraid of the Azerbaijani army than the Armenian one. We had 33 special battalions of volunteers. He disbanded them, and in July 1993 the majority were arrested. AY: Seventy per cent of Azerbaijan’s army were arrested and it was the main reason for Armenia’s victory. Before that, Azerbaijan was attacking Armenian

Opinion and Analysis positions, but without 70 per cent of its army, it became more difficult. Do you think that if you solve the Karabakh issue, Ilham Aliyev will inevitably fall or do you think you need to get rid of Ilham first in order to solve Karabakh? Some parties in Azerbaijan think that even if you get rid of Aliyev, they still need to regain Karabakh – that is to say, it is still important to win the war instead of negotiating with Armenia…

LY: I agree with you, there are some political parties and individuals in Azerbaijan who think it is necessary to have a war with Armenia, and that it is the only way Karabakh can ever be freed. It is also the result of the propaganda I mentioned. When a child reads such horrible propaganda he or she just thinks about war. My thesis, which I repeat at every meeting in Baku, is that, yes, 20 per cent of our territory is occupied by Armenia, but 80 per cent is occupied by Aliyev’s clan. We are occupied like slaves. We have no rights and if we achieve liberation of this 80 per cent, then we can think about the remaining 20 per cent. It is important to understand that if all the Armenians who live in Karabakh see that there is true democracy in Azerbaijan, we can talk with them and slowly resolve the conflict in a peaceful way.

Peace is still far from reach, Interviewer: Valentin Luntumbue AY: When we met with Armenians, I asked the representative of the Karabakh Armenians: “What is your position if you know that one day you have the chance to live in Germany, in an independent Karabakh or in Armenia?” He said Germany; because Germany is a good country. When Azerbaijanis say they want Karabakh to be returned to Azerbaijan, Karabakhis respond that they should first return all the Azerbaijanis who live in Europe and in Russia. There are two million Azerbaijanis in Russia. If Azerbaijanis do not want to live in Azerbaijan, why should Armenians? That is why we need democratisation to solve the Karabakh problem. LY: And Aliyev is exploiting this problem. Pay attention to what he said in April 2016 (the Four-Day War): the Armenians attacked first. This is false, and we know it through some colleagues. On a visit to the United States he was pushed on human rights and democracy issues. Before he went back to Baku, he gave the order to start the war. After the horrible Four-Day War, which caused the death of 200 people, nobody demanded human rights from Aliyev anymore. They all demanded a ceasefire and peace. He won. He is using this war for his own interests.

Leyla and Arif Yunus are Azerbaijani human rights activists. Both have been arrested and imprisoned by the Azerbaijani authorities (released on suspended sentences in 2015). Their most recent book Из советского лагеря в азербайджанскую тюрьму (From Soviet Camps to Azerbaijani Prisons) includes an account of their time in Azerbaijani prison. Valentin Luntumbue is a Belgian writer, independent researcher and College of Europe alumnus based in Brussels.

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TRADITION. IDENTITY. VALUES 1918 – 1989 – 2018 VI EUROPEAN FORUM 28–30/05/2018/GDAŃSK

EUROPE

WITH A VIEW TO THE FUTURE

Europe with a view to the Future 2016. Photo by Grzegorz Mehring / ECS Archive

More information and contact | [emailprotected]

“Today, there are three major hotspots: the Middle East, Russian policy towards Ukraine and the South China Sea. Out of the three, two are in our immediate surrounding. If we, as Europe, do not realise that we are in extreme danger and should unite immediately, aim at greater integration, create a European army and aim for unity instead of divisions, we will perish. It will turn out that we are an aberration in history and peace in Europe – only a post-war prank.” Patrycja Sasnal – a doctor of political science and publicist. She was a Fulbright Foundation fellow, a researcher associated with the American University in Beirut (Lebanon), and a student at Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III in Paris. Head of MENA programme of the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

Europe with a view to the Future 2016. Photo by Grzegorz Mehring / ECS Archive

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“There is a significant difference between what one can expect to happen by the international community and what should happen. I fully share the view that was expressed about what should happen, yes the membership of Hungary, not just voting rights, I think should have been suspended. Financial inflow from the European Union, which comes from the taxpayers of the member states, should have been stopped years ago. I have written extensively on this subject, but it is one thing to encourage each other about what should be done and another is to realize what is being done and what is being done is discouraging.” Charles Gati – a political scientist and lecturer in European and Eurasian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. He is a professor at Union College and Columbia University and a former advisor to the US Department of State.

Europe with a view to the Future 2017. Photo by Dawid Linkowski / ECS Archive

“…the most important issue is that we lack leaders. I personally believe in the role of individuals in history. I have long hoped that Angela Merkel will be this leader, but I see that she has already retreated and does not want to take responsibility for anything other than German matters. This will have negative consequences. Radosław Sikorski had this intuition, when during his speech in Berlin, he made the point about a need for leadership. Without a leader there will be no Europe. Can we create them? A leader who would be able to reconcile the rules of the democratic game in their country, win the election and at the same time take the responsibility for more on the EU level? There is no technical method to do this. It starts on the ideological level, runs through everyday issues we can do something about, and finishes with a crippled leadership, which is not easy to deal with.” Paweł Kowal – a doctor of political science and historian. Lecturer at the College of Europe in Natolin and Polish Academy of Sciences.

Europe with a view to the Future 2016. Photo by Grzegorz Mehring / ECS Archive

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EUROPE

WITH A VIEW TO THE FUTURE

TRADITION. IDENTITY. VALUES 1918 – 1989 – 2018 VI EUROPEAN FORUM 28–30/05/2018/GDAŃSK

PANELISTS

Mykola Riabchuk | Literary critic, writer Marina Skorikova | Political scientist, Mieczysław Abramowicz | Writer and Moscow School of Civic Education theater, historian, theater director Eugeniusz Smolar | Journalist, opposition Robert Alagjozovski | Philosopher, activist in the communist period, Minister of Culture of Macedonia participant in the demonstration Bogdan Borusewicz | Politician, activist in March 1968 in Warsaw of the democratic opposition in the years Beata Stasińska | Editor, cultural activist of the Polish People’s Republic, deputy Andrei Yurov | Human rights defender, speaker of the Senate (the ninth term) philosopher and trainer, Moscow Helsinki Group Daniel Beauvois | Historian, scholar of Michał Wójcik | Historian, journalist, Slavic studies, writer, translator former editor-in-chief of Focus and Włodzimierz Borodziej | Historian Focus Historia magazines specializing in contemporary history, Professor of humanities, Warsaw University Marcin Żyła | Deputy editor-in-chief of Tygodnik Powszechny Eoin Drea | Economist and Economic Historian, Wilfried Martens Centre for TOPICS European Studies Europe 1918 – 1989 – 2018. Paweł Kowal | Historian, politician, Tradition. Identity. Values columnist, Polish Academy of Science Was 1968 a breakthrough moment in Agnieszka Lichnerowicz | Journalist, European history? Radio TOK FM European economy after the crisis – Georges Mink | Historian, French Academy lessons learnt? of Sciences, College of Europe No changes in the East? Russia after Sebastian Płóciennik | Economist presidential elections and lawyer, head of the Weimar Triangle Europe with a view to the future programme at the Polish Institute of What is a European identity? International Affairs, co-president of Is the EU able to maintain peace? the Foundation for Polish-German Effects of nationalism on the EU? Cooperation What kind of Europe do we want to live in?

Organisers and Partners European Solidarity Centre The City of Gdańsk Honorary Consulate of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in Sopot The Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation The Heinrich Böll Foundation in Poland The Allianz Cultural Foundation The Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe Editors of: ”Przegląd Polityczny” | ”New Eastern Europe” | Nowa Europa Wschodnia Eastbook.eu Radio TOK FM

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Organizers

Medal design by Dobrochna Surajewska, Gdańsk artist. Photo by Grzegorz Mehring / ECS Archive

Already in its seventh edition, the award AMBASSADOR OF THE NEW EUROPE is bestowed annually by the European Solidarity Centre and the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wroclaw. The author of the best publication receives: a medal, cash prize (worth 5,000 PLN) and the privilege to use the title “Ambassador of the New Europe”. This year after several meetings, deliberations and votes the jury decided to nominate the five best books: Ece Temelkuran, Turcja: obłęd i melancholia, Publishing house: Książkowe Klimaty Paweł Pieniążek, Wojna, która nas zmieniła, Publishing house: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej Elizabeth Åsbrink, 1947. Świat zaczyna się teraz, Publishing house: Poznańskie Wydawnictwo Lukas Bärfuss Koala, Publishing House: Ossolineum Aleksander Podrabinek Dysydenci, Publishing House: KARTA The award will be bestowed to one of the nominees on 28th May 2018 in Gdansk during the forum ”Europe with a view to the future” More information | www.ecs.gda.pl/Ambasador_Nowej_Europy

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Georgia’s separatist regions at a standstill A G N IE SZKA T O M C Z Y K

Moscow continues to be the main beneficiary of its policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Aspiring to gain recognition as states, Georgia’s breakaway territories agree to institutional, political, military, economic and social dependence on Russia. The moderate interest of the international community in solving the conflicts and the relatively weak position of Georgia further impinge any prospects for future stabilisation of the region. Years after declaring independence, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia’s separatist republics, are far from becoming autonomous entities. Their functioning continues to depend on the support of Moscow, which sees them as convenient centres of projecting Russian influence in the region. The country’s military and economic ties with the separatist states have successfully prevented Georgia’s bid for NATO or EU membership. At the same time, it gives the republics a semblance of autonomy where they can continue to play the lead part in the spectacle called independence. When your homeland is at your fingertips Shavshvebi, a settlement for internally displaced persons from South Ossetia, is located in central Georgia just off the main road from Tbilisi to Gori. It was built in 2009 by the Georgian government with international support. It currently

Opinion and Analysis

Georgia’s separatist regions at a standstill, Agnieszka Tomczyk

houses around 600 people. Forced to flee the war-torn South Ossetia in 2008, refugees found shelter in Georgia. Standing at the edge of Shavshvebi they can see the Ossetian border, the area they had to flee and the communities they left behind. Meanwhile, in the western part of Georgia, internally displaced people from Abkhazia live a one or two hour-ride away from the homes they left in 1993. The traces of bullets in the ruins of abandoned Abkhazian homes are still visible. Here, it seems like the war ended yesterday, rather than 25 years ago. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war brought not only military but also civilian casualties. It left the local infrastructure in ruin and sparked a humanitarian crisis. The reception of large numbers of refugees was a chalThe streets are lenge for Georgia, which was logistically unprepared such a large-scale exodus. To address the situanamed after the for tion, Georgia housed refugees in old and abandoned villages which the schools, hospitals and hotels that, with time, became refugees left behind. uninhabitable. The camp in Shavshvebi, for instance, is composed of 177 two-bedroom houses and small gardens where people can plant their own vegetables and fruits, which is often their only source of sustenance. Rows of red-roofed houses are attached to the cropland line. The streets are named after the villages which the refugees left behind. Yet, people can recognise their villages even without street signs. Children have to walk four kilometres to school. Only some families can afford to pay for a minibus which transports the children to a nearby town. The only place where the local children can spend their free time, participate in after school activities and study, is Casa della Nonna. This place emphasises psychological rehabilitation for the children affected by post-war trauma. Several teachers from Tbilisi come to Shavshvebi three times a week to work with the kids. The Shavshvebi residents are financially supported by the Georgian state. Each individual receives around 48 Georgian lari a month (about 20 US dollars). When the camp was first built, the government covered utilities like electricity and gas. As resources depleted, the residents had to start covering the costs themselves. Some of them could not afford to pay and electricity and gas was shut off. The biggest problem in the community is unemployment which affects up to 95 per cent of the residents. Household duties, breeding cows, pigs, hens and gardening have become the residents’ main occupation. Older residents of Shavshvebi remain faithful to their Ossetian traditions. However, the youngest generation – those who were born in Georgia – feel little connection with South Ossetia. At first, it was believed that life in the camp was temporary and that they would eventually return to their homes. Now the refugees are certain that they will never see their homes again. In some way, the Shavsh-

Georgia’s separatist regions at a standstill, Agnieszka Tomczyk

Opinion and Analysis

vebi camp is a reflection of Georgia’s misery. Born out of the war with Russia, the settlement now illustrates the impasse in the tense relations between Georgia and both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In both cases, Russia has supported the separatist enclaves financially and militarily and seems to be the only true beneficiary of the situation. Meanwhile, the affected communities on both sides of the conflict are immersed in grief, and experience economic, social and psychological trauma. No end in sight One could say that the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus resemble a hurricane. They begin abruptly with a destructive vortex of rotating episodes of violence and then after everything calms down, the situation stalls for many years. The lingering stabilising negotiations result in political declarations but without any effective solution. The situation teeters until a new hurricane comes along, triggering new fighting. The roots of the conflict between the republics and Georgia date back to the early 20th century. In 1918 Georgia proclaimed its independence which led to unrest in both regions as they refused to function as autonomous republics within independent Georgia. Over the years, the ruling elite in Tbilisi sought to suppress the separatist aspirations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The growing ethnic tensions, fuelled by an emerging national identity in the republics, led to the outbreak of two wars and their eventual separation from Georgia in the early 1990s. South Ossetia, located in the Tskhinvali region northeast of Georgia, separated from Georgia following a violent conflict in 1991 – 1992. Both sides agreed to a Russian-mediated ceasefire. The Kremlin sent its soldiers to the region and offered Russian passports to ethnic Ossetians. The escalation of the conflict occurred in the evening of August 7th 2008 when Georgia and South Ossetia accused each other of launching artillery attacks. A new war, known as the Five Day War (or the August War), flared up. As a result, Russian forces launched air strikes the following day on Georgia and moved troops to occupy the bulk of South Ossetia. The war ended on August 12th. According to the Kremlin, Russia intervened in the conflict to protect South Ossetia’s citizens (many of whom were Russian citizens) from Georgian forces. Abkhazia, another de facto state in the region, separated from Georgia after the 1992 – 1993 war. It was followed by ethnic unrest between Georgians – the main ethnic group in the region – and the Abkhaz – the titular ethnicity. Following the war, Georgia faced an influx of close to 220,000 refugees from Abkhazia. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia attended Geneva peace conferences with Georgia

Opinion and Analysis

Georgia’s separatist regions at a standstill, Agnieszka Tomczyk

Photo: International Crisis Group (CC) www.flickr.com

A member of the European Union Monitor Mission points towards Tskhinvali, the regional capital of South Ossetia and across the Russian-guarded administrative boundary line.

which has created a platform for talks between the warring parties. However, establishing the format appears to be the only accomplishment of the negotiations. The international community largely supports Georgia’s territorial integrity but currently there are few parties seeking to overcome the long-term impasse. Nevertheless, the initiative has been denounced by the Abkhazian side. For them, there is no alternative but Georgia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia. In December 2009 the European Union adopted the Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy (NREP) and international engagement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia substantially decreased over the years. NREP is a twin-pillar policy: on the one hand, it assumes non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence; but on the other, it seeks to engage with both regions. It aims to create a legal and political space that would allow the EU to interact with the breakaway territories, at the same time acknowledging Georgia’s right to its territorial integrity. In the wake of the 2008 war, Russia and a handful of other states (Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru) recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As a result, both separatist regions are classified as partially recognised. In

Georgia’s separatist regions at a standstill, Agnieszka Tomczyk

Opinion and Analysis

addition, on April 18th 2017, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov opened an embassy in Sukhumi (the capital city of Abkhazia). There is a popular belief, especially among Russia’s critics, that the 2008 war with Georgia was a rehearsal for the Kremlin prior to both the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent war in Donbas in eastern Ukraine. Managing the present The year 2017 marked the 25th anniversary of the Georgian-Abkhaz war (1992 – 1993), and this coming August it will be a decade since the 2008 war in South Ossetia. The political and economic conditions in the breakaway Abkhazia – but also in South Ossetia – create the potential for further crises which mainly have to do with a decline of financing from Russia. Moscow has been struggling with its own economic woes which have forced it to drastically lower financial support for the breakaway regions. In addition, the failing Abkhaz state system has caused serious frustration among the local population. The first and the second post-war generation often have relatively poor education and, in most cases, few ideas on how the para-state should function. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are largely dependent on Russia economically, militarily and institutionally. With an underdeveloped industry, the republics rely on the Kremlin’s investments. The economy of both republics is further exacerbated due to poor development of small businesses and high unemployment. After the August 2008 war, Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was followed by a large scale militarisation of both regions. It is estimated that there are now around 4,500 – 5,000 Russian soldiers stationed in each territory. In South Ossetia, Russia has one soldier for every eighth resident. Moscow established several military bases (including one in Largvisi) built in the mountainous part of the Akhalgori region of South Ossetia. Vladimir Putin has adopted a decree that allows some of the South Ossetian troops to be incorporated into the Russian army. Georgian authorities have claimed that such a move was a step towards de-facto annexation of South Ossetia. On March 18th 2015 the Kremlin signed the Treaties on Alliance and Integration with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Then, in July 2017, following the meeting between Lavrov and his South Ossetian counterpart, Dmitry Medoyev, to discuss the treaty-related agreements, Russia sent more troops – about 700 soldiers – to its military bases in Abkhazia and Armenia. The Abkhaz troops completed tactical exercises with a Russian battalion permanently stationed on its territory. Politically, official visits between Putin and the leaders of the de facto states have become a

Opinion and Analysis

Georgia’s separatist regions at a standstill, Agnieszka Tomczyk

regular practice. In November 2017 Anatoly Bibilov, the South Ossetian president, discussed bilateral co-operation with Russia and received assurances that the country will ensure military and border security of the para-state. Alongside presidential elections in South Ossetia on April 9th 2017, the parastate organised a referendum on changing its name to Alania, after the medieval Caucasian kingdom. Nearly 80 per cent of voters supported the change. On December 29th 2016 Leonid Tibilov, who won the April 2017 presidential election, explained that the renaming of the breakaway territory to South Ossetia-Alania would lay the groundwork for unification with the Russian North Ossetia-Alania. Ossetians seem to support the idea. Creeping occupation Russia continues to erect barbed wire further into Georgian territory, drawing a new boundary at the expense of the latter. Moving the occupation line has not been a one-off act. In July 2017 Russian troops moved the South Ossetian boundary hundreds of metres into Georgia. By doing so they deprived a local resident of 20 hectares of his land. A similar case was reported in January 2017. Many people in the South Ossetian-Georgian borderland found their homes not only fenced off with barbed wire, but also no longer part of Georgian control. Some gardens were sliced in half, leaving the house and the land on different sides of the demarcation. People have been separated from their relatives and friends and some cut off from electricity or gas supplies. Local people fear both Russian re-extension of the border and an oncoming war. Residents of the borderland still experience the consequences of the August 2008 war. Over the past number of years, Georgian citizens have been detained and accused by Ossetian forces of “illegal entry” to their lost pastures or fields. Such actions affect younger generations of Ossetians who do not know Georgians at all. They are growing up in the belief of ethnic hostility and with no memories of the good days of peaceful co-existence. Georgian officials, non-government organisations and ordinary citizens have expressed their indignation, and have protested against moving the borderline. Georgia’s President, Giorgi Margvelashvili, has called Russia’s actions a “creeping occupation”. The minister of reconciliation and civil equality, Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, prefers to name it a “very open and dynamic occupation process” that has been progressing since the August 2008 war. The European Union Monitoring Mission’s (EUMM) team, which patrols the so-called administrative boundary line with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, confirm that the line has moved forward, seizing locals’ farmland. They believe that Russia

Georgia’s separatist regions at a standstill, Agnieszka Tomczyk

Opinion and Analysis

is using a 1984 Soviet military map to redraw the border. Violating another state’s territorial integrity is a well-known tactic of Russia’s aggressive policy. Moscow’s actions in the South Ossetian-Georgian borderland are yet another example of the Kremlin’s expanding None of the presence in the Caucasus region. breakaway territories At the same time, none of the breakaway territories has any intention to go back under Georgian rule. De- has any intention spite ceasefire agreements in place, the Kremlin contin- to go back under ues to support heavy militarisation of both para-states Georgian rule. with the consent of the separatist political elite. All of this is in violation of the principles of international law. Russia’s involvement thus remains the primary obstacle in regulating the relations between the para-states and Georgia. The moderate interest of the international community in solving the conflicts, however, and the relatively weak position of Georgia further impinge the prospects for the future stabilisation of the region. But there is light at the end of the tunnel. In 2018 Georgian authorities have launched the “Step to a Better Future” programme – a comprehensive plan aimed at facilitating trade and encouraging relations with populations of both breakaway territories. The peace initiative also simplifies the procedures for students from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to enrol in Georgian educational institutions. Most importantly, the initiative will involve changes to the Law on Occupied Territories, however, no details have been revealed yet. Agnieszka Tomczyk is a PhD candidate in the Department of Eastern Studies at the University of Warsaw.

The red shoes of Transnistrian women M A RIN A SH UPA C

There is no high quality statistical data on the state of women in Transnistria. A report on the situation of human rights in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova by UN senior expert Thomas Hammarberg in 2013 remains the most in-depth analysis available. According to Hammarberg’s report, the main issues women in Transnistria face are domestic violence and sex trafficking. Two Transnistrian NGOs (Resonance and the Apriori Information Centre) highlight the same issues in their 2013 report to the UN committee on the elimination of discrimination against women. Today, these problems still exist and are some of the most fundamental issues Transnistrian women face, says Alexandra Telpis, a representative of Apriori. In response, a Transnistrian platform for preventing violence against women (which together brings 15 organisations in total, including Apriori) recently organised the public campaign “Red Shoe” in memory of the victims of domestic violence. During the campaign, dozens of women joined “the open microphone” to share their stories of survival against domestic violence. The 2017 edition of “Red Shoe” was dedicated to Elena, who was killed by her violent partner.

The red shoes of Transnistrian women, Marina Shupac

Opinion and Analysis

Traditional roles The 2011 UN HIV Vulnerability Survey found that in Transnistria almost onequarter (22 per cent) of the interviewed women who were married or living in partnership had been subjected to physical abuse from a husband or partner. More than one-third of all women interviewed had suffered physical violence from male perpetrators, at least once in their lives. One in every 17 married woman said they were exposed to sexual violence by their current or former husband or partner. “Domestic violence is a norm for many people; that is why the authorities cannot do much applying the Only two out of anti-violence laws,” Telpis admits. According to the 43 members of Hammarberg report, the role of women in society of the region is still largely seen as the protector of the Transnistria’s domestic life, despite the fact women today are equal Supreme Council partners to men on the labour market, and often pro- are women. vide basic income for the family. Family life, he says, remains divided into traditional male and female responsibilities. The persistence of traditional gender roles is also reflected in the representation of women in politics in the self-proclaimed Transnistrian republic. For instance, only two out of 43 members of the Supreme Council are women. “Generally, gender equality is supported by the population only in the abstract but not in concrete reality,” states Hammarberg. This finding is also reflected in the profiles of a majority of Transnistrian NGOs dealing with women issues. Telpis remarks that “there are only organisations working in the sphere of domestic violence, human trafficking and economic rights, there are no feminist movements as such.” Documentary photographer and PR manager of the Resonance Centre for Civic Initiatives, Anna Galatoniva, adds that “these organisations are called women organisations only because women are more vulnerable to violence and trafficking”. A widespread strategy of the female NGOs in Transnistria is the creation of social services for domestic abuse survivors. For instance, Resonance empowers women in the workforce by organising trainings on entrepreneurship. It has also created the only shelter in Transnistria (it can host seven to nine women and children in crisis situations). But needless to say only one shelter in Transnistria is not enough. For this reason, an NGO called Women Initiatives helps survivors of domestic violence find treatment and rehabilitation. It also provides legal and psychological support in their offices in Tiraspol. Another NGO called Interaction has, in co-operation with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), set up a phone helpline – called the Trust Line. It is offered to victims of domestic violence as a preventive measure to stop human

Opinion and Analysis

The red shoes of Transnistrian women, Marina Shupac

trafficking. The number of calls Trust Line receives has increased every year since it was established in 2009. Interaction, together with IOM, has rescued dozens of Transnistrian women and girls from being trafficked. Same problems, different approaches There are some issues Transnistrian women are subjected to because of the unrecognised status of the republic. For example, the testimonies given by Resonance and Apriori to the UN Committee on elimination of discrimination against women show that there are cases when men flee Transnistria to Chișinău (the capital of Moldova) and thus are sheltered from paying alimony. Single mothers, as a result, are left without any means to survive. On the other hand, Alina Andronache, a member of a Moldovan platform for gender equality (which unites around 26 organisations and activists) says that the issues faced by women from the territories controlled by Tiraspol and Chișinău are the same. Unfortunately, there has been little co-operation to tackle them jointly. Andronache is one of the main organisers of feminist marches held annually on International Women’s Day in Chișinău. No Transnistrian NGO has officially joined the marches thus far, and there are no feminist marches or even informal feminist groups in Tiraspol. “There is nothing that looks like feminism in Transnistria, no feminist agenda,” says Karolina Dutka, a young Transnistrian artist. Dutka’s documentary photo project on survivors of There are no feminist domestic violence was one of the few public reactions the global #MeToo campaign in Transnistria. She marches or even to portrayed survivors of sexual violence together with informal feminist their stories. One of her earlier documentary projects groups in Tiraspol. on the LGBT community in Transnistria provoked a strong reaction, both from the authorities of the region and the general public. Dutka said that the lesbian women from the region, who were represented in the photo project, expressed a lot of fear despite the fact that their identities were portrayed anonymously. “Due to the patriarchal politics in Transnistria, the NGOs cannot openly and vocally defend women’s rights. Each NGO that wants to work in Transnistria on gender issues has to negotiate and ask for permission from the security forces,” Andronache explains. Telpis adds: “In contrast to Transnistria, on the other side of the Dniester River [i.e. in Moldova], there are women organisations and movements that deal not only with domestic violence and trafficking, but also with women’s role in society and

The red shoes of Transnistrian women, Marina Shupac

Opinion and Analysis

campaigning for sexual consent reform. This is unfortunate, because mentality is what leads to violence.” Activists from the region believe that there is an urgent need for the men and women of Transnistria to be better informed and realise that the problem of gender inequality is real. As they say, only with awareness can a real feminist movement in the region emerge. “It should start in schools, where children should be explained how gender stereotypes influence our lives,” says Galatonova. Telpis adds that the media should also be aware of the messages they send to the wider public on gender roles. “These changes will take time. For now I think that art is the only instrument to promote gender equality in Transnistria,” Galatonova believes. Together with Telpis and other activists, she is working on the second edition of a documentary festival that will raise a variety of social issues in the de facto state. “I hope that thanks to my projects people will rethink the norms,” concludes Dutka, who is working on a new project on feminism and the attitudes of women. Empowering the oppressed Thanks to support from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, a sustainable community development platform was created last year which will facilitate co-operation between NGOs and initiative groups, helping persons with disabilities in the Transnistrian region to get their voices heard. Transnistrian women with disabilities have been proactive in creating the platform. According to local media and activists, they face a range of issues from social stigma to access education and work. “We are people with disabilities and

Opinion and Analysis

The red shoes of Transnistrian women, Marina Shupac

we demonstrate to society that we have potential, which we hope can lead to peace and equality,” says Emma Martyniuk in an interview with newsmpr.com. She is a member of the platform and leader of a Transnistrian NGO focusing on youths with disabilities. Another active Transnistrian woman with disabilities is Ecaterina Sochirca, who, as an intern with the United Nations office in Moldova, has demonstrated her ability. In an interview with the UN in Moldova Magazine, Sochirca confessed that after graduating from university she could not find a job because of her visual impairment. After getting six months of experience with the UN, she will now fight for her rights.” This internship gave me power to follow my dream in finding an interesting job. I am sure that I want to inform people from my community about how it is possible to claim your rights.” Roma women are another stigmatised social group in both Moldova and Transnistria. In April this year, there was the first ever roundtable discussion on Roma rights organised in Tiraspol with the support of the UN OHCHR Office. Around 90 participants attended the event, including some high level officials from the unrecognised republic. One of the speakers from the Transnistrian side, a young Roma woman named Sofia Raducanu, confessed that she graduated from the faculty of law but had to quit her career aspirations because of family responsibilities – as Roma women are still expected to fulfil a traditional role in society. She said that she was amazed by the kind of activism that the Roma women’s platform was doing in Chișinău and expressed her willingness to also help create a similar platform in Tiraspol. Marina Shupac is a human rights journalist with NewsMaker.md, an online Moldova-based publication. She is former a minority rights fellow at the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and a former European Parliament Sakharov Fellow.

De facto states and Non-recognition A special series from the Black Sea Institute

The Black Sea Institute, in partnership with New Eastern Europe, is pleased to provide a special series of essays related to the topic of de facto state states, separatism and non-recognition as a part of New Eastern Europe’s special issue on the same topic. The Black Sea Institute (BSI) is an independent research centre dedicated to the analysis of European, Russian and Chinese affairs in the Black Sea region. The research and debates that BSI engages in are reflected in highly regarded publications in Europe and Canada. The centre does not take any institutional policy positions. Our research team publishes on a range of views from our members and external contributors free to express their own views on the issues related to the Black Sea area. The BSI brings together key actors from the broad policy community in Europe, Russia, and China – politicians, officials, media, academia, diplomats, business, unions, NGOs – during events and conferences. Visit the Black Sea Institute online at: https://www.facebook.com/blackseainstitute/ https://twitter.com/BlackSeaInst

Notes from NagornoKarabakh A so-called president’s so-called spokesman R ICH A R D M A R T YN - H E M P H I L L In the eyes of every recognised national government in the world, the day job of David Babayan does not exist. But Babayan, who serves as the spokesman for President Bako Sahakyan of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (also known as the Republic of Artsakh), a breakaway de-facto state in the South Caucasus, prefers to shrug that off. “The most important thing is never to be part of Azerbaijan again,” he tells me, despite these starkly beautiful lands of mountains, monasteries and quaint farmyards still technically lying within the internationally recognised borders of Azerbaijan. On a practical level, the idea of Nagorno Karabakh officially remaining part of Azerbaijan makes for a confusing head spin. Almost all of the roughly 150,000 people here carry Armenian passports, identify as ethnically Armenian and speak Armenian. Their phone dial codes are Armenian and they support Armenia zealously in the Eurovision song contest. Babayan revels amid these confusing legal grounds, granting himself a mandate to speak out on issues in a way

that most spokesmen in other countries could only dream of. Broad shouldered, bearded, and prone to rhetorical flourish, he studiously shuns the bland language of press releases and official announcements, preferring to sprinkle his interviews with grand references to classical antiquity, Chinese philosophy and strange jokes about magic fish. “Of course Nagorno Karabakh is part of Armenia’s cultural and historical space,” he insists, after a lengthy digression comparing the ideologies of the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia. Though he emphasises that Armenians today are living without nine-tenths of their historical lands, a legacy of a history scarred by the Armenian Genocide of 1915, he says Nagorno Karabakh has “no territorial ambitions”, just the “very human desire to live in peace and security”. The aim of independence, he says, is a path to a legal referendum on unifying with neighbouring Armenia, which would only be deemed legitimate according to international law if the NagornoKarabakh Republic’s independent status has first been recognised internationally.

Notes from NagornoKarabakh, Richard Martyn-Hemphill Yet, deep wounds from a decades-long dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which dates back to the collapse of the Soviet Union, keep any prospect of international recognition for NagornoKarabakh, let alone a peaceful unification with Armenia, far from sight. The ceasefire to a brutal war, one which left around 30,000 dead and roughly a million forced from their homes, has been in place since 1994. But the peace process has inched almost no further over the last 20 years or so – stalling time and again due to entrenched ethnic and religious hatred, frequent ceasefire violations by both sides and limited international diplomatic engagement to force through a durable or even partial peace resolution. After years of impasse, the situation has been deteriorating once more, making any international recognition distant as ever. The worst bout of violence since the ceasefire more than 20 years ago took place with four days of intense fighting in April 2016 – showing that Azerbaijan is not keen to relinquish claims over lands it administered during Soviet times. “Separatist tendencies in Nagorno Karabakh were an artificially made provocation,” President Ilhar Aliyev of Azerbaijan wrote on Twitter, shortly after what is now called the Four Day War. “Azerbaijan is still suffering from bitter results of this provocation,” he added, in reference not only to the loss of territory but also the million or so Azerbaijanis forced from their homes after its military lost ground to Armenianbacked forces back in the early 1990s –

Opinion and Analysis another reason a war rife with religious and ethnic tension between the mostly Muslim Azerbaijanis and the predominantly Christian Armenians remains visceral to this day. Some analysts in Baku, the Azerbaijani capital, claim Aliyev, a strongman who succeeded his father in the role, is using the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to divert public attention away from an economy hard hit by low global oil prices. Others see it as an attempt to get the peace process back on the agenda of larger countries who have let conflict resolution in the region fall down the list of their priorities in recent years, due in part to a lack of interest as well as growing exasperation at the intransigence of both parties. At a meeting in Vienna shortly after the Four Day War, the wider regional powers were back at the table. The talks were mediated by top diplomats and officials from Russia, France and the United States – a format known as the Minsk Group – but the only thing Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders could agree on was to be in the same room together, to shake hands and recognise the need to call for more ceasefire talks sometime in the near future. It is why no state, even Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh’s main financial and military backer along with Armenia’s global diaspora, is prepared to recognise the territory’s independence. “We don’t want to pre-empt the peace process with recognition,” said Dirk Laurenz, an EU diplomat based in Yerevan, the Armenian capital, explaining what

Opinion and Analysis is in effect a diplomatic Catch-22. “Only after a comprehensive peace settlement could there be any recognition of Nagorno Karabakh.” In Stepanakert, the functioning capital of Nagorno Karabakh, Babayan seems unfazed by this state of affairs. “Thank God we have gotten rid of this complex of needing to be recognised,” he says, sitting in his office in the town’s grey, imposing and Soviet-designed presidential building. “We’ve realised recognition and status is not enough,” he said. “Ukraine, Iraq and Syria were recognised. Look at them.” Above him is a bronze crest of a spread eagle, one of the symbols of the unrecognised republic. Opposite, a flag of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh, bearing a remarkable similarity with the Armenian tricolour, just with a jagged white line separating one part of the flag from the other. Besides, he says, looking up from his desk, a number of individual states in the US have recognised Nagorno Karabakh, including California and most recently Hawaii, largely the work of active lobbying from Armenia’s extensive diaspora. He is optimistic that Uruguay will soon follow suit, becoming the first country to offer official recognition. Even if there is limited diplomatic progress, Babayan suggests, today’s situation is still one he feels he can work with. “We have to be realists,” he says. “This is also a solution.” He waves aside practical concerns about how the local economy, especially tourism, is hampered by a state of con-

Notes from NagornoKarabakh, Richard Martyn-Hemphill stant war readiness and closed borders. A civilian airport terminal, rebuilt just a few years ago in the graceful peaceful shape of a dove’s wings, remains closed: it cannot function for risk of the planes getting shot down. (The planes would be flying through what international law deems as Azerbaijani airspace without permission to land.) Babayan reckons locals have learned to live without an airport, though this means a several hour drive to Yerevan through single lane mountain passes, dodging roadworks and stray roving herds of cattle. Equally pressing on living standards is the need to spend a vast amount of the budget – a percentage that remains undisclosed – on defence. Previously, forces in Nagorno Karabakh brimmed with confidence in their military after securing extensive territories that stretch beyond what was historically considered Nagorno Karabakh into effectively buffer zone areas of burnt out cottages and various trench formations. Now, however, Russia’s decision to supply arms to both sides of the conflict has rattled nerves in Stepanakert and Yerevan. This was all the more apparent after the Four Day War, which saw a marked improvement in the Azerbaijani side’s offensive capabilities, both in their equipment and their tactics. “The myth of Armenian invincibility was shattered,” said Richard Giragosian of the Regional Studies Center, a research group based in the Caucasus. Giragosian fears more fighting looms ahead. “There is nothing and no one

Notes from NagornoKarabakh, Richard Martyn-Hemphill deterring Azerbaijan from launching attacks,” he added, and was even more scathing about the work done by international observers from the OSCE: “The so-called monitoring is a joke.” Babayan again brushes this off. After 20 years of preparing and all the expensive new high-tech military equipment, he said, all they have to show for it is high casualties and only a few hundred yards of advance. It shows Azerbaijan had a limited chance of military breakthrough, according to Babayan, and they had underestimated the patriotic fervour of the new generation: They are not just interested in using social media to keep track of Kim Kardashian, he said, but also to mobilise and volunteer what they can for the war effort. Especially after the recent flare up in violence, life in Nargorno Karabakh revolves around this war effort. When I visited a local cultural centre in Stepanakert a month after the Four Day War, the pupils were sent home early for the day. The teachers stayed on, keen to cut old green clothing into strips and sew them together to make camouflage for tanks. Vilen Mikaelyan, director of the centre and when he is not making tank camouflage is a talented jazz musician, told me: “We don’t want war. War is a bad thing. But people are preparing.” For Nagorno Karabakh’s leaders, compromise on territorial matters in return for peace remains out of the question. “The only way to survive for them

Opinion and Analysis (Azerbaijan) is always to advance,” said Babayan, and if they were given land they would want more, and could not be trusted to be responsible neighbours on an environmental level. He warns Azerbaijan could even conduct a “blue genocide”, if they were given back some lands which Armenian forces had captured as buffer zone territories. The Azerbaijanis, he warned, could put “chemicals in the water”. As the interview draws to a close after going on until nearly 10pm, Babayan hands over one of his books, The Role of Geopolitics in Biblical Times. Leafing through this work later that night, is another reminder that grudges go back a long way in this part of the world. Back in Yerevan, diplomats, none of whom are allowed to officially visit Nagorno Karabakh, expressed their own heavy pessimism about the prospects for peace. Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, the then Polish Ambassador to Armenia, at a drinks reception in Republic Square, said he was glad Poland was not part of the Minsk Group of peacemakers because of the impossibility of finding a compromise that would be acceptable to all parties. “It’s like Palestine,” he said. An American diplomat at the drinks reception agreed, and cautioned against any attempts at definitive predictions. “Anyone who tells you they know what will happen next in Nagorno Karabakh does not know what they’re talking about.”

A journey to Abkhazia The land of athousanddestinies S O PH IE CL A M A D I E U “Alright, you can go!” Georgi says while getting out of the checkpoint office. I have been waiting for two hours under a tree to get authorisation from Tbilisi to go to Abkhazia. This waiting time has been implemented recently and the representatives of the EU Monitoring Mission in Inguri don’t even understand it. Previously, crossing the border was much faster since it was just necessary to present a passport and sometimes answer the question: “Why do you want to go to Abkhazia?” with “I guess this Georgian region is very beautiful to visit.” The Abkhazian official border is two kilometres away from the Georgian checkpoint. Between these two points, no cars are allowed. It is, however, possible to choose between going there on foot or by taking a carriage for five to ten laris (three euros). Not long after having left the checkpoint, I pass in front of a few Georgian soldiers who kill time in a tent. Next to them fly Georgian and NATO flags. The sculpture of a gun with a twisted barrel is similar to the one outside the UN Headquarters in New York City. No UN blue helmets have ever been mandated in this area,

but a peacekeeping mission was carried out by Russia until 2008. I noticed that the bridge over the Inguri River has been completely renovated since the previous year. Its brilliant white and blue colours are now contrasting with the old wooden carriages. Once in Sukhumi, the largest city of Abkhazia, I am later told that the international community carried out its renovation to facilitate crossings by UN agencies and international NGOs –information that I could verify. While walking on the bridge, I enjoy the beauty of the great verdant hills where cows graze peacefully without realising that they are standing on one of the most disputed territories of the Caucasus. Seeing a traveller with a backpack in this “no man’s land” is quite rare for the many people who cross the border. Some of them observe me with curiosity. In fact, the bridge is mostly being crossed by Georgians from the Gali region, located just one the other side of the Abkhazian border. They travel daily to the Georgian town of Zugdidi, where they sell their agricultural products, such as hazelnuts, at the market for a good price. Georgians like to say that Abkha-

A journey to Abkhazia, Sophie Clamadieu zian hazelnuts sold in Zugdidi are found in Nutella. Indeed, Georgia is one of the main suppliers of hazelnuts for the Italian company, while 10 per cent come from Abkhazia, sometimes passed illegally by the closed border in Anaklia, an emerging Georgian seaside resort along the Black Sea. At the end of the bridge stands a big green panel which reads: “Republic of Abkhazia” in Abkhaz, Russian and English. People carrying huge bags of vegetables and fruits mass near the crossing while a UNHCR car tries to pass by. A soldier in an Abkhazian army uniform checks my documents – a passport and an entrance letter from the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs” of Abkhazia – and invites me to walk towards the second control point. “Why are you going Abkhazia?” a military man asks with limited English and a strong Russian accent. He is standing behind an opaque window and I can only be guessing his shape. He orders me to look forward. “I just want to visit the country,” I answer with my French accent while shrugging my shoulders. The soldier comes out and stares at me. He looks amazed to see a European in this area of the Caucasus. “How long?” he asks. “Ten days,” I reply. The border guard thinks a moment, then gives me back the documents and wishes me a good trip with a big smile. Some taxis are waiting in a car park a little further ahead. The journey to Sukhumi costs 2,500 roubles (40 eu-

Opinion and Analysis ros) and lasts around one hour. We pass through the Georgian Gali district, one of the poorest of the territory. This region of Abkhazia is not without causing some political issues for Sukhumi. After the 1992 – 1993 conflict, an agreement concluded between Sukhumi and Tbilisi allowed around 60,000 Georgian refugees to return to Gali. Once in Sukhumi, I hurry to change and store my stuff since I have a meeting with a local NGO in Gudou Plaza in an hour. The hotel is located near the football stadium specially built for the 2016 ConIFA World Football Cup, a tournament that gathers states and minorities that are not recognised by FIFA, such as Iraqi Kurdistan, Northern Cyprus, Padania or even the County of Nice. Abkhazia won that year’s championship. According to people here, it was the first time in a long time that Sukhumi was so crowded. Abkhazia is not as we imagine. It is necessary to give up on the East-West stereotype in order to understand this small territory which declared its independence in 1993. Unfortunately, very few Europeans venture into Abkhazia. At cafés or restaurants, Abkhazians may join your table if they hear you speaking French or English. They want to know your story before telling you their own, because they are happy to see that you travelled all this way to visit them. This is mainly how I met people in Sukhumi. Unlike some catchy headlines on the internet, Abkhazia is a place that does exist. And if we put aside the war and

Opinion and Analysis the ruined buildings, Sukhumi is a lively town. In the absence of certainty in the future due to the lack of worldwide recognition, the population has gotten into the habit of living from day to day. This is how, for example, making an appointment with someone several weeks or days in advance by email is a total failure, while, phoning the person directly ensure you to get your appointment the same day. Abkhazians live mainly off agricultural goods like honey, chacha grapes, hazelnuts, tea or wine production. In the capital, many have opened restaurants or work in humanitarian organisations or governmental agencies. The Abkhazian State University welcomes Abkhazian students who are mainly studying international relations. Some of them do part of their studies in Russia or even in Europe thanks to a scholarship programme with Italy. In the evening, I head towards the city centre to have a drink with Daria, an Abkhazian girl that I met thanks to an Australian journalist/surfer in love with Abkhazia. We agreed to meet in front of the colonnades which face the Black Sea. There, a painter is exposing his work, mainly paintings of the town and the Abkhazian landscape. All around, people walk peacefully while enjoying the view of the sea and eating ice cream. A few elderly men are playing chess, drinking a small glass of wine and looking at the horizon from time to time. On the other side of the sea is Crimea. It is almost impossible to think that this town is offi-

A journey to Abkhazia, Sophie Clamadieu cially at war for more than 25 years and contrary to what I have been told on the other side, there is not a single soldier walking in the streets. I am amused by a child who is riding a miniature tank with the flag of Abkhazia. Indeed, a little bit further, a woman is renting some bikes and electric cars for children. Since last year, a “yeSukhum” sign has been installed near the harbour, like the famous “I Amsterdam,” and people are taking selfies before posting them on Instagram. In Abkhazia, the society is multi-ethnic. More than 38 languages are spoken. Even if the official languages are Abkhazian and Russian, the latter is mostly used in daily life as it is the common language to all. Kan Taniya, the deputy minister of foreign affairs of Abkhazia, explains to me that the Abkhazian language is very difficult to learn but tends to attract the young generation since pop songs in Abkhazian are becoming more popular. On the road going to the promenade along the coast, it is possible to choose between enjoying some Turkish delights, having an Italian ice cream, eating a Russian soup or sitting in the newly opened Syrian restaurant. Indeed, around 500 Syrian refugees settled in Abkhazia since the beginning of the Syrian crisis. All are of Abkhazian decent. Among these different specialties, Abkhazian cuisine is, of course, the most favoured by the population, since it is part of the Abkhaz identity. Thus, people advise you to go to the restaurant “Narta” and order

A journey to Abkhazia, Sophie Clamadieu some akud (cooked kidney beans) and abysta (porridge of corn flour). The recognition of Abkhazia by Russia in 2008 was not expected by the Abkhazian population. Until then, the war was in everyone’s mind as well as the fear of being attacked again. The 1992 – 1993 conflict is however still visible everywhere. In towns, there are countless memorials in honour of the fallen while sometimes giant panels that bear the name and picture of the dead soldiers have been erected along the roads. Similarly, in the centre of Sukhumi, the imposing parliament building burnt during the conflict is a way for Abkhazians to remember the price paid for independence.

Opinion and Analysis Abkhazia lives now with more serenity even if the future is not totally ensured in the absence of real recognition on the part of the UN. This is what led Maxim Gunjia, the former minister of foreign affairs, to tell me: “Some countries survive thanks to external support, in Abkhazia, we survive against it.” “Before 2008 we did not know that one day another state would recognise us,” someone tells me a few days later while I am drinking an Abkhazian tea at a café. “Everything was uncertain. It was then a real surprise. Now, we cannot say what will happen in the future. But since 2008, there is hope.”

Abkhazian economy today Muslim Abkhazians’ revenge over Russia M IH A IL PRE SL E If there is a part of the world that would definitely need more coverage today, it is without a doubt the Caucasus region. There is certainly a lot taking place in this region which interconnects such topics like international law, migration, ethnic issues, economics and politics. Understanding these complex conditions and where they originate is key not only to improve the situation in the Caucasus, but also in understanding how they will evolve in the future. In that sense, self-declared, partially-recognised Republic of Abkhazia provides a lot of insight. Moreover, understanding today’s Abkhazian economy and its future prospects requires, first and foremost, a proper understanding of history which reveals that the real winners might not be the ones making the headlines… Before the 16th century, Abkhazia, whether it was independent or not, was a region in the Caucasus populated mostly by ethnic Christian Abkhazians. From the 1570s, when the Ottoman Empire invaded Abkhazia, a significant part of Abkhaz converted to Islam. Following the arrival of the Russian Empire in the region in the first half of the

18th century, the Abkhaz revolted twice against the Russian occupant, in 1866 and 1877. As a result to harsh reactions from the Russians, most of the Muslim Abkhaz fled and obtained asylum in the former Ottoman Empire, mostly in today’s Northern Turkey. Today’s ethnic situation in Abkhazia is tightly related to this exodus of ethnic Abkhaz. After a dramatic demographic decrease, Russian authorities decided to populate the deserted lands by ethnic Armenians, Russians or Georgians, making the ethnic Abkhaz a minority where Georgians were a majority. In 1931 Joseph Stalin decided to incorporate Abkhazia into the Georgian Socialist Soviet Republic with the status of Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, thus emphasising Georgian dominance over Abkhazia. When the Abkhaz won the so-called war of independence against Georgia (1992 – 1993) it is without a surprise that they forced into exile over 200,000 ethnic Georgians. Nevertheless, after the war and until today, 94,000 ethnic Abkhaz still do not represent the majority of the population in Abkhazia (only around 45 per cent). Fifty-five per cent of the remaining popu-

Abkhazian economy today, Mihail Presle lation are made up of Armenians, Russians and Georgians. On the other hand, the Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey, descendants of the exiled Muslim Abkhaz, represents an astonishing number of 300,000 to 500,000 people, in other words three to five times the Abkhazian population inside Abkhazia. In order to make the Abkhaz a majority, the Abkhaz authorities have engaged in an ambitious plan to repatriate those Abkhaz living abroad. To do so, they are now offering Abkhaz citizenship to every ethnic Abkhaz living abroad, which gives some economic advantage to those willing to return, especially in terms of investment. According to Abkhaz law, only Abkhaz citizens can own land and real estate in Abkhazia while other nationalities can only rent. Economically speaking, this creates a major barrier to investments in the country keeping the demand and prices artificially low. As a result, the ethnic Abkhaz living in Turkey are massively investing in Abkhazia, buying land and real estate and starting new businesses there. This does not bode well for Russia which, by recognising Abkhazia in 2008 as an independent state, donates a large amount of

Opinion and Analysis funding into the Abkhaz government for development and should expect to have its piece of the cake. The cherry on top of the cake is that the majority of Turkish industry development projects in Abkhazia are destined to export goods to Russia, benefitting from free-trade agreement between Russia and Abkhazia. In fact, Abkhazia has the perfect conditions for producing agricultural goods: cheap labour, cheap electricity, thermal heat, tax benefits, etc. While this is just a quick summation of the situation, it raises some important questions. Abkhazia has argued that it wants to be independent from Russia and it is obviously doing everything possible to illustrate this. What are Russia’s interests in Abkhazia? Why is it sponsoring the Abkhazian government? What will they get in return? One thing is for sure, by the time Abkhazia changes its law with regards to real estate ownership most of the country’s valuable assets will probably have already been bought by Muslim Abkhaz from Turkey. After all, history teaches us revenge while what capitalism teaches us that you need to buy first… it seems as though Russia has a problem understanding both of these concepts.

Meeting the Gagauzes M ICH A E L E RIC L A MB E R T Living in an unrecognised country is not an easy thing, but living in an almost unrecognised state is probably even worse! Having a brief look at the map of post-Soviet space, de facto states have become common and the parent states have learnt how to deal with frozen conflicts – such as Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Karabakh in Armenia/Azerbaijan, or Donbas in Ukraine. However, the complex picture of separatism in Eastern Europe is even more complicated if you decide to focus on regional identity and separatism in the recognised countries themselves – such as Gagauzia in Moldova and Adjaria in Georgia. Moreover, since the separatist conflict in Donbas, we must pay even greater attention to regionalism in Eastern Europe. One of the most fascinating examples is probably Gagauzia, an autonomous territory of Moldova – spanning a region of 1,800 square kilometres with 135,000 inhabitants. The history of Gagauzia goes back to the Seljuk Turks and the Oghuz Turk Sunni Muslim Dynasty that became a Persianate society in the medieval West and Central Asia. Having been a part of an empire spanning from Istanbul to Astana, the few descendants now live in

the poorest country in Europe, Moldova, with no access to the Black Sea. Some historians claim the Gagauz descends from the Pechenegs and Cuman. During the religious wars between Muslims and Christians in Eastern Europe, the ancestors of the Gagauz converted to Orthodox Christianity to survive violent conflicts in Bulgaria before escaping and settling in the isolated land of Bessarabia. Despite an obvious pragmatism to survive and protect themselves, the Gagauz have always been in the wrong place at the wrong time and have been annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812 (following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire) then forced to leave again. Inhabitants have been separated around current Moldova and have no contiguous territorial entity anymore, making it difficult to protect their unique identity and traditions. Successively part of the Russian Empire, Great Romania, the Soviet Union and today Moldova, the Gagauz people are used to living for themselves. They simply enjoy a warm Turkish coffee in the summer, an obvious reference to the Ottoman times, and a glass of red wine. To understand the current context we need to have a look at geography itself. Gagauzia is divided into three distinct districts with four enclaves and the (al-

Meeting the Gagauzes, Michael Eric Lambert most) capital city of Comrat. Comrat is a small city compared to Chișinău, the capital of Moldova. It has a well-founded university in contrast to the rest of the country and shows the interest of the citizens for education. The bright 500 students studying there, like all Moldovans, would like to escape to find a job in Europe, Russia or Turkey. However, the students have developed a strong interest for politics and economics and are deeply motivated by the idea of “Making Gagauzia great again” or at least making it an independent state. The Gagauz perceive Russia as a possible protector due to its policies in supporting other separatist republics of Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Moreover, the Gagauz speak their own language plus Russian as an interethnic language – as in Soviet times – and are not ready to give up Russian for other foreign languages like English or French. The Gagauz also share a historical memory of wars between Western empires and Russia during the 19th century. The British military intervention to protect the Ottoman Empire from Russia and turning Istanbul into a Muslim city remains deep in the people’s mind. An unforgettable mistake neither the Russians nor the Gagauz have forgotten. The similarities between the glorious Russian Empire and the Soviet Union are also visible in Comrat with monuments of Vladimir Lenin, a Soviet tank and many other symbols. Europe does not seem to be the best place for Gagauzes as EU countries are not ready to

Opinion and Analysis support an independent Gagauzia, nor do they provide much business opportunities. Most of the economic activity in the region is based on furniture, targeting the post-Soviet market first and foremost. The same goes with red wine from the region, which is unknown in the EU, but the quality is recognised in Moldova, Russia and, surprisingly, China. Like most people in rural parts of the world, the family unit remains the most important component of society. Yet, there is a fear that the Gagauz are doomed to be assimilated. The demographics are worrisome, with the birth rate decreasing. The language is not well known and the young people who move abroad usually do not come back. The lack of job opportunities in the area – as in the rest of Moldova – makes it difficult to enjoy a peaceful life. “At least in Transnistria and in Abkhazia, the Russians are sending a bit of cash to people,” is a common sentiment found in Gagauzia. Many young men and women are tempted to be the next self-proclaimed state in Eastern Europe. In unrecognised or partially-recognised states, inhabitants can at least decide their official language (plus Russian) and are not forced to learn Romanian. Inhabitants in unrecognised territories usually receive financial aid from Moscow or have cheap gas to cook and heat while many believe that Moldova’s elite are stealing most of the EU aid. In Gagauzia, the EU is perceived as aiding the corrupt elite in Chișinău and unable to develop the country.

Opinion and Analysis The most striking element in Gagauzia is definitely the resilience of the past. Inhabitants still rely on Russia and one decade of European discourse has not had any impact on them. Moreover, people are very pragmatic when it comes to the future. When asked if they would like to be an autonomous country, they enthusiastically agree. At the same time the feeling is not to be the next Transnistria. No matter, any ideas of autonomy remain nearly impossible. The districts that make up Gagauzia are separated and there is no organised military force to fight the central government. The possibility to be a de facto state will also be connected to geopolitical interests of Russia in Moldova. In Transnistria you can find Soviet warehouses, a military airport and some valuable industries like cognac. Gagauzia lacks many of those things. However, the topic has been briefly on the table during the 2014 – 2015 conflict in eastern Ukraine. The Novorossiya project focused on expanding the territory of the separatists from Donbas to Transnistria and some ideas included also Gagauzia. In many ways, the Gagauz people would agree to such a project as it would give them access to the Black Sea and a stronger connection to Russia. Gagauzia’s place in the world still remains an open question and provides some important lessons on the post-Soviet space. First of all, building trust takes a long time and a lot of investment. The weight of the past remains one of the main components for decision makers. The Chinese motto “if you don’t know

Meeting the Gagauzes, Michael Eric Lambert where you’re going, look at where you are coming from” certainly applies in the case of Gagauzia. Second, Moldova is still far from the European Union and NATO and even if it can manage with Transnistria in the future, the question of Gagauzia remains an additional issue for stability. Too often, the Gagauz are pushed outside the debate on the Eastern Partnership and experts focus too much on Transnistria. Third, the EU lacks a certain level of pragmatism when it comes to corruption. The Eastern Partnership is an obvious strategic failure and Europeans have to accept it to start developing a new strategy to increase its role in Eastern Europe. As long as we Europeans reject the idea that we have failed, we will not be able to move forward. Regarding Russia, it seems that the soft power strategy is relevant in specific areas such as Gagauzia, but also Transnistria, Donbas and Abkhazia. However, the Kremlin should not be so confident by doing almost nothing in the de facto states. China is growing and becoming more important in this region as well and increasing its economic activities, buying goods like goat’s cheese and red wine. This is all to say that regionalism remains far more important than we imagine in the capital cities in Europe. Even if regions like Gagauzia don’t have any Iskander missiles, Soviet warehouses or Russian peacekeepers, we should still pay attention and try to understand the whole scale of Russia’s tools of influenceand,most of all, the resilience of the past.

Is Republika Srpska Europe’s next de facto state? B E T T INA R IC H M A N Republika Srpska, a semi-autonomous region in Bosnia and Herzegovina with long-nurtured dreams of independence, could be gearing up to be Europe’s next de facto state. Leader Milorad Dodik may finally be acting on threats to secede, capitalising on weak public institutions in Bosnia, a strong nationalist sentiment in the republic and strategic partnerships abroad. The ethnic tension-fuelled bloodshed of the Bosnian War in the mid-1990s resulted in a desperate attempt on the part of Western Europe and especially the United States to bring peace to the Balkans by any means. The US-devised the Dayton Accords, which stitched a wounded Bosnia together into a peaceful almost-democracy consisting of two semi-autonomous regions, Republika Srpska and the Federation of BosniaHerzegovina (FBiH) with three ethnically-distinct presidents. Twenty years later, the tripartite system fashioned as a means of satisfying all parties and ceasing bloodshed at any cost has long outlasted its utility as an effective governance mechanism for a stable and democratic nation. Dayton institutionalised a political system in

which three leaders representing Bosnia’s main ethnic groups – Bosniak, Croat and Serb – come together in an awkward rotating presidency that achieves little to bring prosperity, rule of law and social cohesion to a country struggling to overcome the legacy of its past. Bosnia is politically fragile, to say the least. It would arguably not be too difficult for the Dayton Accords band aid to fall off should one of the three ethnic groups or two semi-autonomous regions choose independence or provoke conflict. Bosnia’s last census in 2013 revealed over 80 per cent of inhabitants from Republika Srpska to be ethnically Serb. Amid reports of Bosniaks feeling unwelcome and discriminated against in the region due to being Muslim, it is likely this proportion is even higher today as Bosniaks move to FBiH where their ethnic group make up over 70 per cent of the population. The 2013 census has also caused concern among Serbs that Bosniaks now outnumber them in the country as a whole. During the war, Serb forces committed acts of genocide and war crimes against their Bosniak and Croat counterparts. Due to the blame projected

Opinion and Analysis

Is Republika Srpska Europe’s next de facto state?, Bettina Richman

on the Serb population by the West for these offenses, Serb nationalism in BiH was not frequently given a platform in the years following the war out of fear of international backlash. However, increasing ethnic homogeneity and sentiments of being threatened, bring the Serbs ever closer to supporting a movement in which they are relieved of the collective guilt of the past. Milorad Dodik’s rise to lead Republika Srpska began as a campaign by a once moderate political veteran in 2010. In the eight years since, first as a prime minister and then as president of the region, Dodik grew into a more confident and outspoken leader. As the sting of the war retreated, Dodik’s rhetoric offered increasingly nationalist and secessionist ideas. He regularly defended Serb war criminals and even welcomed them to Republika Srpska with open arms. However, while his statements regarding the war and independence were alarming, his threats of secession were proven to be largely empty as the world braced for action that never materialised. Over the past few years, Dodik transformed from a man of words to one of action and citizens are proving their support for his ambitions. In 2016, in outright defiance of Bosnia’s constitutional court, Dodik organised a referendum on reinstating “Statehood Day” which marks the day Republika Srpska seceded from Bosnia at the outset of the war in 1992. Over 99 per cent of the region’s inhabitants voted in favour. On January 9th 2017 and again one year

later, Bosnian Serbs took to the streets across Republika Srpska in celebration of the controversial holiday. In addition to providing Serb nationalists with a platform for their sentiments, Dodik is taking steps to institutionalise his revisionist version of Serb involvement in the Bosnian war and opposition to the western forces that place blame for the war squarely on Serb shoulders. For example, last year, he signed legislation forbidding schools from teaching about the siege of Sarajevo and the massacre at Srebrenica, two battles in which Serb forces committed genocide. Dodik does not hide his profound dislike for NATO and last year passed a resolution proclaiming his republic’s military neutrality, effectively obstructing wider Bosnia’s efforts to join the alliance. It is unknown how much of Dodik’s current secessionist activities are in service of his own vision for the region versus simply a thirst for power via embodiment of popular sentiments. He does not seem to fear the chorus of criticism and sanctions coming from Western Europe and the US for his destabilising political actions and promotion of a revisionist and nationalist public sentiment. However, Dodik’s gamble may have paid off. His efforts to legitimise and nurture nationalist sentiments will serve to bolster public support if he chooses to initiate a real independence movement. His means of doing so, however, remain unknown. It was previously assumed Dodik would begin the process of claiming in-

Is Republika Srpska Europe’s next de facto state?, Bettina Richman dependence by holding a referendum, which he has denied. An alternative scenario involves a temporary delay of the referendum while Dodik potentially ascends to occupy the Serb seat in the tripartite Bosnian presidency during national elections in October of this year. Should he win, Dodik is likely to use his power to further decentralise and transfer power from Sarajevo to Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska, and gauge the extent of support for a future independence referendum from there. Dodik is well aware that a region cannot simply proclaim its independence without backlash from those who do not view its struggle as legitimate. The essential component to de facto state status is a lack of international recognition of its sovereignty. Of the major de facto states in Europe such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, not one has achieved recognition from more than six UN member states. The ability to self-sustain when the majority of the world turns its back is essential to any state seeking self-determination. This is unlikely to be an issue in Republika Srpska, which has key allies abroad willing to support its efforts. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Dodik have a robust relationship. Russia’s support for a possible independence referendum has both historical and strategic undercurrents. Putin believes strongly that the breakup of Yugoslavia constituted a bloody end to stability in the Balkans at the hands of the West. He is a frequent supporter of those who

Opinion and Analysis

claim to be nostalgic for their authoritarian past, as many Serbs in Bosnia have professed to be. Putin also draws a familial link between the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and is said to be in favour of bolstering the ideal of “PanSlavism” in connecting the descendants of both regimes. However, stronger than Putin’s tendency for camaraderie with Dodik and the Serbs is his understanding that Bosnia is more valuable to Russia as a fractured state than a whole. An essential element to Russian foreign policy in its European neighbourhood is assistance to (or even conception of ) forces that destabilise countries’ Euro-Atlantic integration. Fearing the EU and especially NATO’s reach into countries closer and closer to Russia, Putin executes a clear policy of contributing to movements that prevent the accession to these bodies by their sovereign host nations. Russia directly entered separatist regions in Ukraine and Georgia following an advancement of their NATO accession statuses and initiated a failed attempt to bring instability to Montenegro when it joined the alliance last year. Russia has proven itself more than willing to prop up – or in the case of Crimea, annex – regions who reject their country’s positive outlook toward the West. Republika Srpska’s struggle for independence would fit squarely within Russia’s eligibility parameters for assistance to counter western influence in the region. Russia supported outright the 2016 referendum on “Statehood Day” and has

Opinion and Analysis

Is Republika Srpska Europe’s next de facto state?, Bettina Richman

overall proven to be a vocal supporter of any of Dodik’s statements and actions that counter FBiH or western ideals and promote Serb nationalism. However, Republika Srpska will need more than proclamations of support to successfully secede from Bosnia. It will look to Serbia and Russia for investment in order to ensure its ability to survive economically. Bosnia relies on Russia almost entirely for energy imports and it is not difficult to predict which side Putin would choose to support in the case of a conflict. Despite Dodik’s proclamations that any secession will be peaceful in nature, recent news that Republika Srpska is bolstering a suspected Russian-backed “Serbian Honour” paramilitary force is being greeted with alarm. Earlier this year, they also purchased 2,500 automatic rifles from Serbia which it claims is to defend itself against terrorists, but also means it could fortify its efforts against other forces that counter to its political aims. If the so-called “Serbian Honour” is indeed proven to be funded and trained by Russia it would mark a departure for Russian support of recent separatist movements as it has previously limited much of its direct military assistance to those with whom it shares borders and can easily smuggle in weapons and reinforcement. In the case of a bid for independence, Russia would likely look to Serbia to help deliver military support to the region. The extent to which Serbia would be willing

to threaten its already shaky relationship with the US, EU and NATO in service of Republika Srpska’s quest for self-determination (or absorption into Serbia) remains to be seen. Serbia’s insistence on not sacrificing its relationship with Russia in service of its aims for EuroAtlantic integration means it would be difficult for the country to decide with whom to side in the case of a proclamation of independence. Arguably, Serbia would support independence insofar as turning a blind eye to Russian military meddling in the conflict. It may even choose to recognise an independent Republika Srpska out of respect for fellow Serbs. However, it would likely stop short of offering to annex it into Serbia as this would amount to nailing the coffin on its Euro-Atlantic integration and inviting sanctions from the West. Without absorption into Serbia, Republika Srpska’s limited allies means it is likely to follow in the footsteps of de facto states such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia which are able to survive by relying a great deal on Russia, but have not received recognition by enough nations to fully legitimise their declaration. It is unlikely that independence would be greeted with the same appreciation of its struggle and international support as Kosovo, which has, in western rhetoric, largely avoided the de facto state characterisation. Unfortunately, Republika Srpska will have to settle for the title.

The model student, the latecomer and the bully NATO relations in Eastern Europe D O M INIK P. J A N K O W S K I

The next NATO summit will be held on July 11 – 12th 2018 in Brussels. It provides the alliance with an opportunity to uphold or – if needed – potentially update the decisions regarding its relationship with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia. Certainly NATO must assess what it can realistically achieve in today’s relations with Moscow, Kyiv and Tbilisi. The NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016 constituted a turning point for the alliance. For NATO’s deterrence and defence policy it was not just a summit. It was the summit. A number of crucial decisions were made including a set of instruments that enhance NATO’s eastern flank. Most importantly, the allies agreed to establish an enhanced forward presence which consists of four multinational battalions in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. NATO also endorsed a tailored forward presence for the south-eastern flank which has been built around a Romanian framework brigade. Moreover, NATO decided to recognise cyberspace as an operational domain – joining land, air and sea – which enables the alliance to better protect its networks, missions, and operations. Additionally, the allies committed to continue to enhance NATO’s resilience and develop individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. Finally, in Warsaw NATO took its relationship with the EU to the next level. A joint declaration identified key areas for expanding bilateral co-operation, includ-

Opinion and Analysis

The model student, the latecomer and the bully, Dominik P. Jankowski

ing hybrid and cyber threats, supporting partners in defence capacity building and increasing maritime security. NATO Christmas tree Even if the Warsaw summit was oriented on collective defence, it did bring new momentum in the alliance’s relationship with eastern partners – Russia, Ukraine and Georgia. In practice, NATO has tried to act as a good, yet principled, school director. It judged the performance of the three countries according to their actual behaviour as well as their commitment to obeying a set of school rules. In short, the summit in Warsaw confirmed that NATO has to deal at the same time with a bully (Russia), a latecomer (Ukraine) and a model student (Georgia). In an unpredictable security environment there is one constant: every NATO summit delivers a lengthy final communiqué. It is often called the “NATO Christmas Tree”, as it embraces all potential topics from nuclear capabilities to the role of NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Importantly enough, every summit communiqué is based on agreed language and serves as a reference point for any future decisions. With 139 paragraphs the Warsaw summit communiqué was no different. It set out a clear framework on how to deal with the bully, the latecomer and the model student. Russia was mentioned 56 times in the communiqué and was clearly depicted as a global bully. Allies underlined that for over two decades NATO has endeavoured to build a partnership with Russia, including through the NATO-Russia Council. Yet, Russia’s activities and policies reduced stability and security, increased unpredictability and changed the security environment. Russia breached the values, principles and commitments which underpin the NATO-Russia relationship as outlined in the 1997 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration. NATO clearly pointed out that decisions made at the Warsaw summit were fully consistent with international commitments and therefore could not be regarded as contradicting the NATO-Russia Founding Act. In Warsaw, NATO was very clear in naming and shaming Russia’s destabilising actions and policies. The list included: the ongoing illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea; the violation of sovereign borders by force; the deliberate destabilisation of eastern Ukraine; large-scale snap exercises contrary to the spirit of the Vienna Document; provocative military activities near NATO borders in the Baltic and Black Sea regions and the Eastern Mediterranean; Russia’s irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric; and repeated violations of NATO allied airspace.

The model student, the latecomer and the bully, Dominik P. Jankowski

Opinion and Analysis

In addition, the alliance highlighted Russia’s military intervention, its significant military presence and support for the regime in Syria and the use of its presence in the Black Sea to project power into the Eastern Mediterranean which posed further risks and challenges for the security of the allies. Fundamental issues One of the key elements of a future NATO-Russia relationship was defined in paragraph 12 of the communiqué. The allies stressed that while all practical civilian and military co-operation between NATO and Russia remained suspended, political dialogue will continue. NATO set out a concrete framework for such a dialogue. The alliance remained open to a “periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NATO-Russia Council, with a view to avoiding misunderstanding, miscalculation and unintended escalation and to increase transparency and predictability”. The allies also noted the importance of keeping the existing military lines of communication open. In short, the message was unequivocal: the nature of the alliance’s relations with Russia will be contin- NATO’s political and gent on a clear, constructive change in Russia’s actions practical engagement that demonstrates compliance with international law with Ukraine since and its international obligations. Until then, NATO cannot return to “business as usual”. The Russian ag- 2014 has been gression in Ukraine was also a fundamental issue in unprecedented. shaping NATO’s relationship with Kyiv. In February 2010, Ukraine formalised its non-aligned status as a basic principle of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Even if the practical co-operation with NATO continued, the alliance membership for Ukraine was then taken off the agenda and Kyiv became a latecomer in the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Yet, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a game-changer. NATO’s level of political and practical engagement with Ukraine since 2014 has been unprecedented. The summit in Warsaw delivered not only an explicit signal of political support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and its inherent right to decide its foreign policy course free from outside interference, but also offered a concrete framework for additional practical co-operation. Ukraine was mentioned in the final communiqué 35 times. NATO decided to support Ukraine in carrying out its reform agenda, including by making the best use of the already existing mechanisms – the Annual National Programme (ANP) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) – as well as by creating the Com-

Opinion and Analysis

The model student, the latecomer and the bully, Dominik P. Jankowski

Photo courtesy of NATO.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (left) on a recent visit to Kyiv with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. Since 2016 Ukraine has also made significant steps to enhance its political and practical co-operation with NATO.

prehensive Assistance Package (CAP). The ANP, which reflects Ukraine’s national reform objectives, is composed of five chapters focusing on political and economic issues; defence and military issues; resources; security issues; and legal aspects. On an annual basis the allies assess progress under the ANP. In addition, the PARP has helped to guide transformation and reforms in the defence and related security sectors. The 2016 partnership goal package explicitly aimed to support Kyiv’s strategic organisation reform and institution-building for defence and security sector organisations. The PARP has also supported Ukraine in pursuing the reforms mandated in its 2015 National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine as well as the Strategic Defence Bulletin. Finally, the CAP’s aim has been to consolidate and enhance NATO’s assistance aimed at helping Ukraine to become more resilient and to better provide for its own security. As set out in the CAP, NATO decided to continue to advance and implement strategic reforms. The CAP has contained more than 40 areas where NATO has supported Ukraine in reforms conducted by the Ukrainian government. Practical tools The NATO summit in Warsaw confirmed that the above activities constitute just a part of NATO’s effort to enhance Ukraine. In fact, the latecomer has an

The model student, the latecomer and the bully, Dominik P. Jankowski

Opinion and Analysis

immense list of programmes at its disposal including those assisting Ukraine’s military sector with professional development, education, data sharing and most importantly overall reform efforts. Adding to this list, the allies have also helped launched trust funds to help with the financial side. Since 2014, six of them have been set up. They cover such critical areas as command, control, communications and computers; logistics and standardisation; cyber defence; medical rehabilitation; military career transition; and counter-improvised explosive devices and explosive ordnance disposal. Finally, the summit in Warsaw addressed NATO relations with its Eastern European model student – Georgia. Every teacher knows that praising good students is an important, yet only a temporary, solution. At some point, they need a tangible reward. In fact in 2016 Georgia had all the practical tools to become a member of NATO, but for political reasons – including the protracted conflict in the Russian-occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia region – it was not granted a Membership Action Plan. Therefore, allies had a hard nut to crack in Warsaw in order to find added value to NATO-Georgia relations. Ultimately, NATO encouraged Tbilisi to continue making full use of all the opportunities for moving closer to the alliance offered by the NATO-Georgia Commission, the Annual National Programme, the Enhanced Opportunities Partner status, the participation in the Defence Capacity Building Initiative and the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP). The SNGP, approved at the NATO summit in Newport in 2014, has proven to be a success story. In Warsaw, NATO stressed that within the SNGP the Joint Training and Evaluation Centre started work and more than 30 allied and partner security experts were in Georgia supporting security reform efforts, including in areas such as cyber defence, aviation and logistics. Moreover, the Defence Institution Building School was inaugurated and allies decided to provide support to the development of Georgia’s air defence and air surveillance capabilities as well as strategic communications. Finally, NATO and Georgia agreed to deepen their focus on security in the Black Sea region, including in the maritime area. Limited dialogue The next NATO summit will be held on July 11 – 12th 2018 in Brussels. It provides the alliance with an opportunity to uphold or – if needed – potentially update the decisions regarding its relationship with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia. Certainly NATO must assess what it can realistically achieve in today’s relations with Moscow, Kyiv and Tbilisi.

Opinion and Analysis

The model student, the latecomer and the bully, Dominik P. Jankowski

Since 2016 one has not seen a new quality in Russian security and defence policy. Moscow continues to act as a global bully with its aggressive actions, persistent violations of international law, military build-up and political coercion. The list remains long: Ukraine, Syria, the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas, the Western Balkans and the High North. One should also not forget about interference in western countries’ domestic issues, including France, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland. On top of this, evidence indicates that Russia was responsible for the use of a nerve agent in the UK on March 4th this year. This was the first offensive use of chemical weapons on alliance territory since NATO’s foundation. In response, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg withdrew the accreditation of seven staff at the Russian mission to NATO and denied the pending accreditation request for three others. NATO also reduced the size of the Russian mission by ten people, bringing its maximum number down to 20 diplomats. Although NATO did deliver on dialogue after 2016, its results were, at best, extremely modest. Three meetings of the NATO-Russia Council in 2017 revealed Moscow’s true intentions. There was no real progress either on the RussianUkrainian conflict or on increasing transparency. The level of reciprocity was all but disappointing. In fact the “Zapad-2017” military exercise was another realitycheck through which Russia communicated its offensive intentions and sophisticated capabilities. And the recently adopted Russia’s State Armament Programme 2018 – 2027 is yet further proof that an aggressive and unpredictable Russia – with steadily growing military capabilities – will stay with us for a long period of time. For now, Russia continues to be a part of the problem rather than a part of the solution. Therefore, this year’s NATO summit in Brussels should reconfirm the modalities of the alliance’s policy towards Russia as agreed in Newport and Warsaw: deterrence based on defence and limited dialogue based on a set of rules. Dialogue with Russia can be treated as a support for fulfilling the alliance’s core task, yet cannot be treated as the aim in itself. A new level? Since 2016 Ukraine has also made some additional steps to enhance its political and practical co-operation with NATO. Step by step it has diminished the impact of its latecomer status in the relationship with the alliance. On June 8th 2017 the Ukrainian parliament voted to restore NATO membership as the country’s strategic foreign policy objective, amending legislation on national security and internal and foreign policies. During the North Atlantic Council visit to Ukraine on July 9th and 10th 2017, which marked the 20th anniversary of the distinctive partnership

The model student, the latecomer and the bully, Dominik P. Jankowski

Opinion and Analysis

between NATO and Ukraine, the allies decided to launched yet another instrument dedicated to Kyiv: the NATO-Ukraine Platform on Countering Hybrid Warfare. Its framework has four focus areas: model of a hybrid conflict, crisis management system, critical infrastructure protection and strategic communications. The first seminar within this platform was organised by Poland in Warsaw in the autumn of 2017. The goal of the event was to analyse the environment prone to hybrid warfare and responses available to state actors, e.g. by identifying means to enhance resilience and strengthen civil preparedness. Indeed, NATO has a prominent role to play in countering hybrid threats. The NATO summit in Brussels should confirm that the NATO-Ukraine platform could be used by the alliance to catch up with the latest lessons learned from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Recommendations identified by the platform, including through the study projects submitted by Ukraine to NATO in March 2018, could contribute to relevant strands of work in NATO, including the ongoing work on increasing resilience, projecting stability, enhancing civil preparedness and improving strategic communications. Finally, few countries in Europe express as much enthusiasm for NATO as Georgia – even though it is not yet a member of the alliance. Georgia has 870 troops in Afghanistan, making it the largest non-NATO troops contributor to the NATO training mission. In fact, one should not forget that on a per capita basis Georgia has until now the most killed in combat in Afghanistan. Moreover, Tbilisi has also contributed twice an infantry company to the NATO Response Forces which is quite a commitment for a non-NATO country. The upcoming NATO summit in Brussels will offer the alliance a chance to take the NATO-Georgia relationship to a new level while keeping Georgia firmly on the path to full membership. There are three vital elements for such an approach: ensure that the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package is fully resourced; place Black Sea security at the centre of the relationship with Tbilisi which ultimately could lead to the opening of a NATO-certified Centre of Excellence on Black Sea security in Georgia; and push for a greater allied presence in the Black Sea region, including the Black Sea Maritime Patrol mission modelled off the successful Baltic Air Policing mission. Such concrete additional military instruments might help the model student to stay on the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. The views and opinions expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the institution he represents. Dominik P. Jankowski is a security policy expert, diplomat, think tanker and social media afficionado. He currently serves as head of the OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A house divided Orthodoxy in post-Maidan Ukraine G E O RG E S O RO K A

Religious institutions in Ukraine are presently embroiled in an internecine battle between Orthodox factions that stand alongside a gaping ideological divide. The central fault line in this conflict is based on geopolitical and civilisational identities, with Moscow’s promotion of pan-Slavism comprising one side, and Kyiv’s pro-EU orientation the other. The symbolic dimensions of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine are impossible to miss. And, as often as not, that symbolism is connected to religion. It could hardly be otherwise when separatists and Russian officials routinely cast the episodic fighting that continues in the east as a civilisational struggle between an enervated, hedonistic West that backs a “fascist junta” in Kyiv and the traditional Christian values of the so-called “Russian world” – the latter occasionally more palatably presented to Ukrainian audiences as “Holy Rus’.” But divisions in Ukrainian society over religion, far from just being confined to rhetoric emanating from rebel-held areas in the Donbas, permeate the entire country. In a context where (depending on whose survey results you believe) some seven to eight out of every ten Ukrainians identify as Orthodox, which specific jurisdiction one is associated with has taken on distinctly political overtones. In this highly polarised setting disputes between competing ecclesial organisations and their followers often assume an uncompromising character, with extensive media coverage interjecting them into the court of public opinion.

A house divided, George Soroka

Opinion and Analysis Enmity and mistrust

Consider what happened this past New Year’s Eve in Zaporizhia, a city in southeastern Ukraine. A toddler out with his father in the courtyard of their apartment complex was struck and killed by a drunk who jumped out of an eighth-storey window. What transformed this event from a horrifying tragedy into a lightning rod for religious contention was the reaction of the Orthodox priest slated to preside at the boy’s funeral. Upon learning at the last minute that the boy had been baptised in a rival “nationalist” jurisdiction whose canonicity his Church did not recognise, the priest refused to conduct the service, explaining to the distraught parents that the baptism had been illicit and that the child could therefore not be accorded an Orthodox burial. His actions triggered widespread outrage across Ukraine, stirring up a social media campaign to shame the Church he belongs to by having people leave dolls and toys in front of its parishes. Enmity and mistrust, however, are present on all sides. The day after Orthodox Christmas (January 7th), radical Ukrainian nationalists associated with the paramilitary group C14 (“Sich”) attempted to disrupt services at the Kyiv Caves Monastery by setting off fireworks and harassing worshippers as they entered the complex. Its members were there because the monastery, which is one the preeminent monastic centres in the Orthodox world, is controlled by a Church they regard as a Russian fifth column. This was not the first time the monks and parishioners had been subjected to intimidation. And, as a Church statement was quick to point out, similar attacks had recently occurred throughout the country. When it comes to the war zone in eastern Ukraine, the situation is even more pronounced. Ample documentation exists of atrocities and human rights abuses perpetrated by both separatist militias (among them the self-styled “Russian Orthodox Army”) and pro-Kyiv forces against clerics and believers who had the misfortune of belonging to the “wrong” Church. Meanwhile, it is not difficult to find priests on either side of the political fence who actively aid and support the combatants, including by not only blessing soldiers but also the ordnance (guns, rockets, tanks) that may eventually kill fellow Orthodox Christians. Religious divides There are four main religious bodies in Ukraine, three of them Orthodox: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP); the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP); and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). The fourth is the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church

Opinion and Analysis

Organization Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate

A house divided, George Soroka Active religious communities

Monasteries

Clergy

Media outlets

12,079

208

10,289

135

Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate

4,790

3,479

Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church

1,131

709

Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church

3,306

102

2,755

Data (as of January 1, 2017) from the Department of Religious Affairs and Nationalities of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine.

(UGCC), which is also liturgically and theologically rooted in Byzantium but has been in communion with the Pope since the Union of Brest in 1596. Discussion of the UGCC is included as it has been influential in shaping religious discourse in contemporary Ukraine, despite being geographically concentrated in the western provinces that formerly belonged to Austria-Hungary. The UOC-MP possesses the largest number of parishes and monasteries, but this does not mean that it boasts the greatest number of adherents. According to a March 2017 survey by the Kyiv-based Razumkov Center (which excluded Crimea and separatist-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk), among self-identified Orthodox reporting an affiliation, 38.8 per cent belonged to the UOC-KP (up from 22.1 per cent in 2010), 17.4 per cent belonged to the UOC-MP (down from 34.5 per cent in 2010) and 1.5 per cent belonged to the UAOC (essentially unchanged from 2010). The UGCC, meanwhile, claimed 7.8 per cent of the population. For most of the Soviet period, the only recognised Orthodox body in the USSR was the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) headed by the Moscow Patriarchate (MP), of which the Ukrainian SSR constituted an exarchate. Consequently, Ukraine’s current religious divides may be traced back to the late 1980s, when the implementation of glasnost finally permitted competing communities to re-emerge or form. The nexus of this activity centred about the 1000th anniversary of the baptism of Kyivan Rus’ in 1988. Understanding the crux of the resultant divisions requires realising that both Russians and Ukrainians have traditionally seen their nation-states as originating in Rus’, leading them to view their ethnic identities as closely tied to the adoption of Byzantine Christianity by its ruler, Grand Prince Volodymyr (or Vladimir). Disagreements over who can legitimately claim this cultural and spiritual mantle are further amplified due to divergent perspectives being tied to such notable figures in the respective national pantheons of Russia and Ukraine as Vasily Klyuchevsky and Metropolitan Macarius (Bulgakov), who held that Moscow was its direct inheritor, and Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, who instead asserted that it had passed to Halych-Volhynia. (The option that it may reside with both is too moderate a position to attract much sympathy among nationalists of either stripe).

A house divided, George Soroka

Opinion and Analysis Independence

The UOC-MP in its present configuration dates from 1990, when the ROC granted its religious communities in Ukraine self-governing status. This means that the UOC-MP is formally independent in financial and administrative matters, but that the “mother Church” retains certain prerogatives, with the Patriarch of Moscow (whose official title is Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’) confirming the head of the UOC-MP (who holds the title Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine) and the ROC serving as the conduit for the UOC-MP’s relations with other Orthodox churches. Importantly, of the three major Orthodox jurisdictions present in Ukraine, only the UOC- Of the three MP is regarded as canonical, meaning it is the only major Orthodox one that is recognised by world Orthodoxy. jurisdictions in However, this arrangement did not suit everyone. Ukraine gained independence in 1991, but even before Ukraine, only the then many were calling for the establishment of an au- UOC-MP is regarded tocephalous (“self-headed”) national church. Among as canonical. the proponents of this idea was the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Filaret (Denysenko), who broke away from the UOC-MP to help establish the UOC-KP in 1992, of which he was elected Patriarch in 1995. The ROC responded by defrocking Filaret, eventually excommunicating him in 1997. Like the UOC-KP, the UAOC does not accept the ROC’s involvement in Ukraine’s religious affairs. Unlike the former, however, the UAOC was founded in 1920, emerging mired in controversy over the unusual way in which it consecrated its first bishop. Soon thereafter the Bolsheviks effectively ended its existence in Ukraine. However, it survived among the diaspora, which helped re-establish it on Ukrainian soil in the late 1980s. The UGCC was also revived during this era, having been forced underground in 1946, when Stalin brought about its fictitious “reunification” with the ROC. While the UGCC has again operated openly in Ukraine since late 1989, the Soviet-imposed seizure of its properties and buildings by the ROC, and subsequent difficulties it has experienced in having them returned, has produced significant animosity towards the UOC-MP and ROC. Maidan support The Maidan reified the political dimensions of these religious divides. While the UOC-MP’s faithful could be found on both sides of the barricades in Kyiv, it

Opinion and Analysis

A house divided, George Soroka

officially espoused a neutral position that many interpreted as clandestinely proMoscow. In contrast, the UOC-KP, UAOC and UGCC openly supported the Maidan protesters, with the UOC-KP and the UGCC conspicuously reviving the ancient church tradition of granting sanctuary by permitting St Michael’s GoldenDomed Monastery (UOC-KP) and the Patriarchal Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ (UGCC) to be used as shelters. Certainly there were more than a few high-ranking members of the UOC-MP who opposed the Maidan agenda. These included the abbot of the Kyiv Caves Monastery, Metropolitan Pavel (Lebid) of Vyshhorod and Chornobyl, who, in a January 2014 sermon, likened Viktor Yanukovych’s travails to the suffering of Christ on his way to Golgotha. However, it would be extremely unfair to paint the entirety of the UOC-MP’s hierarchy as complacent or reIt would be unfair actionary. Belying this, on December 12th 2013 Cyril to paint the entirety Hovorun, a theology professor who has held prominent roles in the UOC-MP (and ROC), published a of the UOC- widely read essay praising the Maidan protesters and MP’s hierarchy denouncing the Church’s complicity in countenancing as complacent or Yanukovych’s corrupt and “unchristian” government. day later, Archpriest Andriy Dudchenko (editor reactionary. One of the online Kievskaia Rus’) addressed the assembled crowd on the Maidan, sharing a statement signed by 17 UOC-MP priests supportive of Ukraine seeking closer ties to Europe. Then on March 2nd 2014 (Forgiveness Sunday) Metropolitan Oleksandr (Drabynko) of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky and Vishnevsky publicly and severely criticised those who sought to justify the by-now-overthrown government’s criminal actions. That same month, the UOC-MP’s Chief Chaplain to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Metropolitan Avhustyn (Markevych) of Bila Tserkva and Bohuslav, proclaimed that soldiers have a duty to defend their country and that he has a duty to minister to them. These stances did not emanate from low-level clerics and laypeople, but from key figures in the UOC-MP. Likewise, immediately before the Crimean referendum was held, Metropolitan Onufry (Berezovsky) of Chernivtsi and Bukovyna (then still serving as locum tenens for the UOC-MP’s ailing head, Metropolitan Volodymyr [Sabodan], he became Metropolitan of Kyiv in August 2014) declared his “fervent hope” that Russia would do everything possible to preserve Ukraine’s territorial integrity. However, unlike his predecessor, who was widely regarded as pro-Ukrainian and sympathetic to the idea of an autocephalous national Church, Onufry’s stance soon evolved in a more pro-Moscow direction. Indicative of this, by June 2014 he was claiming Europe’s permissive values were incompatible with Divine Law. Later that same

A house divided, George Soroka

Opinion and Analysis

year, he reportedly compelled two senior bishops to withdraw their signatures from the Rivne Memorandum, which advocated for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian Church. And in an act that generated a media firestorm, on May 8th 2015 Onufry and the UOC-MP delegation refused to stand when President Petro Poroshenko read out the names of 21 soldiers awarded the title “Hero of Ukraine” (10 of them posthumously) for their role in military operations in the Donbas during a special session of the Verkhovna Rada marking the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazism in Europe. Orthodox-on-Orthodox conflict In marked distinction to the UOC-MP’s ill-defined stance, the UOC-KP, UAOC and UGCC unambiguously present themselves as patriotic institutions supportive of the current Kyiv government and its rapprochement with the West. Indeed, the UGCC has taken to labelling itself, the UOC-KP and the UAOC as “churches of the Kyivan tradition”. Meanwhile, in present-day Ukraine the UOCMP is increasingly referred to as the “foreign” church. Archbishop Evstratiy Zorya of the UOC-KP encapsulates this anti-Russian position when he states “having a church that is dependent on Russia is … a threat to our national security and a threat to our existence as Ukrainians”. As a result, Ukraine is presently embroiled in an internecine battle between Orthodox factions that stand alongside a gaping ideological divide, the central fault line being where one’s geopolitical affinities and civilisational predilections lie. Greek Catholics and other religious minorities also factor into this equation, but their relatively small numbers ensure that, to the extent believers are involved in determining the future of Ukraine and its religious landscape, this is an Orthodox-on-Orthodox conflict. And the tide appears to be shifting in favour of those who advocate breaking away from the embrace of the “Russian world” and the ROC. Government officials and public figures, including Poroshenko,

Opinion and Analysis

A house divided, George Soroka

Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman and Rada Chairman Andriy Parubiy, have recently been actively campaigning for the See of Constantinople to proclaim an autocephalous, canonical Ukrainian Church. (The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople has traditionally been accorded a special place of honour in Orthodoxy, with the holder of this office regarded as primus inter pares, or “first among equals”. Constantinople thus views any declaration of autocephaly as requiring its consent). Ukrainian legislators have also joined this effort, passing a resolution in June 2016 asking the current Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I, to not only consider a decree of autocephaly, but to also declare the 1686 subordination of the Metropolitanate of Kyiv to the Moscow Patriarchate uncanonical. Roughly around the same time, two particularly controversial bills were introduced in Ukraine’s parliament. If ratified, the first would assign special status to religious organisations headquartered in an “aggressor state”, allowing Ukrainian authorities to, among other things, oversee the appointment of ecclesial leaders. The second, meanwhile, would permit the transfer of religious communities between jurisdictions on the basis of a simple majority vote. Unsurprisingly, both proposals are strenuously opposed by the UOC-MP and ROC, with Patriarch Kirill appealing to Pope Francis and other religious and political leaders in 2017 for their support in opposing the legislation. Specifically, Kirill noted that its passage would further legitimate the expropriation of UOC-MP parishes, more than 40 of which had been forcibly seized by what he characterized as “right-wing radicals” between 2014 and 2016 alone. Reconciliation and unification? The current outlook on the prospects for reconciliation among the three jurisdictions is not terribly encouraging. There was a glimmer of hope in November 2017, when Filaret sent a curious letter to Patriarch Kirill and the Episcopate of the ROC in which he broached the topic of restoring communion and requested all sanctions and anathemas be rescinded. However, while this resulted in the ROC establishing a commission for dialogue with the UOC-KP, the media spun the story to imply that Filaret was asking to be received back into the ROC – a claim that he vehemently denied in a subsequent press conference, insisting he was only interested in the recognition of an independent Ukrainian Church. In reality, there is virtually no chance that the Moscow Patriarchate would support the autocephaly of the UOC-MP (although late last year the Bishops’ Council of the ROC did re-affirm and formalise its autonomous status at Metropolitan Onufry’s request). This is because keeping the UOC-MP nominally dependent

A house divided, George Soroka

Opinion and Analysis

ensures the ROC will retain its unquestioned status as the largest Orthodox body, whereas if the UOC-MP, UOC-KP and UAOC united they would straight away become the world’s second-largest Orthodox Church, possibly someday even rivalling it in size. At a time when the MP seems increasingly keen on challenging Constantinople’s prerogatives, this is especially salient. As regards the potential unification of the UOC-KP and UAOC, prospects looked bright right after Metropolitan Makary (Maletich) was elected as head of the UAOC in 2015. An announcement was even made that a merger was imminent, but since then repeated attempts to finalise the agreement have fallen through. Nonetheless, with the annexation of Crimea having removed the most proRussian part of Ukraine’s society from participation in domestic politics (interestingly, Crimea’s three dioceses remain part of the UOC-MP) and the unresolved conflict in the east producing a rally-round-the-flag effect, the Ukrainian state is now more ideologically consolidated than it has ever been. The same may be said of its truncated population, with survey data suggesting societal views are gradually converging on a number of historically contentious issues. If these trends continue, the emergence of a canonical Ukrainian Church with its Patriarchal seat in Kyiv will not be a question of if, but rather only of when. George Soroka is a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University, where he is also affiliated with the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, and the Institute for Quantitative Social Science.

Will the long-awaited justice prevail in Ukraine? KAT E R YNA PR YSH C H E PA

Many of Ukraine’s judiciary reforms are starting to take effect. A new Supreme Court has been in place since last December and new commissions are vetting and retraining judges to ensure fair trials and minimise corruption. Activists who advocate reform, however, have expressed disappointment with the judiciary reform process thus far. The judiciary reform in Ukraine, which unofficially started in 2014, has finally brought its first results. The new Supreme Court of Ukraine began functioning in December last year and the newly established higher bodies of the judiciary are now assessing the judges who will continue working in the general and appeals courts of Ukraine. However, the reforms, which began mostly out of the need to restore trust in the judiciary, have not yet managed to achieve its main goal. The judiciary continues to be one of the least trusted institutions in the country – a view that is shared by the general public and external experts. The experts and officials involved in the reform process believe it can be finalised in two to three years – when all the currently working judges will be assessed by an independent body and when a new generation of judges will have completed training. However, some public activists are afraid the reforms will not purify the judiciary enough which would conserve distrust in the system.

Will the long-awaited justice prevail in Ukraine?, Kateryna Pryshchepa

Opinion and Analysis

Deficit of trust Reform of the judiciary was meant to be one of the symbols of the new policies after the EuroMaidan revolution. The first steps taken included transforming the system after many Maiden protesters were sanctioned. Activists estimate that close to 351 judges supported requests by police to withdraw the driver licenses of the protesters, and agreed to detain severely beaten activists when they clearly needed to be in hospital. They also issued orders prohibiting rallies in a number of cases. In addition, the level of public trust in the judiciary was so low that any attempts of administering justice, in cases related to the Maidan, inevitably led to greater distrust in other court decisions. The principal motive behind the reform is the need to restore trust in the system. The secondary aim is to raise the level of professionalism within The principal motive the system. Interestingly, the judiciary itself did not behind the reform is generally see a need to change. A GFK poll commissioned by the USAID in 2015 the need to restore found that 79 per cent of Ukrainians did not trust the trust in the system. courts and judges. Meanwhile, only 40.4 per cent of judges, surveyed separately, have the perception statement that the society does not trust the judiciary. According to the same survey, 89 per cent of Ukrainians believed there was a need for a lustration process in the judiciary system, whereas a mere three per cent of judges supported that idea and 78.3 per cent believe that the vetting of judges would have only a political motive behind it. In 2014 the law on “Restoring Trust to the Judiciary” was passed by Ukraine’s parliament. It issued an assessment of judges involved in cases relating to the Maidan protesters. In order to evaluate judges’ actions during the revolution, a temporary special commission was established. The commission reviewed judicial action and gave its opinion on judges and their future. Thirty-four of the 351 judges involved in the Maidan cases were fired and 29 more were suspended. In May 2015 a presidential decree confirmed the “Strategy for Judicial Reform” and parliament passed a law on access to a fair trial. Amendments to the constitution which gives more independence to the judiciary were subsequently passed in 2016. Judges who were previously appointed by parliament will now be selected and assessed by a special independent body called the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ). The law On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges stated that the chairpersons of the courts will be now elected by the judges themselves. In addition, the judiciary system governing body, the High Council of Justice, was created. Finally, in 2017, competition for the candidates of the new Supreme Court took place and the court began its work in December 2017.

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Will the long-awaited justice prevail in Ukraine?, Kateryna Pryshchepa New Supreme Court

The new Supreme Court was the flagship project of the judiciary reform. Twenty-four per cent of the 111 judges in the new Supreme Court had no judiciary experience prior to the reform. Most come from other legal professions, human right organisations or academia. Some activists have voiced concern, noting that the new Supreme Court appears to represent the old system. This had a special significance since, according to the GFK survey, the judiciary is formed on a narrow social and professional basis: the majority of judges (70 per cent) are former court staff members or law enforcement officials. This means that the judiciary is a rather closed corporation in Ukraine, which could hinder the reform process. Some members of the public believe that the “renewal rate” of the new Supreme Court is too low and say that more new faces are required. However, external experts have expressed confidence in the reform. Dovydas Vitkauskas, an expert with the Support to Justice Sector Reforms in Ukraine project financed by the European Union, has argued that the number of people from outside the judiciary who came to the Supreme Court is unprecedented compared to reforms in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In Vitkauskas’s view, it is impossible to create a functioning system without those who have practical experience. The main guarantee will be the quality of judges present as a result of the fierce competition and vetting process that will be in place. Out of more than 1,400 candidates, for example, only 120 were nominated to the Supreme Court. The new HQCJ began functioning by organising the formal application process for candidates applying and later it started to assess the judges of the appeal court. This year the HQCJ finally started examining the judges within the general court. Similarly, The High Council of Justice (created in 2016 via a reorganisation of the High Council of Justice that functioned between 1998 and 2016) is tasked with overseeing the work of the whole judiciary system in Ukraine and taking disciplinary decisions on judges who deliver illegal court decisions or break the law in other ways. It is also officially tasked with proposing the candidates selected by HQCJ to be appointed as judges (the appointment to be finalised by the president). It is made up of representatives of the judiciary, academia prosecution bodies and members of the public. Practical difficulties In the meantime the looming qualification assessment has forced many judges to resign. The transitional provisions of the reforms have allowed judges who have

Will the long-awaited justice prevail in Ukraine?, Kateryna Pryshchepa

Opinion and Analysis

20 years’ experience to resign and receive a pension that is 90 per cent of their salary. It has been reported that by the end of 2017 more than 2,500 judges – or 20 per cent of all eligible judges – have chosen this option. At first, some commentators in Ukraine saw this as a positive development, believing that the judges who decided to leave were the corrupt ones who were afraid to disclose their property in the new public declarations (a compulsory requirement for all the state officials since 2016). Other experts argued that some judges decided to leave because they did not think they could pass the evaluation. What is more, the High Council of Justice fired an additional 890 judges due to numerous offences or unsatisfactory qualifications. The mass exodus added stress on the system. By the end of 2016, in 219 courts across Ukraine, there was only half the required number of judges working. In some courts only 20 per cent of the required number of judges was still in place. In seven courts there were no judges left at all. As a result, hundreds of cases remain pending before the courts. According to Ukrainian law, only criminal cases can be transferred to different district courts. According to Serhiy Koziakov, the chairman of the HQCJ, there are currently 2,400 vacant judges’ posts in the judiciary system – mostly in the general courts. The vacant posts can only be filled by qualified candidates who meet the strict new requirements. At present, candidates need to have at least five years’ experience working in one of the legal professions, and be over 30 years old. During the first selection attempt, 700 candidates were pre-selected by the HQCJ from a pool of more than 5,000 candidates. However, there will still be some delays before they can start working. The law requires all successful candidates to take a special 12 month training course and pass a final examination before they can start working. There are also other problems. A number of the new procedural regulations came into force at the same time as the new Supreme Court began its work. This means that the new judiciary is working in a new legal framework. However, the conditions in which regulations are adopted, with the practice of constant changes and amendments, can prove challenging. For instance on March 15th this year the president signed a law which amended the changes that were made in the Criminal Procedural Code (which had just entered into force on March 10th). There will also be infrastructural issues. At the end of 2017 the president signed a number of decrees reorganising the system of courts and their physical jurisdictions. A number of courts will be merged and the borders of districts will expand. In Kyiv, for example, there now will be six district courts (instead of ten); in Kharkiv, five instead of nine; and in Lviv, three instead of five. Some experts have raised some concerns. “In criminal cases the districts in which prosecutors work will not correspond to the court districts,” Roman Ro-

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Will the long-awaited justice prevail in Ukraine?, Kateryna Pryshchepa

manov, director of the human rights and justice programme at the International Renaissance Foundation, told me. “This would mean that the same prosecutor may have to present cases in different district courts, the suspects may have to be transported for their hearings by longer distances. This all will make the work of the prosecution less effective.” Inconsistent application The activists who advocate reform in Ukraine have expressed disappointment with the judiciary reform process thus far. Many argue that too many corrupt judges will be able to pass through the new selection process and that the new oversight bodies have not been tough enough when it comes to dismissing judges who were involved in cases against Maidan activists. In November 2017 one member of the Temporary Special Commission (which was created to Many activists argue review cases against Maidan activists and give recomthat too many corrupt mendations regarding the judges involved) said that having reviewed 63 judges the commission recjudges will be able to after ommended that 62 per cent of them be fired. Yet the pass through the new High Qualification Commission of Judges supported selection process and only half of those recommendations. In March this year the Public Integrity Council – that the new oversight a special consultative body that was established as an bodies have not been official watchdog to verify and give opinions on judges tough enough. who wish to remain in the system – declared that all members of the PIC were suspending their participation in the qualification assessment. The reason given was that the HQCJ was letting too many unworthy candidates pass. In only about half of cases that the PIC raised concerns about did the HQCJ agree with them. Despite the consensus regarding the need for reform, the public in general does not see the changes as effective. According to surveys carried out by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in 2017, only six per cent of Ukrainians believe the changes to the judiciary are going in the right direction. The most trusted people to help create positive change in the country are civil activists (47 per cent), foreign experts (29 per cent) and lawyers outside of the judiciary (23 per cent). The president and the parliament are trusted only by 16.5 per cent and 13 per cent respectively. According to officials who are currently working on the reforms, the most important changes have already been made. There was “an injection of integrity” in the judiciary system, which was brought on by the civic activists, academics and

Will the long-awaited justice prevail in Ukraine?, Kateryna Pryshchepa

Opinion and Analysis

experts from the private sector (who came to work either in the High Council of Justice, the High Qualification Commission of Judges or the new courts). Andriy Boiko, a member of the High Council of Justice, believes that this injection of integrity and destruction of the mechanisms of political control over the appointments in the judiciary will be the main factors which will contribute to its renewal and improvement. Experts like Romanov of the Renaissance Foundation as well as members of the judiciary believe that the reform in itself will not be sufficient. As Vitkauskas noted in a public appearance recently: “The justice system is a complex system which includes the prosecution, the lawyers representing the clients, etc. Therefore complex reforms are needed.” Romanov claims that currently only one per cent of the accused in criminal cases in Ukraine are acquitted (both in the general courts and the appeal courts). This is a clear demonstration that the prosecution does not work to serve justice, but merely to create impressive statistics. Many experts and practitioners believe that the education of lawyers and the bar exams should be changed in order to ensure more quality lawyers. This will be the next task to complete in order to ensure justice is holistically administered in Ukraine. Kateryna Pryshchepa is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. She previously worked as a journalist in Ukraine.

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The far right’s disproportionate influence N IN A B O ICH E N K O

In Ukraine the majority of the population remains pro-European. Yet, there is a visibly growing influence of marginal far right groups who aim to reshape politics and mainstream discourse. Society either does not notice the effects or it considers these groups as overly emotional patriots. After all, for a country immersed in war, nationalism should serve as a force to unite against the enemy. After the Revolution of Dignity, many new nationalist parties have appeared on the Ukrainian political arena. While none of them have managed to become a serious political force, some are finding support by successfully blending into the patriotic trend, deftly playing on Ukrainians’ wartime pains. Despite its pro-European origins, the EuroMaidan has spawned a number of conflicting trends. The power of the democratic, liberal protest and the civil struggle for justice was intercepted and replaced by conservatism and the status quo. Rightwing radicals have made use of the tense revolutionary situation in which people appreciate the strong, dedicated nationalist movement that has since emerged, one which first protected the protesters from government forces and then joined the fight against the Russian-supported separatists in Donbas. Black and white discourse Nearly five years since the EuroMaidan, the right-wing movement in Ukraine appears to be thriving. In the post-revolutionary period, however, this movement

The far right’s disproportionate influence, Nina Boichenko

Opinion and Analysis

no longer protects liberal-leaning values, but spreads fear and puts down left-wing views. While still a significant minority, these groups have acted aggressively, often with the unofficial blessing of the authorities who allow the far right to melt into the conservative mainstream and influence Ukrainian public opinion. If the EuroMaidan defended European ideas, then the conservative and rightwing radical groups are Euro-sceptics in terms of economic and social policy. At the social level, the rejection of European values is especially noticeable in relation to issues like feminism and LGBT rights. For the Ukrainian far right, these ideas have become synonyms for immorality, just like the labels “leftists” and “liberals” have acquired a pejorative meaning. In the increasingly black-and-white discourse of the nationalists each at- Marginal far-right tempt to defend progressive values risks being dubbed groups have managed Kremlin propaganda spread by Russian agents. to grow, and over Nevertheless, the majority of the population is still pro-European. Society either does not notice the im- the past number of pact that the radicals are having or it considers them as years have become overly emotional patriots. Nationalism, within a coun- increasingly more try immersed in war, serves as a force to unite against the enemy. Therefore, their views are not seen as dan- present and influential gerous but necessary and a temporary phenomenon. in mainstream Against this background, the marginal groups have political discourse. managed to grow, and over the past number of years they have become increasingly more present and influential in mainstream political discourse. Recently, they have begun their takeover of higher education institutions, increasingly penetrated by right-wing views and groups. Last year, Alexei Kurinnoy, a law lecturer at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, wrote on Facebook that seeing students wearing mini-skirts and navel piercings tempted him to give them higher grades. He nevertheless “managed to survive, despite the spring”. The post provoked a strong reaction from students at the university and sparked a protest against sexism and sexual exploitation. But the rally was soon disrupted by representatives of right-wing groups, including Svoboda, the Right Sector and Falcon, who claimed they were there to fight against “leftists and feminists” and protect the teacher/patriot. In their view, the campaign against sexism was a Moscow-inspired provocation. In one interview, the teacher had said that the protest was a result of his active social media presence. “I am a public activist who is engaged in actions that are controversial for the pro-Russian part of society. These include decommunisation and questions of national memory. In my posts I often refer to specific names, cases and situations. And this may be the reason why I was targeted,” he said. The

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The far right’s disproportionate influence, Nina Boichenko

teacher expressed his gratitude to the right-wing groups who supported him and helped to expose the Putin-like provocation. He also promised to continue to fight for Ukrainianness by all legal means, despite the hostile resistance. “We’ll talk about feminism later. Glory to Ukraine,” Kurinnoy added. Campus conflicts Following the same logic, students from the National Pedagogical Dragomanov University in Kyiv were sent to the Vladimir Cathedral for prayer during the lectures. Screenshots of correspondences between the students and their class presidents began circulating on social media. Participation in the event appeared to be “voluntary-compulsory” and it was made clear that non-attendance would be regarded as truancy. Female students were asked to wear head scarves and skirts. Some students came to the prayer service holding banFar-right groups ners saying “I was forced to come here instead of classhave targeted higher es”. Soon, they were confronted by Bohdan Khodakthe leader of Tradition and Order, a political education institutions ovsky, movement. in what they see as “Today, together with other student-Christians, we a prolonged battle came to the Vladimir Cathedral to declare that we will allow anyone to humiliate our religion, and that we to save universities not are proud of our belonging to the church,” Khodakofrom what they see vsky wrote on Facebook. This was the beginning of a as moral decay. prolonged battle to save the university from what the right has seen as moral decay. In September 2017, teachers Anna Maria Basauri and Ekaterina Goncharenko, together with philosophy student Valeriya Zubatenko, announced the launch of a “gender club”. The club was meant to become a discussion platform, free from prejudices and stereotypes, where participants could discuss primary sources on gender theory, share their everyday experiences and analyse culture through a gender lens. After the university administration decided not to register the club as an optional university group, the organisers elected to gather at the Sklo university art space. The idea soon sparked a backlash from far-right groups operating on the university campus. “When they saw me in the corridor, they tried in every possible way to touch me, humiliate me and provoke an argument. They said ‘Sieg Heil’ making a Nazi salute”, Zubatenko recalls. “I knew they would come to the opening of the club as they said that we should wait for them.”

The far right’s disproportionate influence, Nina Boichenko

Opinion and Analysis

As expected, four representatives of right-wing groups came to the first meeting of the club, but the organisers refused to let them in, arguing that they were not there for the discussion. In response, the group stated that their rights were being violated. The organisers finally agreed to allow them to participate under the condition that they follow the club’s rules: do not interrupt others and tolerate all views. The right-wing activists failed to follow these rules, however, and the organisers agreed that next time, they would be excluded from the discussion. But that was easier said than done. A group of 15 right-wingers showed up at the next meeting. Some of them were university students. The discussion never took place as the unwanted guests accused club members of extremism, propagating a particular ideology and disgracing the university by spreading deviant views. The accusations were coupled with demands that the meeting organisers leave the premises. The main arguments against the club included the claims that gender does not exist and that the concept is unscientific. While a representative of the dean’s office interfered in the argument, at first condemning the right-wing intrusion, she later stated that she understood their position. “Instead of discussing theoretical writings, we listened to the radicals talking to the deputy dean for half an hour on gender ideology, and that we want to enslave the Ukrainian people and force them to pay taxes which will be spent on toilets for transgender people,” the organiser reported. Continued threats Katekhon, an organisation that opposes “exposing children to homosexual propaganda, same-sex marriage, gender dictatorship and the killing of children,” published an article on its Facebook page about driving gender propagandists out of universities. The article referenced the gender club meeting and argued that hysterical female participants had to be calmed down by a representative of the university administration who, after listening to the position of the Christian students, solved the problem. Moreover, Katekhon drew attention to the fact that a number of articles around this incident were written in Russian and suggested that grants for the destructive activity of the gender club came from Russia. They also stressed that the story should be an example of a successful fight against LGBT rights and feminism, and called those who learn about such “deviations” at universities to contact the administration and Christian organisations or write to Katekhon. The next day, through a third person, Zubatenko was told that the administration does not want any information about the incident to be leaked to the press and was advised to keep it quiet. The incident took place on the eve of the rector’s

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The far right’s disproportionate influence, Nina Boichenko

election so the university did not want the publicity. That evening, the Sklo art space was unexpectedly closed for renovation. The threats continued and so did the passivity of the university administration. But the gender club decided to hold another meeting. Their discussion was soon interrupted by three men in balaclavas. Storming into the room, one of them shouted: “We are closing you down!” Shortly after, one of the young men used pepper spray on the club members. Some inhaled the gas and one sustained a chemical burn. The organisers have accused Oles Marinovich and Artyom Oleynik – students who regularly participate in actions like this – as the attackers. It was not possible to identify the third assailant. Marinovich himself denies his participation in the attack. In his comment for Studway.com.ua, he claimed that the club members were trying to slander him, since they disliked his comments from past meetings at the club where he came “searching for dialogue”. After the incident, Zubatenko wrote a statement and Basauri requested the expulsion of the student she recognised from the university. In response, the dean called a meeting with Marinovich and representatives of the student union who declared their neutrality. Neither Zubatenko nor Basauri were invited to the meeting. Two first year students, whose paths never crossed with Marinovich, were asked to represent the victims of the attack. Responding to journalists’ questions about the incident, the vice rector, Igor Vetrov, said that the administration had already identified “certain names” and implemented “certain steps” against the attackers. He assured that the university would make every effort so that similar situations do not happen in the future. On the question of whether the university can expel the attackers, Vetrov replied, “No, absolutely not. It would be persecution. If they violated the law – this is the responsibility of the police.” The police, in turn, reported that they had not included Zubatenko’s case in the register of pre-trial investigations since she “did not go to hospital and refused to undergo forensic medical examination due to minor bodily harm.”

The far right’s disproportionate influence, Nina Boichenko

Opinion and Analysis

The dean’s office suggested that the club change its name to “the gender science club” and become officially affiliated with the university, which would require the university to take responsibility for its security. Such a move, according to the dean, would prevent further violence. The organisers, however, are sceptical of the proposal. They see it as an expression of tolerance for violence since the university failed to unequivocally condemn the attack. Us vs them Ukrainian national unity, in the eyes of the far right, rests on the imaginary dualism of “us” and “them”, where any position of a mediator is perceived as betrayal, any criticism as a provocation and any peacekeeping attempt as fraternisation with the enemy. These dichotomies concern both zones of direct military conflict and citizen initiatives. In Ukraine, intolerance has intensified. Threats of physical violence by right-wing radicals, who aim to suppress public expressions of alternative views on social and political issues, are way too common. Those holding views contrary to the far right are Those holding views declared as “separatists” and “enemies of the people”. contrary to the far At the same time, violating the law, suppressing freeright are declared dom of speech, inciting ethnic hatred, xenophobia and as “separatists” political cleansing often goes unpunished. Moreover, not infrequently, the authorities not only and “enemies of fail to adequately respond to violence, but often di- the people”. rectly support such actions. In September 2017 representatives of an LGBT Association were planning to lay flowers at the monument to the Heavenly Hundred Heroes in Mykolayiv. The event was cancelled after the group received threats from representatives of Falcon and the Right Sector, and because the police were not able to guarantee the safety of the participants. Furthermore, the organisers of the Lviv Publishers Forum received threats from far-right groups forcing them to cancel the presentation of a book about lesbian parents. Similar violations and acts of discrimination take place on the level of public administration. The Poltava City Council published an open statement urging the Verkhovna Rada to ban the “propaganda of deviant sexual behaviour”, including gay parades and queer culture festivals, and to remove any mention of “sexual orientation” or “gender identity” from national legislation. On March 8th 2018 marches for women’s rights took place in several Ukrainian cities and a number of attacks against participants and journalists were reported. In Kyiv, a claim of administrative violation was filed against the director of Insight LGBTQ NGO,

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Elena Shevchenko. The reason was a complaint about a banner which was held by several rally participants depicting a naked woman whose foot was punctured with a trident-like object. The image was interpreted as a “violation of a state symbol”. On March 12th, a district court held a hearing in the case, which was attended by about 20 young people from far-right groups. According to Shevchenko and her lawyer, they arrived with golf clubs and gas cartridges, threatened her and exerted pressure on the court. Following the trial, they blocked the exit of the court building, which forced Shevchenko to call a private guard. The court’s session was postponed. At the same time, police and law enforcement agencies react in emergency cases only, in order not to provoke the radicals. This was the case with the Rossotrudnichestvo (the Russian Centre for Science and Culture) in Kyiv which was attacked by the far right in February this year while the police stood by and watched. A similar situation occurred in Kyiv last January during a memorial event for the Russian human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov and the journalist Anastasia Baburova (who was murdered in 2009). The police did not intervene while the group of far-rightists threatened violence. At the same time, the police detained several protesters to check their identity and registered them as witnesses. All these examples show that in contemporary Ukraine, restrictions on freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly continue. Vertical control over public life has been replaced by horizontal control – exercised by “conscious Ukrainians” representing radical right-wing organisations. Most of these groups (such as the National Corps/Azov movement) have several wings: a political party, a military battalion and a civil youth organisation. The latter wing is actively involved in censoring public life as well as promoting the “patriotic education” of Ukrainian citizens and traditional values. The majority of Ukrainian society does not support the far right, but they choose not to interfere and just stay quiet – like the dean at Dragomanov University. The level of self-censorship is increasing. Fear of provoking the radicals which can elicit an even stronger reaction raises questions about the current state of freedom of speech and expression in Ukraine. Translated by Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska Nina Boichenko holds and MA in cultural studies. She writes about the Ukrainian far right and the new national identity.

Sport, geopolitics and Russia A short history A N N A M A R IA D Y N E R

Throughout the last 70 plus years, the Soviet Union and Russia have used large sporting events for both geopolitical and domestic purposes. While the latter often brought about desired results, achieving success in the former continues to elude Russia. This year the Kremlin will most likely try to use the FIFA World Cup to show the world that Russia matters, and showcase Putin as a powerful world leader.

William Shankly, the legendary coach of the Liverpool Football Club, was known for saying that football mattered more than life itself. If such words can be articulated about football in particular what can be said about sport in general? The role that sport plays in society has been recognised since ancient times. The Romans believed, in the words of the ancient Roman poet Juvenal, that people are only interested in “bread and circuses”. Those “circuses” became an integral part of social and political life throughout the ages. Yet it was in the second half of the 20th century, and the rise of television, when sporting events became entertainment for the masses. During the Cold War, sport competition became a part of international rivalry, pitting one ideology against another. The late Polish writer Ryszard Kapuściński described this phenomenon in his 1978 book The Soccer War. He pointed out that in Latin America the line between football and politics was very thin. He argued that the list of governments which had fallen, or were abolished by military coups, because of a national team’s poor performance was actually quite long.

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Sport, geopolitics and Russia, Anna Maria Dyner Arenas of political manifestation

Alluding to Carl von Clausewitz, one can say that sport is “politics by other means”. It generates strong emotions and can reach its zenith when a game is played by national teams of states who are in conflict. Such events can literally turn stadiums into arenas of political manifestation. This was the case in 1982 in Poland, just three months after the introduction of Martial Law, which was imposed by the country’s leader Wojciech Jaruzelski to quash growing support for the Solidarity opposition and in lieu of a possible Russian invasion. At that time, a game was played between the Warsaw team, Legia, and Dynamo Tbilisi (from the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic). The latter was the great Soviet pride after it had won the UEFA Cup a few months earlier. Despite a large number of militia in the stadium, the Legia fans shouted anti-regime and pro-opposition slogans. In some cases, football matches offer an opportunity for high-level diplomatic meetings which would not take place otherwise. The only times the presidents of Turkey and Armenia sit next to one another, for instance, is during a football match. And this year, during the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, representatives of both Koreas marched together under the same flag. Politicians know all too well what sport means for their respective countries. Not only can a great victory improve the feeling of national pride, it can also generate extra support for politicians. In other words, sporting victories can translate into electoral victories. It is also quite common for retired athletes to become involved in politics, and political parties often exploit them as engines for bringing success. Given that all of the above is true for nearly all countries, it is particularly true of non-democratic ones. This includes the Russian Federation and its predecessor, the Soviet Union. In light of this year’s FIFA World Cup, which Russia is hosting, it is worth exploring Russia’s earlier experiences of hosting global sporting events. Moscow 1980 In the Soviet Union sport was not only an important means of entertainment, but also a key element of state propaganda. Through sport, the new Soviet man was to be made. Thus, the best Soviet sportsmen worked for clubs linked either with the military or the KGB. Nikolai Semashko, the People’s Commissar of Public Health and one of the organisers of the Soviet health system, pioneered the inclusion of sport and physical education into socialist education during the 1920s. But it wasn’t until a few decades later when the USSR began to seriously use sport as an element of rivalry with other states. Interestingly, it is alleged that Stalin refused

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the Soviet Union’s participation in the 1948 Olympic Games out of concern that the team would fail. Soviet success came only after Stalin’s death, during the 1956 Olympic Games in Melbourne, when the Soviet team brought home 98 medals – more than the United States, their greatest competitor. During the Cold War, rivalry between capitalist and socialist states (particularly between the USSR and the US) was legendary. It started in Helsinki in 1952 and subsequently brought about six Soviet victories for the most medals (the US had four) in the summer games and seven in winter games. In the case of the latter, the USSR was beaten only by Norway and the GDR. In the 1970s, the rivalry expanded beyond winning and losing on the field, to which country could organise the best event. This was illustrated in the battle over what city would host the 22nd Summer Olympic Games in 1980 – the two candidate cities were Moscow and Los Angeles. It was reported that Moscow won the bid by a vote of 39 to 20. After the decision of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to award the games to Moscow, Historians have Soviet officials developed new infrastructure, includ- claimed that the high ing the Sheremetyevo International Airport. In 1977 construction costs the authorities revealed the mascot of the Moscow Games – Misha, the bear who became one of the most of the 1980 Olympic recognisable symbols and clearly an inspiration for one infrastructure of the 2014 Sochi mascots. Historians of the Soviet Union claim that the high became a serious construction costs of the sport facilities and the in- problem for Leonid frastructure surrounding the games became a serious Brezhnev. problem for Leonid Brezhnev, the then Soviet leader. At one point he even allegedly considered withdrawing Moscow as the host city. However, the prestige line of reasoning won out and the Olympic Games were held in Moscow (some events also took place in Kyiv and Tallinn). Unfortunately in 1980 the USSR did not adhere to the ancient rule that the Olympic Games should not take place at a time of war, and the Soviet army continued their active operations in Afghanistan. As a sign of protest, 65 states (including the US, Canada, West Germany, Egypt and Turkey) boycotted the Moscow games. In addition, the IOC refused to allow Iran to participate. Understandably, the Soviet authorities feared that without foreign fans their stadiums would be empty. To avoid such a scenario, cheap tickets were offered to local citizens. But with many partners and global sponsors pulling out – Adidas was the only major company to not pull out – an economic blow was clearly dealt. In an effort not to disappoint fans traveling to Moscow, some western products were imported into the Soviet Union via Finland. For the first time Soviet consumers

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Courtesy: IISG (CC) www.flickr.com

A Soviet football poster from 1954.

were able to purchase Marlboro cigarettes, Coca-Cola, Fanta and chewing gum – even the latter was considered an ideological product. Soviet officials also decreed that the “undesirable residents” of Moscow (i.e. the homeless and prostitutes) be driven outside the city for the duration of the games. The hosts also made every effort possible to ensure that the Soviet team triumphed – and it did. The USSR won a total 195 medals (80 gold) and they were followed by other members of the Socialist bloc – East Germany and Bulgaria. For Soviet propaganda, the games were a huge success. They were used to distract attention away from both the war in Afghanistan and the growing economic problems. Political tensions continued through 1984 when the Soviet Union, along with

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Opinion and Analysis

the majority of the Eastern bloc states, refused to participate in the Los Angeles Games. Even though security concerns were given as the official reason, it was well understood that the decision was a direct response for the American boycott of the Moscow Games. Second chances The Russia Federation, as successor state to the Soviet Union, would have to wait over 30 years for another opportunity to host the Olympic Games. In 2007 the IOC announced that the Russian resort city of Sochi would host the 22nd Winter Olympic Games. Even though, according to some experts, Vladimir Putin did not plan to win the bid, the state propaganda machine aptly exploited the opportunity for its own purposes. Nevertheless, from the outset the Sochi Olympics generated many controversies. In 2013 the Russian opposition figure Boris Nemtsov published a report revealing that 30 billion US dollars, out of a total of 50 billion dollars’ worth of investments, were embezzled and unaccounted for. And a few months before the games were scheduled to begin, many officials feared that the Sochi preparations would not be completed on time. Fortunately for the Kremlin, they managed to pull it off. Had it not been for the events unfolding in Ukraine, the Sochi Games would have been regarded as overall successful. Eighty-eight national teams participated with Russia winning the most medals – 29 altogether (11 gold). The only things that tarnished the almost perfect picture were the rumours of Russian doping and, of course, the situation in Ukraine, with Russia later annexing Crimea and its military intervention in Donbas. Russia’s image of success was quickly overshadowed by its brazen breach of international law. Four years after Sochi, Russia was chosen to host another large-scale sporting event: the 2018 FIFA World Cup. The decision to award Russia the hosting of the World Cup was made back in 2009, well before the conflict in Ukraine. However, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the downing of the Malaysia Airlines MH370 over the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine, representatives of many states began calling for stripping Russia’s right to organise the tournament. Scepticism grew further after it was revealed that Gazprom, the Russian state-owned gas giant, was among the lead sponsors of the tournament. Yet despite the growing dissenting voices, FIFA refused to reverse its decision, and Russia is set to host the tournament this coming June. However, the political controversies continued after Richard McLaren, a lawyer with the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), publically accused Russia of having operating a state-sponsored doping programme. In

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response, the IOC voted to exclude the Russian team from official participation in the 23rd Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang earlier this year, thus further damaging Russia’s image as a fair competitor. Propaganda cover-up The preparations for the World Cup, and the profits it will generate, were an important element of Vladimir Putin’s re-election campaign ahead of the March 2018 election. They were particularly used to build a sense of national pride amidst stewing economic problems as a result of low oil prices and continued western sanctions. Similar to Nemtsov in 2013, Alexei Navalny, the main opposition figure today, highlighted the level of corruption and the lack of transparency surrounding the infrastructure investments of the FIFA tournament. Navalny claimed that Russia has spent 40 billion roubles (around 730 billion US dollars) on preparations for the World Cup, with a significant portion of the money completely disappearing. What is more, the tragic Kemerovo shopping mall fire in March this year, which killed at least 64 people (40 of them children), has raised serious questions about standards of buildings in Russia where corruption schemes trump safety. Nevertheless, Russian propaganda, domestically and internationally, will undoubtedly cover up any negative events relating to the tournament by focusing on its success as a demonstration of Russia’s greatness. Following the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia, in Salisbury, England and the subsequent expulsion of 140 Russian diplomats (suspected as being spies) from the West, the Kremlin desperately needs some positive PR. It will certainly use the FIFA World Cup to show the world that it matters and provide an opportunity to showcase Putin as a powerful world leader. Throughout the last 70 or more years, the Soviet Union and Russia have used large sporting events for both geopolitical and domestic purposes. While the latter often brought about desired results, achieving success in the former continues to elude Russia. History has shown that nearly all major sporting events organised in Russia have been overshadowed by international events, military interventions and sour relations with the West. This summer’s World Cup appears to be no exception. Translated by Iwona Reichardt Anna Maria Dyner is the head of Eastern European programme in the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).

From Putin’s Russia to a non-Putin’s Russia An interview with Gleb Pavlovsky, a Russian political scientist. Interviewer: Maxim Rust MAXIM RUST : In your social media posts and comments you often use the hashtag #sistemaRF (system of the Russian Federation). What is this system like today and what is its essence? GLEB PAVLOVSKY: I use this concept because I wrote several articles where I describe the regime in Russia which does not fit classical categories as a political system or a state. These are disputable issues indeed. What is the Russian regime like, what kind of state is Russia, etc.? The regime is bad but that does not mean anything, because if we make comparisons between today’s Russia and other systems, it means we put Russia in a certain order which may mean that we will lose the key to understanding its essence. This essence is what I am searching for. That is why I use this hashtag to describe the Russian system as a unique aggregation of behaviour and power norms. This system is exceptionally flexible, which is important. If the Kremlin regime – as it is often called – was solely limited to a re-

source-based economy or conservative bureaucracy, it would have collapsed a long time ago. But it is not collapsing and nothing indicates that it is going to. This is because it was built on the ruins of the Soviet Union. It was created by people whose goal was to survive and make money. We can now say that Russia is governed by a group of survival experts. This does not mean, however, that they are professional in other areas. They have no managerial skills, they are no experts on economic development or state-building. But using the old, typically Russian, idiosyncrasy – that is, a lack of a border between the authorities and society – they built a model that Nassim Taleb, the Lebanese-American scholar, would call “anti-fragile”. However, Taleb coined the term in reference to developed economies, while in Russia we have an “anti-fragile” political system, which assumes using deceit and deception as well as chaos and fear. The essence of our system lies in that it was born out of extraordinary situations and has al-

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ways been creating such situations. That is why such a system dwells on chaos, crises and catastrophes. Would you say that the Russian systemsuffers from the besieged fortress syndrome?

This is one of its elements. But what is an important feature of the Russian system is that it can be adjusted and you can easily change its patterns of behaviour. Tomorrow, Russia can open itself to the world with a wide smile on its face and to do so it does not have to change absolutely anything. Overall, the Kremlin needs extraordinary situations to have a mandate to govern. To understand our economy and management system – here I am often using metaphors of the work of humanitarian aid institutions – you have to think in terms of a disaster and its effects as well as people who can offer solutions to avoid further catastrophe. Such persons are perceived as saviours and their authority is indisputable. That is why our authorities need disasters or a spectre of a catastrophe. These disasters and catastrophes can also be created by the authorities. Then they can defend the people against them. This is an old mechanism, one that goes back to Stalin times. The paradox is that society which just yesterday was cursing the authorities because of a disaster now sees a saviour in them. You mention the saviour, so let us talk about the last election. Do the official results, which show Vladimir Putin with almost 77

per cent of the vote, reflect the real support of Russian society?

In Russia there is no such thing as an independent society and that is why, in our situation, this question is absurd. It is more justified to reflect on whether there were so many ballot sheets with an approval for this candidate, and how many votes were forged. With this in mind, I think the numbers are credible. We have regions, such as Kemerovo or Chechnya. I call them areas of artificial voting because over there you cannot make a count of anything and these are the regions that generate 90 per cent support. They are also, like Putin’s support, an indicator of the lack of alternatives. In fact, what people really experience is the lack of any alternative. This does not mean that they have no other ways to express their political support. For example, Aman Tuleev, who was the governor of the Kemerovo oblast, got over 90 per cent of the voters’ support. Last March he was recalled after the tragic fire in Kemerovo’s shopping mall, even though there were no demonstrations. The question is: where are the 90 per cent who voted for him? I think that there is a similar situation with regards to our president. Putin is the biggest symbol of Russia. Just like in Soviet times, people were voting for “Lenin’s state” even though nobody, of course, was expecting that Lenin will rise from the mausoleum and lead the nation to a brighter future. Does this mean that #sistemaRF will not end any time soon and that Putin will re-

From Putin’s Russia to a non-Putin’s Russia, Interviewer: Maxim Rust Interviews main its symbol even when he is no longer president?

It is difficult to say whether it will last long or not. Eighteen years ago there was no such thing as Putin’s Russia, even though there was a Putin’s majority. I coined this term “Putin’s majority” as a campaign slogan, not as a real measuring unit. During Putin’s first term, there was still an alternative, but since the mid2000s a massive unification and de-politicisation has taken place. I also participated in that, as it was a well thoughtout policy. That is why if someone says that things have always been like this in Russia, it is rubbish. Things were not this way. And it does not mean that they will always be like this. As a rule, these are short cycles in the history of a state, but this one will be remembered for a long time. Russia became Putin’s for the people and by the people. However, in reality, there is nothing of Putin here. And that is why I think the current presidency will be a transition term, from Putin’s Russia to a non-Putin’s Russia. This is regardless of how Putin himself is looking at these matters. In one of your recent analyses, you mentioned that this election marks the beginning of the post-Putin Russia. Are you convinced that this is indeed Putin’s last term?

I am not a prophet. This term may actually turn out to be shorter than six years. But I also cannot exclude that in certain political circumstances and in the situation created by his closest circle,

which is really ruling Russia, Putin will stay even after 2024. This is because Putin’s closest circle needs him more than he needs them. Putin would certainly like to leave nicely and in a comfortable way, but the people in his circle want to keep their positions and the same influence and privileges that they are enjoying now. The problem is that these people hold their positions only because Putin is a part of the system. Will the post-Putin Russia be different from today’s Russia?

Russia is already different. It is hard to see this from the outside. But living here I can see many changes related to social media that, in some way, shows where political life is budding. However, I am cautious to not overestimate the importance of social media. In Russia they make so much noise which does not really say who is in power, who redistributes goods, etc. It rather resembles a masquerade more than anything else. That is why, today, it is difficult to notice Russia’s real face. Putin himself does not see the full picture of Russia, as he too watches Russian television. In a sense, censorship returned to the Kremlin. Their reality is seen as it is depicted in the media even though they themselves order this narrative. But this is also one of the reasons behind the degradation of the strategy in Kremlin’s external and internal politics. Let us return to Putin’s circle. You mentioned that the fight within the political

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elite over influence has already begun. Is the Russian elite no longer a monolith and do you think it will change into a proverbial jar of spiders in the near future?

Every community is a proverbial jar of spiders. Today’s Kremlin is not consolidated. It is very difficult for them to reach an agreement with regards to Russia’s future and its power structure. Putin’s power is, in its essence, informal. He has not built any rational bureaucracy that would allow him to be replaced by somebody else after he leaves. Under the current situation it would be a difficult operation. At the time, when we were developing the project of Yeltsin’s successor, the office of the president had much fewer competences than it has today. But it was clear already back then that one person would not change the state of affairs – the problem lies in the system. When the authorities allow real elections, this is an expression of their power. This is very relevant today. The authorities should allow free elections. I am talking about not just allowing representatives of the opposition to participate, but also candidates from within the power circle. That means from Putin’s circle…

Yes. Overall, I think that this is from where the real opposition will eventually emerge. Where else could it come from? This is the reason why the authorities do not let anyone from within the circle to run. No governor, no minister, no head of industry would dare mention that he or she would like to be-

come president. And this is stupid, as it will be someone from the establishment who will have real experience of governing Russia. I doubt that such a candidate will come from some of the groups that spend most of the time demonstrating on the streets and who have no policy proposals apart from their fond memories of Yeltsin times. This brings me to the question about the alternative. Can we treat today’s opposition as a real alternative? Is there anybody whom we can call the new rising star of Russia’s politics? Somebody who can replace Putin one day?

First of all, you should be looking at the sharks within the Russian political elite. The Russian political market does not offer alternatives. There is Alexei Navalny who is a very important figure. He is important because he reminds us of what politics is all about and this is something we have not had for the last 15 years. That is not a very long time, but during these years people started to get used to this state of affairs and started believing the myth that everything is decided by Putin and nothing can change that – which, of course, is not true. Navalny reminded us that politics starts with concrete activities, and not because somebody within the Kremlin willed it. But in the current environment, he is not an alternative. Navalny will play an important role in open politics when it comes back to Russia. The leaders of large regions will play an important role then, but it is difficult to point to anyone

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Photo: Mikhail Afonin

specific today. Ramzan Kadyrov should also be looked at very carefully. Sergey Sobyanin, the mayor of Moscow, could also become a player, as long as he does not make any mistakes on the last leg of Putin’s system. Sobyanin is a very talented and powerful politician who created himself (a rarity in Russia), and this is something we tend to forget. Is the West waiting for a change in relations with Russia?

Russia’s problem is that it is doomed for functioning on the global stage. Rus-

sia cannot istolate itself from the world and manoeuvre all the time. It may seem like a paradox but Russia’s system is dependent on world politics. The Kremlin goals are also conditioned by global affairs. Should the authorities become strictly focused on domestic matters, they would become very parochial and not able to retain power. Putin is perfectly aware of that. Here the question is: Can the existing world order integrate Russia? I will not be going into all of our problems, starting with perestroika, but I will say that we owe the current system

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to ourselves. The truth is that Russia, in its current form, is not capable of being integrated with the rest of the world. At the same time, it cannot be isolated, or cease being a global player. This is what causes many problems and tensions on the international stage. How will the Putin regime manage this? I do not know. Usually regimes solve these kind of problems by escalating tension and waiting for the opponent to let go. But when our opponent is Donald Trump, that is Putin’s American equivalent, the situation becomes more dangerous. I think that here we need a détente, but not a Soviet-style one. Something different. Otherwise these two guys may get too far. Also, I cannot say anything comforting regarding our relations with the West. To make matters worse, for a long time our system has not had any checks and balances, even compared to those that existed during the Soviet Union. I know that it can sound quite bizarre but this is how things are. Had Putin publically said in the totalitarian Soviet Union, “why would we need the world, if Russia ceased to exist?” he would have been kicked out of the communist party and chased out of the KGB. At that time, the official ideology was to promote peace around the world and not allow a third world war to erupt. That is why this kind of thinking was forbidden. Today, nobody wants a third world war, but where are the mechanisms to stop it from happening? Where is there an understanding of the risks? Unfortunately, right now the

situation is very tense and that is why it is dangerous. I think that within a year we will be forced to find a solution. Given that Russia will become neither an autocracy nor get integrated with the West, I gather it will continue to manoeuvre…

Of course. Putin will say – and he will be partially right – that 15 years ago he made a proposal to somehow integrate Russia with NATO and to create an alliance with the European Union, but it was the West who did not want that. It was Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 who proposed a new European security architecture, yet nothing came out of it. I do not want to go deeply into the reasons why that happened, but I do not believe there is such a thing as a permanent “geopolitical crack” between Europe and Russia. Today, we cannot see any signs of Russia’s integration with the West. Thus, even after Putin, the West will have to deal with a Putin regime. Such a regime may be even more Putinist (or ultra-Putnist, if you like) even without Putin being there. What can we expect in the region? I am not only asking about Ukraine, but also about Belarus and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan – at least recently – has been increasingly demonstrating that it wants to distance itself from Russia.

Unfortunately in each situation we are dealing with an unpredictable player without any specific strategy. Since Russia is such a player, we can expect an escalation. An escalation could come as a

From Putin’s Russia to a non-Putin’s Russia, Interviewer: Maxim Rust Interviews surprise even for those who are the most involved. For example, a month before Yanukovych’s escape from Ukraine, Russia did not even think about the annexation of Crimea, and it did not assume such a course of events would occur. That is why it is so difficult to predict developments in the region. The problem is that the post-Soviet space turned into a space of absence, a symbolic vacuum. And the responsibility for this symbolic vacuum lies on Moscow. There was no request for it from any side. Moscow has yet no plans for the region; it has nothing to offer to it. If Russia had a real strategy for Ukraine, it would use the revolutionary situation in Kyiv. And offer it something. This was an ideal moment for introducing some kind of a strategy, had there been one… Instead a mechanism of escalation was used in order to get out of the situation. The same can happen in other places. Today, the Kremlin is making more calculations, as it has gained experience

in recent years. Yet these experiences do not translate into alternative solutions. There is still an illusionary sense of responsibility for the post-Soviet space which has turned into – as we say here – a suitcase without a handle, meaning it has a symbolic value but no one knows what to do it with it. If we look at Kazakhstan, what will happen when there is no Nazarbayev? The Kremlin will feel obligated to do something, but China might also have plans for such a situation. If we are to analyse Moscow’s offer to different countries of the region, we will see that there are almost no concrete offers. Maybe there was some kind of offer for Armenia, but even this would not have passed without problems. So who do we have an offer for? We do not even have an offer for Moldova or Belarus. That is why, unfortunately, in our region we need to be ready to improvise. But let us remember that unpredictable improvisations, without any rules, are usually dangerous.

Translated by Maxim Rust and Iwona Reichardt Gleb Pavlovsky is a Russian political scientist. He is president of the Russia Institute and the Foundation for Effective Politics in Moscow. He was a political advisor to the Kremlin until 2011. Maxim Rust is a contributing editor with New Eastern Europe and a fellow at the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw.

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The Odesan myth and the Ukrainian façade An interview with Professor Borys Khersonskyy, a Ukrainian poet, translator, clinical psychologist and Odesa’s leading intellectual. Interviewers: Tomasz Lachowski and Vitalii Mazurenko TOMASZ LACHOWSKI AND VITALII MAZURENKO : Every now and then, the world reminds itself of the Donbas conflict, following the exchange of prisoners between Ukraine and the separatists or Kyiv’s efforts to reintegrate the region. The war thus continues. The question is: Is separatism still a real threat to Ukraine? Or, perhaps, it ended with the rebellion in Donetsk and Luhansk? You live in the Odesa region, which is ethnically diverse and borders the unrecognised Transnistria, where this question seems to be more pertinent. BORYS KHERSONSKYY: First of all, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, independent Ukraine formed on the basis of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which began to sovereignly govern over its territory. This place has been very diverse when it comes to historical and economic development as well as cultural and national identity. On the one hand, some of the regions in the eastern part of the country imme-

diately fell under the influence of our northern neighbour, the Russian Federation. In other places, the strength of the Ukrainian state proved to be too weak, thanks to which criminal clans began to exert real power, like in the case of Zakarpattia (which to this day is a serious problem in Ukraine, especially after the Kremlin’s aggression). This diversity – political, cultural and even ethnic – is also clearly visible in the Odesa region and the city of Odesa. Undoubtedly after 2014, separatist forces (or simply Moscow) were trying to take advantage of it – although their influence on Odesa’s residents today seems to be marginal. How would you describe Odesa’s character? Few people are aware of the city’s historical diversity and the many nationalities which have shaped it.

In practice we can distinguish three myths about Odesa. First, there is the leg-

The Odesan myth and the Ukrainian façade, Interviewers: Tomasz Lachowski and Vitalii Mazurenko Interviews end that Odesa is a Russian imperial city founded by Catherine the Great in 1794. This is, of course, true but at the same time the myth suggests that the city has been striving to become part of Russia. The second myth (popular after the Revolution of Dignity) can be referred to as the Ukrainian myth (which is also a simplification). It assumes that the city does not differ from other Ukrainian cities (especially those in the south and east of the country), which is clearly not the case. Odesa was part of the territories captured by the Turks at the end of the 18th century when the historical region of Novorossiya was forming. The tradition of Novorossiya was revived after 2014 by the self-proclaimed people’s republics of Donbas in a clearly distorted and ahistorical way. Today, the separatist leaders have adopted a narrative of Little Russia (Malorossiya). However, Alexander Zakharchenko, the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic, understands the concept differently than it was historically interpreted, where Little Russian identity was markedly different from Russian identity. The third and final myth depicts Odesa as a multinational and multicultural city without any deep conflicts. In the past, Odesa’s linguae francae were Italian and French, although, of course, Russian was the official language. Odesa was a Russian-speaking city, but in reality the majority of Odesans spoke their own peculiar dialect drawing on Russian, Ukrainian and German traditions as well as Yiddish. Let us not forget

that in the 19th century Odesa was also built by the Poles, who to this day constitute a cohesive and strong, although no longer a numerous, minority. Myths seek to create reality, but they usually have little to do with it…

This is true in the Odesa case as well. None of the myths I mentioned reflect reality, although the last one is surely the closest to the truth. However, it is important to note that this was a touristcarnival myth developed in the 1960s during Nikita Khrushchev’s time, which is still being popularised by those who benefit from tourism. Unfortunately, important elements of this myth are no longer there – especially the Jewish element since most Odesan Jews were exterminated during the Holocaust. After the war, Germans were displaced to Kazakhstan and the characteristic Odesan architecture was increasingly replaced by new buildings, without respect for the city’s tradition. What remained was a commercialised “façade”. Has anything changed in Odesa following the Revolution of Dignity? It is worth remembering the tragic events of May 2nd 2014, when clashes between supporters of change and the so-called Anti-Maidan killed almost 50 people. Has the memory of this tragedy, variously interpreted, influenced the city’s life today?

This tourist-carnival myth is still alive, and it may have even strengthened following the annexation of Crimea by Russia, thanks to which Odesa has be-

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The Odesan myth and the Ukrainian façade, Interviewers: Tomasz Lachowski and Vitalii Mazurenko

Photo: Tomasz Lachowski

“I have decided that my next novel, Duvet’s fractions (Клаптикова ковдра), will be half written in Ukrainian and half written in Russian,” says Borys Khersonskyy, a Ukrainian writer.

come the main holiday destination for Ukrainians. Over this period, a number of Maidan activists, volunteers and participants in the Donbas war appeared in Odesa. Many of them spoke Ukrainian and expected more from their city than pretty façades of historical buildings and a place for a summer rest. When it comes to the tragedy of May 2nd – as we tend to refer to this gruesome day – while I do not have a 100 per cent certainty, I think that the authorities are the ones to blame for the huge fire in the Trade Unions building. The delayed arrival of the ambulances is one

of the reasons. Three myths grew around the events – the first one, promoted in the Russian media, blames “Ukrainian fascists” who came to fight “Russian patriots”. The second myth talks about an FSB provocation, and the third one – a mixed one – points to the interests of the local authorities, the police and other influential people from Odesa at the time. Again, the third one seems to be the most viable. In a sense, I myself was drawn into the politics of disinformation at the time. I was credited as saying that “after the Russians were burned, the air in Odesa became cleaner”, which

The Odesan myth and the Ukrainian façade, Interviewers: Tomasz Lachowski and Vitalii Mazurenko Interviews is a complete lie, just like the claim that I wrote a poem in a similar tone, which I did not. How has the EuroMaidan and the Russian aggression against Ukraine influenced your writing?

For many years I was an exclusively Russian language author. I was born in Chernivtsi, in Ukraine’s Bukovina region, but it was only during my short stay in Stanisławów (renamed IvanoFrankivsk in 1962) when I was a student that I learnt Ukrainian. Thanks to that, we can now converse in that language, but I have spent the majority of my life in the predominantly Russian-speaking Odesa and Kyiv. At the same, I do not deny that in 2014 I felt sorry that I did not speak and write my country’s mother tongue; so I have decided that my next novel, Duvet’s fractions (Клаптикова ковдра), will be half written in Ukrainian and half written in Russian. Even my wife, who comes from Moldova, started speaking Ukrainian from time to time – all thanks to Vladimir Putin. The authorities in Kyiv have tried to increase the presence of the Ukrainian language in the media. They have introduced time and quantity quotas for broadcasters to meet in their Ukrainian language programmes. Do you think it is a good solution given how sensitive and political the issue of language is?

First of all, I think the issue of language is extremely important and it is good that the authorities support the

development of the Ukrainian language. Secondly, however, I think that if someone was born in a Russian-speaking environment, grew up and matured in it, he or she should also have the right to die in it. No forceful actions are advisable, as it is impossible to encourage someone using legal means to change their long-established habits. There are people who would give their lives away for the Ukrainian ideal and yet they do not know the official language – they cannot be denied the right to be Ukrainian patriots just because they speak Russian at home. Nevertheless, we have to fight all the symptoms that denigrate our language. In Moscow you can often hear it said that Ukrainian is a regional dialect of the Russian language, and that a nation without its own language has no right to independently exist. I do not agree to that, but at the same time I do not agree that Ukrainians should totally dismiss Russian culture, which has existed long before Vladimir Putin came to power. The church is an important element of Ukraine’s public life. Next to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, there is the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church as well as the Roman Catholic Church and many other smaller denominations. Does the churches’ activity influence the unification of the Ukrainian nation, especially in light of the war in the east of the country?

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The Odesan myth and the Ukrainian façade, Interviewers: Tomasz Lachowski and Vitalii Mazurenko

We have to remember that, in the Orthodox tradition, the priest is a very important figure. For the Russian Orthodox Church, the Soviet Union still exists and so does the Holy Rus’, but only on the rhetorical level, never in the service of God. I was baptised within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate – although today, for political reasons, I am much closer to the Kyiv Patriarchate, or even – as long as Bishop Lubomyr Huzar was still alive – to Greek Catholics. I think that in practice there are few differences between these rituals, except for the small issue of being subject to the pope in the Vatican in the case of the Greek Catholic Church. Of course, the latter is a huge church in a regional sense, just to compare the scale and scope of liturgy in the St George Cathedral in Lviv and a small Greek Catholic chapel in Odesa to note the difference. I have never heard any calls for separatism in the church, but my friends say they have witnessed pseudopatriotic activity of the Moscow Patriarchate’s priests, some of whom were taking photographs on the May 9th Victory Day with the portrait of Stalin in the background. In Odesa, the church never supported the Revolution of Dignity, although I personally know several priests who decided to back the Ukrainian ideal, so strongly articulated on Kyiv’s Maidan in the winter of 2013 and 2014. The question regarding the extent of national consolidation remains open. It is especially important in the context of the

need to reintegrate Donbas and Crimea. It seems that not everyone believes in regaining the illegally occupied territories…

Undoubtedly, the loss of Crimea and Donbas, as a result of the Kremlin’s aggression (not only physical, but also a brutal verbal one), is something negative, but at the same time, paradoxically, the events contributed to the awakening of the self-consciousness of the Ukrainian spirit and the creation of the foundations of Ukrainian national identity. Perhaps my position is not as clearcut, but I think that for Ukraine’s development, especially its European path, leaving Crimea and Donbas out would be a better solution, although I realise that as far as our state interest is concerned – in a strictly legal sense – we need to continuously stress the Ukrainianess of these regions on the international arena. We need to ask ourselves what we can do with those who do not want to be with us. Shall we deport all separatists to Russia after regaining control of Donbas? Or maybe we would prefer to have an area in the country that would constantly block Kyiv’s reform attempts? The answer seems to be obvious. On the other hand, the lack of control over parts of its territory can bury Ukraine’s chances for full integration with the European Union…

We have the example of Northern Cyprus, a country supported and recognised only by Turkey, which has existed since Ankara’s invasion of Cyprus in the

The Odesan myth and the Ukrainian façade, Interviewers: Tomasz Lachowski and Vitalii Mazurenko Interviews mid-1970s. All efforts to unify Cyprus so far have failed and yet the country joined the European Union in 2004, and formally the whole territory has been admitted to the structure. Coming back to Ukraine, I think the return of Crimea and Donbas could only be possible after the disintegration of today’s Russian empire.

But how can a police state, ruled with a heavy hand and with significant social support, disintegrate?

I would rather ask whether its disintegration would be beneficial for the whole European continent. This is a key issue for the security of Ukraine, but also Poland.

Translated by Tomasz Lachowski and Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska Borys Khersonskyy is a writer and professor of clinical psychology. Since 2017 he has been a rector of the Institute of Contemporary Psychology and Psychotherapy in Kyiv. He is a prominent Ukrainian intellectual, translator, poet and writer from Odesa. Tomasz Lachowski is a lawyer and journalist. He has a PhD in international law from the University of Łódź and is the editor in chief of the Polish online magazine Obserwator Międzynarodowy (International Observer). Vitalii Mazurenko is a lawyer and journalist, member of Self-Defence of Euromaidan in Odesa and PhD Candidate at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin dealing with the issue of human rights protection in Ukraine.

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Veterans of the Bosnian War struggle for their rights LID IA K UR A SIŃS K A

For nearly a year, veteran combatants from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been protesting in front of the government building in Sarajevo, demanding financial aid and access to free medical services. Despite a mass nationwide protest on February 28th, the government has yet to adequately respond. Meanwhile, public support for the protesters continues to increase. “My name is Amir Sultan, I come from the Sarajevo Canton. At the age of 14, I exchanged a classroom chair for a gun. I joined a special unit, criss-crossed the country and was wounded three times. I survived, but two of my brothers did not.” Seated on an improvised wooden bench outside a tent that he has called home for the past half a year, Sultan recalled the realities of the 1992 – 95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina that he fought in: “I gave my all. As a result of the injuries I sustained in combat I am sick and I live with a pacemaker. But, since the war ended, I have not received any assistance from the government, not even one fening.” Sultan is one of a group of around 300 unemployed Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) veterans of the Bosnian conflict who have taken turns to occupy a grassy patch in front of the country’s federation government building since June 2017 in an effort to draw the government’s attention to their financial hardship and urge it to address their longstanding grievances that have been neglected for over two decades. The

Veterans of the Bosnian War struggle for their rights, Lidia Kurasińska

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protesters accuse the authorities of a lack of transparency in distribution of financial aid and spending large parts of the budget earmarked for veteran assistance on maintaining a loyal voter base. As if they had feared they were in for a long haul, the protesters brought with them a couple of tents and shipping containers, some cabins with portable toilets, and a. Now, after nine months of the camp’s presence in downtown Sarajevo, the place has become a fixture in the city’s landscape. The locals have dubbed the camp “Heroes’ Square”, and, as the veterans assure, they are not leaving until their demands are met. “Sell a cow, buy a gun” The 1992 – 95 war in Bosnia that the protesters took part in was one of the ethnic conflicts that accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Following the relative success of the Yugoslav “middle way”, between a planned and liberal economy, came a period of upheaval, compounded by the death of Josip Broz Tito, who had held the federation together. Croatia and Slovenia’s declarations of independence in June 1991 were followed by a referendum in Bosnia in February 1992, in which voters unequivocally opted for full independence from what remained of Yugoslavia. The referendum was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs who promptly began mobilising their military forces to prevent the republic from seceding. Following the Yugoslav People’s Army withdrawal from Bosnia, most of its weaponry ended up in the hands of Bosnian Serbs who used it to support their campaign of terror against the Bosnian Muslim population. Outgunned by the heavily-armed Serbs and faced with huge human losses, many ordinary Bosniaks took up arms to prop up the army. “When the war started, my president, Alija Izetbegovic, (the first president of the independent Bosnia and Herzegovina) proclaimed ‘sell a cow, buy a gun’; which meant that we, Muslims, had no chance of surviving unless we defended ourselves by all means possible”, explained Nazil Velić, a 60-year-old protester and the informal leader of the camp who had served in the army throughout the war. “They asked us to not only join the army ranks but also sacrifice all that we owned, including our tractors, machinery and animal stock, to further the military efforts. In the beginning, people didn’t have guns or uniforms, they went into combat barehanded, wearing trainers,” he continued. While the fighting initially took place between the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH), composed of Bosniaks and aided by Croats from the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), and the Bosnian Serbs in the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), tensions between Bosniaks and Croats in late 1992

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Veterans of the Bosnian War struggle for their rights, Lidia Kurasińska

led to an outbreak of a conflict between the two former allies. “I had a Croatian girlfriend, and my high school friends hailed from all the ethnic groups inhabiting Yugoslavia. But when the bloody war came, politicians tricked us into killing each other,” Velić said. Three demands The Dayton Agreement that ended the war in December 1995 created a new administrative and institutional order in Bosnia. The country was divided into the Serb-majority Republika Srpska, and a Bosniak-Croat Federation. The two entities established separate governing bodies. The agreement also became Bosnia’s constitution. Immediately after the signing of the accord, Bosnia embarked on a process of demilitarisation, thus making thousands of former soldiers redundant. As a result of the rapid imposition of democracy and poor vetting procedures, adequate socioeconomic programmes for veterans and victims of the conflict were not properly implemented. The protesters camping out in Sarajevo also allege that the political elite used the war to enrich themselves and propel their cronies into lucrative jobs while denying the foot soldiers, on all sides, access to basic benefits. There are around 50,000 demobilised veterans of ARBiH and HVO in the federation who do not receive any form of support from the state, including those who are unemployed, disabled or suffering from medical conditions. The former combatants’ financial hardship is compounded by There are around Bosnia’s high unemployment rate (25 per cent) – the 50,000 demobilised highest in Europe and the third highest in the world. the law on veterans’ rights in the federaveterans of the Although tion stipulates that former soldiers and their families Bosnian War who do should have priority access to jobs, in practice there not receive any form of are no mechanisms to enforce it. Throughout the protesters’ camp, posters plastered support from the state. on tents and fences remind visitors and passers-by of the veterans’ three core demands. One of them is the introduction of a monthly monetary benefit for unemployed veterans of the ARBiH and HVO to the value of 326 Bosnian marks (167 euros) and access to state-funded healthcare. The protesters also demand that each former soldier be given a monthly supplement of two to three Bosnian marks (one to 1.5 euro) for each month served during the conflict. The federation government has repeatedly refused to meet this demand as it estimated it would require an additional 140 million euros annually, a sum that is out of reach. As a result of extensive cuts to public services imposed as a condi-

A protester during the February 28th protest holding a sign that reads: “It’s an election year, what you do to us, we will do to you”. Photo: Lidia Kurasińska

Protesters heading to Vogošća during the February 28th protests – the eve of Bosnia’s Independence Day on March 1st. Photo: Lidia Kurasińska

Veterans having a cigarette break at the camp outside in downtown Sarajevo. Photo: Lidia Kurasińska

The permanent camp of the protesting veterans. The place has become a fixture in the Sarajevo’s landscape. The locals have dubbed the camp “Heroes’ Square” and, as the veterans assure, they are not leaving until their demands are met. Photo: Lidia Kurasińska

Nail Salihovic, one of the veterans living at the camp, on Women’s Day 2018. Photo: Lidia Kurasińska

Veterans of the Bosnian War struggle for their rights, Lidia Kurasińska

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tion for further loans from the IMF, the government not only does not consider increasing the budget for veterans but it also began revising the combatants’ disability benefits. So far, over 6,400 disabled recipients had their benefits stopped and more than 6,700 had them reduced. In 2013 a law passed to appease the IMF resulted in a 20 – 70 per In 2013 a law passed cent decrease in pensions for those veterans who re- to appease the IMF tired between 1997 and 2008. resulted in a 20 – 70 The former combatants argue, however, that the budget deficiencies could easily be remedied if the per cent decrease government took decisive action to root out false claim- in pensions for ants. This claim forms the second and most contentious demand – namely, the establishment of a single, those veterans who publicly-available register of former soldiers from retired between wartime ARBiH and HVO in order to prevent people 1997 and 2008. who had falsely stated to be veterans from receiving monetary benefits. In February 2017 the federation’s minister for veterans, Salko Bukvarević, released a report compiled by his ministry which claimed that 577,000 people are registered as having served in the two armies, “be it that they served only one day or throughout the entire wartime period”. The release of the figures drew widespread condemnation and ridicule from veterans across the federation who accused Bukvarević of artificially inflating the headcount. They allege that there were no more than 280,000 demobilised soldiers in the federation after the ceasefire, and a large number of them had passed away in the 23 years since 1995. “Who are those extra 300,000 people, then? If we had a transparent register we could see clearly who has been milking the system over the past two decades, and then strike these people off the list. That would give the government more than enough money to divide between the real veterans who deserve it”, argued Velić. Bukvarević has maintained that the publication of the register as requested by the protesters would contravene Bosnia’s data protection legislation, but a new register available only to officials employed by state institutions is being compiled. However, the protesters argue that unveiling the names of all former soldiers is the only way to ensure that ineligible claimants will not receive any more money from the shallow pool earmarked for veterans. By law, the only individuals eligible for financial support are those who were left disabled as a result of injuries sustained during the war, the recipients of military awards and the families of fallen soldiers. The protesters’ third demand is for the government, as well as each cantonal and municipal government within it, to end financing what they see as unnecessary and wasteful veteran associations. They allege that many of the 1,600 associations operating in the federation, at an annual cost of 18 million Bosnian marks (approx.

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Veterans of the Bosnian War struggle for their rights, Lidia Kurasińska

9.2 million euros), do so on a patronage-like basis, with politicians pumping money into them to keep their voter base loyal. Emir Sufić, a veteran from Srebrenik, noted that some associations “consist of 4 – 5 people, and they share the funds they receive from cantonal and municipal governments among themselves. Now, can you see why they do not support our protest?” The protesters also point out that, had the register been made public, it would be possible to verify how many of the associations are operated by actual veterans as opposed to political party activists. Bukvarević responded to the demands by pointing out that, as of August 1st 2017, the federation government ceased funding veteran associations and it was now up to the cantonal and municipal authorities to follow suit. According to the veterans, the move was merely a smokescreen that has allowed the funding to flow uninterrupted. Brotherhood and unity Disillusioned by the lack of progress, the demobilised combatants called for mass protests on February 28th this year, on the eve of Bosnia’s Independence Day on March 1st. By 10am of the protest day, the Heroes’ Square filled up with veterans that travelled to Sarajevo from all across the federation. As buses carrying protesters kept arriving and the crowds spilled onto the streets, Bukvarević’s earlier claim that “only a small group of people is unsatisfied” was put to a test. The protesters were then divided into two groups Disillusioned by the and tasked with occupying roads leading into and lack of progress, the out of Sarajevo. As the temperature hovered around the first contingent, consisting of around demobilised combatants -15°C 2,000 – 3,000 men and women, walked ten kilometres held mass protests to block a major junction in Vogošća on the outskirts on the eve of Bosnia’s of Sarajevo. The second group set out to occupy the Independence Day. Ivan Sedlo tunnel on the highway towards the city. In a coordinated protest, veterans from other cities and towns across the federation came out on the streets and blocked local roads. By nightfall, traffic to and from the major urban centres in the country had been paralysed, with only emergency response vehicles and those with an urgent reason to travel being allowed to pass. Battling the snowfall and freezing temperatures, reaching -20°C, the demonstrators kept warm by lighting fires and sipping hot drinks delivered by the locals. Although most protesters, including the two Sarajevo contingents, were dispersed by the police the following morning, veterans in a handful of smaller towns carried on for a few days.

Veterans of the Bosnian War struggle for their rights, Lidia Kurasińska

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As both Bosniaks and Croats came out on the streets to demand their rights, the protest was interpreted as a testament to the former combatants’ rejection of nationalist rhetoric and an embrace of the Yugoslav ideals of brotherhood and unity (bratstvo i jedinstvo) at a time when ethnic tensions in Bosnia and the Balkans are on the rise again. In a direct response to the protest, Bukvarević announced that a new bill on veteran rights, including free healthcare and a monthly monetary benefit, would be sent to the federation parliament for consideration within a month. However, after two decades of defeat, the veterans are not optimistic. On March 15th, Bosniak and Croatian combatants convened at Heroes’ Square and decided to go ahead with further road blockades unless the government addresses their demands by the end of the month. Gathered outside the tents, the men voiced their dismay at the letters that some of their comrades received in the aftermath of the demonstration on February 28th, and the state’s increasing hostility towards their struggle. Despite not having been asked by the police to identify themselves during the protest, a group of around 40 people, including a local baker who donated bread to the protesters, was fined 600 Bosnian marks (306 euros) each. “We have three basic demands, and there is absolutely no force that can stop us from fighting for our rights. There are 30 of us in this tent right now. The politicians can threaten us, fine us, send the cops on us, but the only way they can get us out of here is in 30 coffins. We are not giving up on our dignity,” Sultan proclaimed. Lidia Kurasińska is a freelance investigative journalist based in the Balkans.

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Witnessing another Putin victory W IK T O RIA B IE LIA S Z Y N

The results of the March presidential election in Russia have come as no surprise. Yet, the election victory of Vladimir Putin was not his only success. The high voter turnout, together with a low level of voting irregularities in comparison with previous elections, indicate that Putin’s system has not lost the people’s hearts and minds. I arrived in Moscow a few days ahead of the 2018 presidential election. The weather was cold and the city was plastered with flyers and banners reminding Muscovites of the upcoming election – in which the outcome was all but certain. On every street corner, young Russians were handing out refrigerator magnets and balloons with similar reminders. They are reluctant to talk about their political preferences, but they do not have to. In the end, what the authorities are aiming for is a strong voter turnout. In my interviews with experts and ordinary Russians, the common theme that emerged for this election was the aggressive policy to mobilise voters. The purpose of the strategy, as one of my interviewees admitted, was not to influence the result (which has long been predetermined), but to contribute to the triumphant image of the winner. In the end, a 70 per cent victory with the support of 70 million voters looks much better than a victory with a low turnout. But the pre-election agitation was not the only method used to secure a satisfying result.

Witnessing another Putin victory, Wiktoria Bieliaszyn

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Red October In Moscow I meet Irina Yatsenko from the foundation For Human Rights on Saturday, a day before the election. It wasn’t easy to catch her and when we finally meet late in the evening at Komsomolsky Square, the city, immersed in election silence, is far from calm. Yatsenko explains that for the members of the opposition who enrolled as election monitors, the day before the vote is one of the busiest in the election cycle. Monitors are completing their training, getting acquainted with the common violation methods and forming teams. Yatsenko herself is one of the volunteers. “If it is possible, I will create a list of voting irregularities, as they will surely take place. Taking pictures or filming is not always allowed, although according to the rules, this is our right,” Yatsenko says. According to her, election observers are often seated in places with little view over the voting process and the police, officially tasked with ensuring order, often assist or look the other way when infringements do take place. As Yatsenko explains, the list of possible irregularities under the eye of the police is long. “It would be difficult to name all the options, but the most visible ones include ballot stuffing, when ballots are thrown into the box earlier, before the polling station opens, or later, after its closure.” The so-called carousels are another method to influ- Volunteers collecting ence election results. Organised busses of voters are reports on voting driven to cast their votes from one station to another violations in the in exchange for money. It is no secret who they vote for. “There are situations which bring to mind com- polling stations have edies or theatre of the absurd,” Yatsenko continues. little time to speak “Imagine the shock and disbelief on the face of a man with me. They spend who wants to vote, shows his passport, and then learns the whole day with that he has already voted today.” On the election day, Golos – a movement for the their ears glued defence of voters’ rights – set up a temporary call cen- to the phones. tre in an old chocolate factory called Krasnyi Oktiabr, which in English means Red October. I receive a message with a map and address of the office right before the election. As Golos members explain to me later, the last minute invitation is due to security reasons. Earlier disclosure of the address could risk police intervention. Volunteers collecting reports on voting violations in the polling stations have little time to speak with me. They spend the whole day with their ears glued to the phones. When I finally find a moment in-between calls for a chat, one tells me

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Witnessing another Putin victory, Wiktoria Bieliaszyn

about the irregularities already registered. Ballot stuffing, carousels, buying and stealing votes, and attempts to impede the monitoring process have all been too common, just as Yatsenko had predicted the day before. Selfies and group pictures of people at the ballot box flood Russian social media. When I ask about the purpose of such an eager display of interest in the country’s political life, one of the Golos volunteers bursts out laughing. “Some of them want to show that they have fulfilled their civic duty, others need proof for their employer that they had voted. In some workplaces, especially those financed from the state budget, there is an unofficial requirement to vote. Sometimes, the failure to cast a vote can have serious consequences, including being fired.” As I was leaving the office, Golos had already registered 3,000 cases of voting irregularities. Before the end of the day, the number will rise to 3,245. Crimean spring According to Russian law, a presidential election should take place on the second Sunday of the month in which the president was formerly chosen. It therefore means that the 2018 election should have taken place on March 11th, rather than the 18th. According to the official explanation of the Federation Council members, Andrey Klishas and Anatoliy Shirokov and Duma deputy Mikhail Sheremet, the date change was caused by Women’s Day, which is a national holiday in Russia. However, many Russians interpret the change as Vladimir Putin’s attempt to remind Russians about the greatest achievement of his third term: the annexation of Crimea, which took place on March 18th 2014. A commemoration concert organised on Manezhnaya Square, titled “Russia. Crimea. Sevastopol”, confirms that, despite the fact that not all the votes have been counted, Putin knows that everything is going according to plan. He suddenly appears on stage to thank the audience. “Dear friends, thank you. Thank you for your support. Thank you for this result. You are our team. I am a member of your team. All those who have voted today, make up this team. I think this is a reflection of appreciation of all that has been done in the recent years,” Putin says to the audience gathered during the concert. “Success awaits us! My friends, it is very important to nurture this solidarity. It will allow us to continue moving forward.” Despite the freezing temperatures (-15 degrees Celsius), crowds of Russians, some wearing white jumpers and vests with Putin’s name on them, wave national flags and chant the name of their leader. Manoeuvring through the crowd and leaving the square takes longer than it did to get in and pass through police controls. In the evening, national TV broadcast experts and political scientists discuss

Witnessing another Putin victory, Wiktoria Bieliaszyn

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the results live from the studios and assess the chances of other candidates. They analyse Putin’s victory in depth, openly noting that they themselves supported his candidature. During one programme, a Polish election observer (possibly invited to the studio by mistake) takes his chance to comment on the results: “On the one hand, I feel sorry for Russia. But on the other, I envy you. I feel sorry that the election looks the way it does. At the same time, if you manage to introduce democracy here you will have a reason to be proud.” His comment is soon drowned out and forgotten. A graph shown on the bottom of the TV screen is constantly changing. Next to Putin’s name, the numbers continue to steadily rise while the other candidates are falling behind. Putin as a symbol The following day in Moscow is not much different than the day before. Walls and utility poles still bear the signs pointing to the polling stations. The cold sun is still shining and the metro is as crowded as ever. Newspapers, radio and television all announce the crushing victory of Vladimir Putin, who has received a record 76 per cent of the vote. He will remain president for another six-year term. The announcement comes despite that fact that not all the ballots have been counted. Information on voting irregularities, invalid ballots and other violations are still being collected, but it is clear that they will not change the result. During a press conference organised by the Golos organisation, representatives repeat what was already clear: the election took place, there were irregularities, the police had aided in breaking election rules, the election was clearly not free and fair, and it was not conducted in line Roman Udot, who has with the Russian constitution. been organising election Yet, Roman Udot, who has been organising elecmonitoring for years, tion monitoring for years, states with a bitter smile that this election was much calmer and more trans- states that this election parent than previous ones: “We should positively was more transparent assess the decline in some turnout figures, as com- than previous ones. pared to previous elections, which caused serious doubts among some observers,” he says. Despite some improvements, however, the election has not met international standards. A statement on the Golos website reiterates this claim. “Recognising the undoubted formal leadership of the winning candidate, we regret to state that we cannot recognise these elections as truly honest – fully in line with the constitution, the laws of the Russian Federation and

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Witnessing another Putin victory, Wiktoria Bieliaszyn

international election standards because the results followed an unfree, unequal and uncompetitive election campaign.” On my last day in Moscow, I still try to understand how Putin managed to hypnotise the Russian public to be elected for a fourth term. There is no doubt that his victory cannot be explained with forgery and election violations alone. I saw with my own eyes the reactions of thousands of Russians, who ecstatically cheered Putin during his speech on Manezhnaya Square. These emotions were real, not staged. During an interview with Dmitry Glukhovsky, a journalist and writer known for his critical view of the authorities and acute analysis of the Russian political scene, tells me: “On the one hand, people like a bull challenging the US, but on the other, if you ask people if they are happy with what is going on in the country, they will answer no.” Glukhovsky argues that Putin is not seen as a human, and not even as a politician. “It is an illusion,” he continues. “A figure. A symbol. Putin does not conduct any public policy. He does not promise anything to anyone. His narrative is based on mythology.” According to Glukhovsky, Putin gains sympathy by pretending to be close to people, making gaffes or telling awkward jokes, but people know little about him. This is why it is so difficult to assess him as a politician. “Any analysis of his actions or political decisions is momentarily being misinterpreted or ridiculed,” he explains. “When it is confirmed by some political clown, then they are being taken even less seriously.” Glukhovsky talks about a permanent crisis, the lack of self-respect which has been ingrained in the Russian national character together with the trauma related to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Interpreting reality through the prism of grounded myths and archetypes, longing for the fallen empire and an emotional vision of its return is something that Putin exploits. He understands how strongly it resonates with the Russians. Translated by Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska Wiktoria Bieliaszyn is a Polish journalist focusing on Russia. She writes for Krytyka Polityczna.

On mythical identities of mythical countries A conversation with Miljenko Jergović, a Balkan writer. Interviewer: Aleksandra Wojtaszek

ALEKSANDRA WOJTASZEK : We are meeting thanks to the recent publishing of a collection of your essays by the Krakówbased International Cultural Centre tilted Muscat, lemon and turmeric. It seems that a common denominator for these essays is Central Europe, which binds the descriptions of cities and biographies in your texts together. Do you believe that a Central European identity exists? If yes, what are its features?

for over a hundred years and then was physically moved hundreds of kilometres westwards. In other words, a great amount of people had to leave their local homelands and move elsewhere, which is both tragic and fascinating from a literary point of view.

MILJENKO JERGOVIĆ: I believe that we could talk about it in an unorthodox fashion. What is common to all of the peoples living in Central Europe is primarily all the traumas of the 20th century, such as the concentration camps. We are also connected by historical experiences such as being a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or the bloc of socialist countries after the Second World War. In one sense, we lived our lives in a border region. From the perspective of the Balkans, it is truly fascinating that Poland hadn’t existed

Yes. This is possible because Galicia is a mythical land. Although the Galician identity is not connected to any country or nation, it can be clearer and stronger than many national identities. I identify with this and it fascinates me as my identity also is not directly linked to a specific nationality or an existing or non-existent country. We can imagine Central Europe as a community made up of mythical countries and mythical identities. The Habsburg monarchy really existed, but its myth was stronger than its reality.

In the essay titled “A Galician Myth”, you write that the Polish writer Andrzej Stasiuk is a writer from your world.

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On mythical identities of mythical countries, Interviewer: Aleksandra Wojtaszek

If we speak of mythical lands, another one would be the Balkans. Where are they really located?

The Balkans? Now that is an interesting story! This word has been used as a curse and insult in all shapes and forms for 150 years. Depending on whom you ask, the Balkans will always be located to the southeast of where that person comes from. Austrians would claim that the Balkans begins in Slovenia. Slovenians, meanwhile, believe it starts at their eastern border. The Croats are offended if they are characterised as Balkan, even if that is a fact. To them it is obvious that Bosnia and Serbia are part of the Balkans. From the perspective of those two countries, Macedonia and Bulgaria are the Balkans. The Bulgarians admit to being Balkan, as they do not have much of an option to push this unwanted label any farther. But even to them this ugly world is always to the southeast of the place they currently reside. Understanding the Balkans through the prism of culture and identity, the region has been outlined by the former Yugoslav borders in the north and west for some 60 years. In other words, the Balkans begins in Slovenia and ends on the Bosporus straits. On the other hand, there is a cultural and historical argument for recognising everything south of Vienna, including the city itself, as the Balkans. What are these cultural features that allow us to outline such borders for the region?

Even if the Balkan identity at times faces denial, it does exist and is seen in

the poor music played in pubs. The Balkans goes as far as the music reaches. The inhabitants of the region share a historical experience and their identity is made up from a mix of Austro-Hungarian and Turkish-Ottoman remnants, experiences and cuisine. It is in the traditional food we can see this unique common space filled with mythology and shared memories. One can witness this extremely interesting combination of Vienna and Istanbul. These two spots could only be connected in the Balkans and nowhere else. When I go to Salzburg or Graz, I see it is its own world. Yet, fragments of that world exist in Plovdiv or Istanbul as well. This is all possible because I live in the Balkans and the city I come from – Sarajevo – is an unorthodox merger of these two distant styles of architecture and identity. This, in general terms, is the Balkans. All other stereotypes and images are false and imprecise. The Balkans is not a type of mentality, where people stab each other with ease or a never-ending fiesta in a Balkan slum. It is also not only a place of Roma. The Roma live outside of the Balkans as well. So why should the Balkans, and not France or Slovakia, be associated mostly with Roma? Where did all these stereotypes come from?

As much as the Balkans is a mythical landscape, it is also a place of prejudice. It turns out that the term is easy prey for different sorts of manipulation. Emir Kusturica’s films and Goran Bregović’s popular music have had an influential role

On mythical identities of mythical countries, Interviewer: Aleksandra Wojtaszek

Art, Culture and Society

Photo: Klaudyna Schubert/MCK

in creating a new image of the Balkans. Kusturica is a talented director who is respected across Europe. His vision of the Balkans did at some point become mandatory and in many cases the only one that existed, as people didn’t know of any others. Kusturica uses poetry of hyperbole in his work which has been misunderstood as the Balkan reality. It created a hyper-realistic picture of the whole region. It became a place where everyone is constantly drunk and happy. Where the sound of trumpets never fade and people are so emotional they

love and kill for the same reasons. From an artistic vantage point this is very interesting, but it does not and cannot be connected with reality. You are not alien to this type of mythologisation of surroundings. In the essay about your hometown you claim there are two Sarajevo’s – one fictional from your texts, and another real one influenced by the media and political discourse.

This mythical Sarajevo is part of my individual recollections and literary construct. I like these constructs as a read-

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On mythical identities of mythical countries, Interviewer: Aleksandra Wojtaszek

er and I enjoy mythical and literary cities. I prefer the Vienna that is described in literature than the one that exists in reality. When I imagine Sarajevo, I try not only to create a non-existent city, but also a place that never existed or could never exist in the future – that is if we assume there is no reality outside of literature. Though, I do believe that a collective mythology is nothing good for the community. The collective, incorporating elements of individual psychology, never ends well. I cannot imagine a context where this fantasising would have a positive impact. The collective does not have any imagination. There are only collective prejudices that come out of the fantasies and they in turn lead to totalitarianism, and even fascism. When we speak of mythical cities, I come to think of an opposite example – Andrićgrad. It is a real city created by Kusturica, made from stone, based on mythology, visions and cinema. It is a place where everything has symbolic significance…

I have to admit I have never been there. I have avoided travelling to Višegrad (in Bosnia, not to be confused with Visegrád in Hungary, which is the namesake of the Visegrad Goup – editor’s note) for different reasons since the war. In principle, I do believe everyone has the right to create their own world on their private plot of land based on their ideas and preferences – as long as it stays true to some general rules and urbanistic concepts. I would like to stop here, however, as I haven’t seen Andrićgrad

from up close. I honestly do not understand the point of building cities based on imagination. Returning to Sarajevo… the cactus is a motif in your debut and most famous collection of stories “Sarajevo Marlboro”. It is about the war in Bosnia in the 1990s. In an essay you wrote in 2016 about a trip to Sarajevo, you describe an attempt to water a cactus that has already dried out. This metaphor sounds very bitter. How do you view the situation in Bosnia 20 years after the signing of the Dayton Agreement?

Bosnia is a very unhappy country on many levels. Nobody really wants it, none of its ethnic groups. The Bosniaks, or the Muslims, declare that they want Bosnia to exist. However, they do it in a way that excludes the two other communities. It makes no difference if one claims that Bosnia is unwanted, as Milorad Dodik (current president of the Republika Srbska, a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina – editor’s note) and his associates do, or if one says there should be a Bosnia without Dodik and his people – meaning without Serbs, as the other side does. Bosnia cannot be Bosnia without the Serbs and it cannot be divided as Dodik claims. Bosnia will remain in a vegetative state for quite some time. That is its unforgiving fate. I used to see some hope in the direct or indirect integration with Europe and I hoped that if it was integrated with Europe it would become European. Meanwhile Europe stopped being European itself and began its own disintegration,

On mythical identities of mythical countries, Interviewer: Aleksandra Wojtaszek changing into something that reminds me of the Balkans and its worst stereotypes. It looks as though Europe doesn’t offer much hope for Bosnia. The Balkanisation of Europe instead of the Europeanisation of the Balkans?

That is exactly what happened. Not only is it a Balkanisation of Europe, but a Balkanisation of the entire world. When I see Donald Trump I get the impression that I see “our man” – the worst stereotypes. It is hard to see a difference between Donald Trump and Voijslav Šešelj (the Serbian nationalist who was acquitted of war crimes in 2016). Both men are, as we say in Bosnia, “the children of two brothers”. It is not only restricted to Šešelj as we have lived for 25 years with similar Trump types as ministers and presidents. The problem meanwhile is that our Trumps have taken over the White House and Washington. This is what the Balkan conspiracy against the world looks like. How do you assess the strengthening of Polish-Croatian relations within the Intermarium initiative?

The Three Seas, but not a single refugee. The Three Seas, but no Roma. The Three Seas, but without any Jews. Obviously, no atheists either. This blatantly Catholic initiative is an idea where everyone is Catholic, more or less like in Franco’s Spain. This is the kind of Catholicism that cries “Save us, Lord, from the Catholics who follow the teachings of the current pope”.

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In a radio interview a few years ago you said that Poland is not in the East any longer, that it has become a normal European country in contrast to Croatia. When we discussed this in March last year, you said that you were unsure if Poland is worthy of its great history…

I believe Poland’s greatest misfortune is itself. Today’s Poland is turning its back on its great sons and greatest traditions. The thing that shocks me the most, in light of recent events, is that the people who undisputedly rule the country have roots in the Solidarity movement, the same movement that fought for freedom and solidarity among the labour force. I do not understand what the Jarosław Kaczyński of 30 years ago has in common with today’s Kaczyński. It is very strange and this is what I mean when I talk about renouncing the better part of your traditions. The Polish Catholic Church had a very noble and praiseworthy role during the Second World War, full of sacrifice – very different from parts of the Croatian church. Today, it seems the church is turning on its past, wanting to show it is worse than it was. I am interested to know what type of writers, musicians and artists would get through the criteria set by right-wing clerical xenophobes if they remain standing? What type of literature, or culture for that matter, could Poland then refer to? A rise in xenophobia and nationalist sentiments is not only limited to Poland, however, but a large part of Europe as well. The Balkans region is also radicalis-

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On mythical identities of mythical countries, Interviewer: Aleksandra Wojtaszek

ing. Bosnia could be an example, as it is the place in Europe with the most recruited jihadists…

not a sentence for all Serbs. It seems many Croatian commentators did not agree with that view.

I would call this an “Eastern European syndrome”. I think the main reason is disappointment with freedom. Everything points to a failure of this democratic experiment that has been ongoing in Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin wall. It seems that people in Eastern Europe do not necessarily want freedom, just Coca-Cola. When they understood they won’t receive as much Cola as Paris or Berlin, they reverted to what they know best and what makes them happy. Communism is no longer, but there has been a shift towards something that is similar to the worst forms of communism, including its nationalist shape. Let us take Croatia as an example. The central committee has been replaced by the Catholic Church. Instead of communism, we have the kingdom of heaven and eternal life. There are also internal enemies who are against our nation and its prosperity. They do not want to recognise that we live better now than in the times of communist enslavement. Everything is how it used to be with a slight change of slogans and a modified ideological matrix.

This, of course, is a sentence for a specific war criminal not an entire nation. Unfortunately the problem is that a part of the nation identifies with the perpetrator, viewing him as a hero. It is bad that the other side sees this as a sentence for the entire nation. It is more interesting for the Bosnian and Croat state representatives that a Serb has been sentenced as a criminal. When a Serb is proclaimed guilty, his countrymen claim that the tribunal in The Hague is biased, while the Croats or Bosnians believe justice has been delivered. This is also true when it’s the other way around. When a Bosnian or Croat is sentenced, it is a conspiracy while the other side is content. In consequence, there is no catharsis and no awareness of the crime itself.

Right before our conversation, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague decided that Ratko Mladić is guilty of genocide in Srebrenica among other things, and sentenced him to life in prison. The chief prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, emphasised it was

Yet, you have written about the collective and individual responsibility of Croats for the Ustaše movement in your book titled: Father…

When I wrote that seven years ago, I was convinced that it was not exaggerated. Some friendly voices were reaching out to me to say that I could have put it in a more delicate manner as it isn’t completely true. Seven years later the same people that were motivated by this goodwill do not believe it anymore. After seven years I see that I was absolutely right. But this does not make me happy, nor does it stroke my ego.

On mythical identities of mythical countries, Interviewer: Aleksandra Wojtaszek Can we compare the situation in Europe today with the 1930s, as many commentators tend to do? You have often described this as the “silence before the storm” – a time right before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, or the year 1938 in your story about Wilimowski…

I think not quite. Larger European and non-European countries remain a bit healthier. We can observe it while looking at Germany. The far right party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), gained 10 per cent in the last election and is now losing support. There is no room in German society for a tide of fascism or the same hysteria we see in our re-

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gion. France was supposed to have Marine Le Pen and ended up with Emmanuel Macron. Trump is also trying to govern now for over a year, with poor results. Suddenly there is a judge from a forgotten place that blocks his decrees making him furious, or someone from the general staff claiming he will not carry out Trump’s orders. The community and system turns out to be stronger than some loony individual. In Eastern Europe, we would like to be Central Europe. But, unfortunately, this is not the case. It is enough that a maniac appears and the whole nation is content.

Translated by Aleksandra Wojtaszek and Daniel Gleichgewicht Miljenko Jergović is an award-winning writer, whose books have been translated into many languages, including English, French, Italian, Polish and German. He was born in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and currently lives and writes in Zagreb, Croatia. Aleksandra Wojtaszek is a journalist, editor and translator dealing mostly with Balkan countries. A graduate of the Slavic philology, she studied in Kraków and Zagreb, currently working on her PhD on the contemporary ex-Yugoslavian literatures.

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Mickiewicz reactivated G R Z E G O R Z N URE K

For the first time in 190 years, music has been added to the poetry of Poland’s greatest poet – Adam Mickiewicz. The project is a collaboration between a Ukrainian folk rock band and a contemporary Polish writer. The album, titled Mickiewicz-Stasiuk-Haydamaky, includes 10 poems put to the music of the Kyiv-based band Haydamaky. Andrzej Stasiuk, a renowned Polish writer, is one of the initiators of the project, and appears in some of the tracks reading Mickiewicz’s poetry. The cross-border collaboration reflects the heritage of the poet himself. “Mickiewicz has it all,” Stasiuk says. “The lyrics, rhythm and energy.” The manager of Haydamaky, Grzegorz Stech, explained how this unique record was made in an interview with the Polish Gazeta Wyborcza. “It all started in Lublin during the European Festival of Taste. Haydamaky hit the stage with their Cossack rock and Ukrainian ska punk. We started brainstorming how we could make it sound very Polish and, at the same time, very Ukrainian. That is how we ended up with Mickiewicz. The guys were introduced to Mickiewicz in the version translated by Maksym Rylsky, then they read the original Polish. They liked it and found the right music to accompany it, something they are very good at and somehow it worked. It reminded me of Stasiuk reading fragments of his White Crow years ago with his hoarse and raspy voice. That’s how I came up with the idea that Stasiuk would read the poetry.” The outcome of this collaboration was an energised mix of voice and song. The musical layers are filled with an almost Arabic atmosphere, depicted by the Tatar and Ukrainian influences mixed with rock, punk and modern folk. The instruments used included guitars, a trombone, trumpets, a clarinet, several types of percussion instruments as well as some unusual regional instruments like Tatar pipes.

Mickiewicz reactivated, Grzegorz Nurek

Art, Culture and Society One of the greats

Haydamaky was established in 1991 (originally under the name Aktus) and is known for singing poetry in their native Ukrainian. For the project, Mickiewicz’s poetry was translated by renowned Ukrainian writers such as Yuri Andrukhovych and Serhiy Zhadan. On some tracks, Stasiuk reads Mickiewicz’s sonnets in Polish. He is, after all, a poet, although he is better known for his prose. So, why did a group of contemporary writers and musicians decide to record sonnets written by a 19th century poet? The answer one would hear at school in Poland is that he was a great poet. In fact, Mickiewicz is not only considered a national poet by Poland, several other countries claim him as their own as well, including Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and even France. Mickiewicz was born in 1798 in Zaosie or Navahrudak (formerly Poland, today it is part of Belarus) and died in Constantinople in 1855. While he died relatively young (age 57), he is considered one of the greatest poets of Polish romanticism. In the compendium of the history of European literature – written by Annick BenoitDusausoy and Guy Fontaine – Mickiewicz is described in the following way: “As a great practitioner of the romantic open form, Adam Mickiewicz constructed incomparable poetic colossuses. In both Dziady and Pan Tadeusz we can find several intertwined literary Mickiewicz is not only styles and conventions. Poetically aesthetic images considered a national created through painting, art, music, dance and architecture also safeguarded whole poetical myths in poet by Poland. Several traditional Polish culture. As a classical philologist, other countries claim he could explore the Mediterranean heritage in its him as their own as well, original languages. He also read: Dante, Petrarch, Voltaire, Rousseau, Schiller, Goethe, Byron, Scott, including Lithuania, Pushin and other ‘Moscovite friends’ in their original.” Belarus, Ukraine, After he completed his studies at Vilnius Uni- Russia, and even France. versity, Mickiewicz worked as a teacher in Kaunas. It is important to add that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was partitioned in the years 1772 – 1795. Russia, Prussia and Austria took over its territory and Poland ceased to exist until 1918. In 1823 Mickiewicz was arrested and put on trial for his participation in a secret youth conspiracy aiming at self-education and independence. As punishment, he was sent to Russia for six years. The only consolation was that as a teacher he had the right to choose his place of exile, residence and work. Between 1824 and 1829 Mickiewicz lived in Petersburg, Odesa, Moscow and Crimea. He befriended several Russian poets such as Alexander Pushkin and got involved with Polish and Russian opposition movements that were critical of the tsar.

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Mickiewicz reactivated, Grzegorz Nurek

During these years, Mickiewicz was very productive. His “Crimean Sonnets,” which describe his travels to the Crimean Peninsula, were described as “a breakthrough within the language of lyricism”. It is from this series which consists of 18 sonnets that Haydamaky chose to include on their album. Among the sonnets we find: “The Ackerman Steppe”, “Baydary”, “Tschatir Dagh (The Pilgrim)”, “The Graves of the Harem” and “The Pass across the Abyss in the Tschufut-Kale”. The rest of the material is based on other works by Mickiewicz. “Alpuhara” is from the poetic novel Konrad Wallenrod and “The Ghost” is a fragment of Dziady. “Pytasz, za co Bóg…” is from the Lausanne lyrics, and another separate poem called “Ordon’s Redoubt” describes the defence of Warsaw against the Russians in the November Uprising of 1830 – 31. The East in miniature After so many years, the words of the poet are still surprisingly relevant, especially considering the current geopolitical reality (namely, the annexation of Crimea, the destabilisation of Ukraine and the conflict on its eastern borders). A perfect example of this can be found in “Ordon’s Redoubt”: We were not told to shoot – I stood on the cannon I took a look at the field; two hundred cannons were thundering. Rows of Russian artillery stretching out Straight, long, far like shores of the sea … Where is the king, who sends those crowds to be slaughtered? Is he sharing their courage, is he putting his own life on the line? No, he sits five hundred miles away from his capital … Great king, the ruler of half the world. When Mickiewicz wrote these words he was referring to Tsar Nicholas I. If heard today, many Ukrainians would think of Vladimir Putin. “Rows of Russian artillery stretching out …” – a timeless and suggestive vision it seems. Roman Koropeckyj, who wrote a biography of Mickiewicz a decade ago, describes the sea voyage the poet took from Odesa to the Crimean Peninsula: “Getting through the storm on the Black Sea, Mickiewicz gazed admiringly at the raging waters, while other passengers were overcome with seasickness confined to their cabins. The travellers reached Yevpatoria, a town in the north-western part of Crimea known for its healthy mud baths. The poet travelled over two months across the western part of the peninsula. The Crimean Khanate was incorporated

Mickiewicz reactivated, Grzegorz Nurek

Art, Culture and Society

The album Mickiewicz-Stasiuk-Haydamaky is available to buy in Poland and online (and can be found on iTunes, GooglePlay and Spotify).

into Russia some 40 years prior and while still free, it was becoming increasingly Slavic. However, the Tatar culture and way of life remained dominant in those lands. There were auls (a type of fortified village) with wooden houses, sculptured porches, mosques and women with veiled faces sitting on strong ponies, accompanied by men with Asian features. All of this is set in a backdrop of great views of the sea, mountains, the steppe and a pleasant Mediterranean-like climate. The ruins of Greek temples, Byzantine monasteries, Karaite strongholds, Genovese fortresses and palaces of the Khans… Mickiewicz crossed the steppe over to Simferopol and from there to Bakhchysarai and was an old Karaite village next to a cliff. The poet proceeded to climb Chatyr-Dag, its peak casting a shadow on the steppes surrounding Yevpatoria.” In a letter to a dear friend, Mickiewicz wrote: “I saw the East in miniature”. The exciting thing about his travels throughout the Crimean peninsula is that he was

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Mickiewicz reactivated, Grzegorz Nurek

accompanied by Karolina Sobańska (née Rzewuska), who was an “agent in a skirt”, working for the Russians. There was also a tsarist spy named Boszniak who went undercover as a botanist. Even if Mickiewicz was aware of this, he seemed to pay it little attention, and he even had an affair with Sobańska. Final journey Mickiewicz was deeply affected by the sight of the never-ending steppe. He compared it to a “dried up ocean”. This is how elaborate the Crimean landscape is described in “The Ackerman Steppe”, the first track on Haydamaky’s record: Across sea-meadows measureless I go My wagon singing under grass so tall The flowery petals in foam on me fall After returning to Odesa, the poet left for Moscow. The subsequent fate of the great bard was just as interesting. After years in exile, he left Russia and travelled to Europe, crossing Germany, Italy, Switzerland and France. In 1885 he left for Constantinople trying to create Polish and Jewish armed units that would fight against imperial Russia. Stasiuk describes Mickiewicz’s last journey in the epilogue of the album: “Adam Mickiewicz died in Istanbul on a rainy November day. He died of cholera in a squalid apartment. The last months of his life were filled with some solace … The Turkish Sultan had agreed to the formation of Cossack units. What an army it was! Cossacks from Dobruja, Nekrasov Cossacks, Bulgarians, Volochians, Poles, Jews, mercenaries and common runaways. Sadik Pasha gave Mickiewicz a horse named Crocodile. The morning cold forced him out of the tent. He would mount Crocodile and take two greyhounds with him – Karakus and Dumane – and hunt for hares.” Listening to Haydamaky’s record is not only an opportunity to experience a unique collaboration of Ukrainian and Polish contemporary culture. It is a journey to a different time and place via Mickiewicz’s multi-faceted poetry that is as relevant today as it was in the 19th century. The words and music express a Ukrainian affection and longing towards a lost Crimea and encourage reflection on the meaning of freedom, sovereignty and pride. At the same time, the music provides a boost of positive energy. Translated by Daniel Gleichgewicht Grzegorz Nurek is a Polish journalist specialising in cultural affairs.

Renaming streets A key element of identity politics A N N A W Ó J CIK A N D UL A D Z I S L A U B E L AV U S A U

Like many governments in history, the current Polish government has been no stranger to regulating historical interpretations through law. The ruling party has pushed several memory laws related to decommunisation in Poland. One initiative focuses on the renaming of streets and has caused further tension in an already divided society. The mass renaming of streets reflects the current pulse of identity politics in Europe. France is considering changing street names associated with the historical slave trade. The Netherlands ponders how to confront its colonial past inscribed in public spaces. Spanish municipalities and communes have started implementing the 2007 Law on Historical Memory on a larger scale, replacing Franco-era street names to honour women in Spanish history and victims of terrorist attacks. In 2015, Ukraine adopted a package of decommunisation laws that included mass street renaming. Most recently, the implementation of the new street decommunisation law in Poland, which came into effect last year, is yet another bone of contention in Poland’s divided society. It has raised concern over the quality of democratic participation and respect for minority rights and political pluralism in a country undergoing a major transformation under the leadership of the ruling conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party.

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History and Memory

Renaming streets, Anna Wójcik and Uladzislau Belavusau New state – old society

While the reformist PiS does not have a constitutional majority, it has managed to profoundly change the character of democracy in Poland through a series of laws adopted in regular vote. Major changes include effectively subordinating the Constitutional Tribunal and a strong part of the judicial branch to the legislative and executive powers which has led to an ongoIn 2016 lawmakers ing dispute between the European Commission and estimated that the Polish government. Other developments include approximately 1,000 turning the state broadcaster into a promoter of state launching a smear campaign against particular street names across policies, NGOs as well as threatening the freedom of assembly the country would and women’s rights. The current ruling party, led by Jarosław Kaczyński, fall into remit of the demonstrated its vision to profoundly change not new law prohibiting has only the Polish state but also to assure that the majority the propagation of of society continues adhering to conservative values communism or other and worldviews against a perceived threat of Europetotalitarian regimes. anisation conflated with progressivism. Therefore PiS has concentrated a lot of effort and public money on cultural policies aimed at preserving a certain vision of Polish identity through a particular understanding of the nation’s history. The most discussed element of this project has been the 2018 amendment to the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance, which criminalises ascribing responsibility for the crimes committed during the Second World War to the Polish state when it is contrary to established historical facts. Despite guaranteeing artistic and academic exceptions, this law may inhibit debates about the darker chapters of Polish history. It has already provoked tensions with Israel, Ukraine and the United States – and has been blamed for provoking a few antisemitic outbursts in Poland. Like many governments in history, the current government has been no stranger to regulating historical interpretations through law. The party pushed several “memory laws” related to decommunisation of the Polish state almost three decades after its transition to democracy. While the renaming of streets was launched shortly after 1989, in 2016 lawmakers estimated that approximately 1,000 street names across the country would fall into remit of the new law prohibiting the propagation of communism or other totalitarian regimes through the names of buildings, objects and other public facilities. The law was adopted in 2016 and took effect on September 1st 2017, mandating local authorities to change the names as indicated by the Institute of the National Remembrance (IPN). The IPN list of

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130 names includes those that refer to, among others, the Red Army, the Polish People’s Army, the Polish Workers’ Party, as well as the likes of Karl Marx or Rosa Luxemburg (who was born in 1871 in Zamość). After the deadline was set for local authorities, the centrally-appointed governors of the Polish provinces were responsible for issuing a replacement order to rename selected streets in their provinces. Initially, the local authorities had three months to appeal the decision to the administrative court, or overrule it in a regular vote in the local council. However, due to several protests against the governors’ decisions, the law was amended in December 2017, making it more difficult for the local authorities to object. The councils then required the permission of the IPN and the provincial governor to overrule any decisions. Local struggles for memory While there were cases when the IPN opinion was favourable to dissenting local communities, the 2017 amendment remains an alarming development. It reflects a growing trend of governance by decree, where the central government pays little regard to local history. In a democratic state, citizens have a right to remember, including the right to mourn and commemorate, but they are not obliged to comply with a duty to remember something imposed by the state. Citizens should not be forced to mourn or commemorate against their will. The street renaming programme is thus a powerful symbolic intrusion into the life of local communities. Some local council members and local residents protested against the unabashedly partisan choice of new street patrons. One factor in this process was that many local councils are still dominated by the opposition party, Civic Platform (PO). The next local elections are scheduled to take place later this autumn. The local struggles in Katowice and Łódź illustrate this point. IPN had advised renaming all the Wilhelm Szewczyk streets across the country. Szewczyk was a writer and supporter of the Silesian regional identity, was a communist party member and long-time MP in the parliament of the Polish People’s Republic. His street in Katowice was renamed Maria and Lech Kaczyński Street, the presidential couple who tragically died in the airplane crash in 2010. More recently, Szewczyk Street in another town in Silesia, Ruda Śląska, was changed to honour the late local PiS politician Jerzy Drażyk. In Łódź, the central Victory Square, which since 1945 had commemorated the victory against Hitler’s fascism, was briefly renamed Lech Kaczyński Square. The local city council out manoeuvred the government by declaring that from 2018 onwards Victory Square will commemorate a different historical triumph – the victory of the Polish Army over Bolshevik forces in the 1920s.

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Extensive commemoration practices of the late presidential couple divide public opinion. For some, it stands as a welcomed extension of the national pantheon, while for others it bears elements of an imposed cult of the Kaczyński namesake, which began to rise in 2010 with the burial of the late president and his wife in the Royal Wawel Castle in Kraków, next to Polish kings, saints and nobles. Lech Kaczyński has been commemorated with 40 streets and Lech and Maria Kaczyński jointly with 17 – a modest, but possibly growing number. Broad understanding The new street decommunisation law defines the propagation of communism broadly, to include names which “refer directly to a totalitarian ideology”, as well as names referring to “persons, organisations, events or dates symbolising the repressive, authoritarian and non-sovereign regime in Poland from 1944 to 1989”. Involving IPN in the selection of names to be removed was to assure a degree of academic detachment, but the resulting list is not without controversy. It bans, for example, such historical figures as Bruno Jasieński, Józef Lewartowski and Bronisław Taraszkiewicz from serving as street patrons in Poland. Bruno Jasieński (1901 – 1938) was a prominent interwar futurist poet and playwright, author of the celebrated Manifesto to the Polish Nation for the Immediate Futurisation of Life. Jasieński joined the communist left in Poland and later moved to the Soviet Union where he acquired Soviet citizenship, joined the Soviet communist party and became an exemplary author of Soviet literature. Accused of “ideological alienation”, he died in a labour camp in the USSR in 1938 and was probably executed by the NKVD. Jasieński was both a Soviet propagandist and a victim of Soviet policies. Depending on one’s perspective, his life may be deemed a tale of betrayal, or a warning against the blind infatuation of an undemocratic and anti-pluralistic political agenda. In Jasiński’s case, the IPN resolved the question of whether an artist should be judged by the merits of his work, or by his political biography – but not everyone agreed with this decision. In 2016 the authorities renamed Józef Lewartowski Street after Marek Edelman. The street is situated in a part of Warsaw built upon the rubbles of the Jewish ghetto that was established by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Before the war, Lewartowski (1895 – 1942) was a politician of the Polish communist party. Later, he was one of the first organisers of the Jewish resistance in the Warsaw ghetto, where he died in 1942. Edelman (1919 – 2009) was a Jewish socialist party activist in pre-war Poland. He was one of the leaders of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943. Edelman survived the war, became a renowned cardiologist and was

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active in the anti-communist opposition. Edelman, without any doubt, deserves a street named after him, but a complete erasure of Lewartowski, from the place where he had fought against the Nazis, implies that his efforts and sacrifice – just because he was a member of an ideologically communist party – are somehow less important than that of other heroes. Such an implication may support a dubious gradation of sacrifice and martyrdom in Polish history, and impact negatively on political pluralism of today’s Poland. A third example is highlighted in the case con- Current attempts at cerning Belarusians in Poland. Branisłaŭ Taraškievič, decommunisation or Bronisław Taraszkiewicz in the Polish transliteration (1892 – 1938), was a prominent Belarusian lin- should be read guist after whom a street and school were named af- against the backdrop ter in eastern Poland – a region with a high concen- of anti-communist tration of Belarusian minorities. Taraškievič was the sentiments which, author of the first standardised grammar of the Belarusian language. He was tortured by the NKVD in the in today’s Poland, 1930s and died as a victim of Stalin. His standards of includes more than grammar were prohibited in Soviet Belarus from the denouncing the 1930s onwards. Today, an openly pro-Russian regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka uses either the Russian lan- state’s historical guage or the Russified version of Belarusian. The clas- subjugation to sical written standards of Taraškievič have thus re- Soviet Russia. mained a symbol of anti-communist resistance. Nevertheless, Taraškievič was considered by the central branch of the IPN in Warsaw as unfit to be a street patron in Poland, since he had supported a left-wing “communist” faction representing the interests of the Belarusian minority in the Polish interwar parliament. Ironically, he is another victim of Stalin to be banned by virtue of the decommunisation law. Ambitious project These three examples demonstrate that the decommunisation law, justified by the government as a tool of much delayed transitional justice, in fact contributes to the process of erasing historical figures of the political left and the contribution of minorities in Polish history. Current attempts at decommunisation should be read against the backdrop of anti-communist sentiments which, in today’s Poland, includes more than denouncing the state’s historical subjugation to Soviet Russia, condemning atrocities and gross human rights violations perpetrated by

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the Soviets and the Polish communists against Polish citizens before 1989, or the rewarding of activists of the anti-communist opposition. The current anti-communism legislation is also an ambitious political and cultural project aimed at disassociating left-wing figures and movements from the historical and contemporary understanding of Polishness. According to the view of many in the current government, a true Pole cannot be a communist. For example the current prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, claimed it was not Poles but communists who launched the antisemitic campaign in 1968 and therefore the Polish state does not bear responsibility for these events that resulted in human rights violations. In contrast, during the official commemoration events in Warsaw, President Andrzej Duda asked those expelled in 1968 for forgiveness to the Polish Republic and authors of the antisemitic campaign. On the other hand, a more nationalistic understanding of Polish citizenship seems to be gaining support, or at least it is more audible in the current political climate where xenophobic utterances are no longer taboo. This should be alarming for ethnic and cultural minorities in Poland who may fear their contributions to Polish culture and heritage may be questioned, excluded as foreign, or otherwise unwanted. Like any government policy, the large-scale street renaming programme may lead to unintended consequences. There is a risk that it will contribute to a political project of homogenising anti-pluralistic and even anti-democratic ambitions, aimed at curbing political competition and imposing one particular identity over others. On the flipside, it also opens a window of opportunity to redress some historical injustices – for example, including the mistreatment of minorities. Nevertheless, the challenge for policymakers is to now design and implement the street renaming programme while safeguarding constitutional responses to diversity of all its religious, cultural, social and political dimensions, as well as remembering that state should not arbitrate historical issues. Uladzislau Belavusau is a senior researcher in European Law at the TMC Asser Institute in The Hague – University of Amsterdam (The Netherlands). He is currently a visiting scholar at the University of California at Berkeley (USA). His most recent book is Law and Memory (co-edited with A. Gliszczyńska-Grabias, Cambridge University Press, 2017). Anna Wójcik is an assistant researcher and PhD candidate at the Institute of Law Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences within the MELA (Memory Laws in European and Comparative Perspective) research consortium.

Memory of independence A gap-filling exercise M AT E USZ M A Z Z I N I

2018 is the year Poland celebrates its 100 years since regaining independence. However, not all of today’s Polish territory was a part of Poland a century ago. This creates a dilemma for these regions and highlights, once again, issues of memory, identity and belonging. In 2018, Poland becomes “infinitely independent”. At least that is the message on the official logo of the 100 years of Polish independence, which is composed of the infinity symbol coloured in white and red. Independence is to remain in Poland once and for all. But this total somehow all-encompassing message transpiring from the logo may also be seen through different lenses – those of geography. In other words, as infinity has no borders in time, it should have no borders in space either. It is therefore possible to draw an assumption that the century of Poland as an independent state ought to be celebrated equally in all parts of the country, from its western extremes to eastern borders and from the northern seaside to the mountains in the south. Even though local and state officials can promote these celebrations and assure the official narrative and symbolism, the societal reception of the commemorations will remain largely outside their control. What is more, even as early as today, it is safe to assume that this reception will be highly unequal across Poland – such an outcome seems almost intuitive. After all, how to prepare a holistic, inclusive narrative about independence and statehood – notions so closely intertwined with various layers of local and personal identities – for a country that had significant parts of its borders reshaped, populations displaced and lands taken away over seven decades ago?

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Memory of independence, Mateusz Mazzini Complex task

For the communities of Szczecin, Wrocław, Olsztyn and many others located on the so-called Recovered Territories – the former lands of Eastern Prussia and eastern parts of Germany that Poland gained after the Second World War – the commemorations of the 100 year anniversary will be a very complex and uneasy task to carry out. The vast majority of these cities, as well as many other ones, have been governed by Polish authorities for no more than a fraction of their overall history, and they still maintain distinct architectural, societal and economic features indicating their urban consanguinity with Germany. Even today, this differentiates them from other parts of Poland. From a purely chronological perspective, therefore, the notion of Polish independence as a collective good has much stronger roots in Warsaw than in Wrocław, in Kraków than in Szczecin, and in Kielce than in Słupsk. Thus the two questions that persist and need to be asked are: firstly, whether it is at all possible to create a narrative commemorating independence that is inclusive enough to embrace such a diverse multitude of identities? Secondly, is it even desirable to attempt to develop one? The underlying tension expressed through these two questions stems from the unavoidable clash between the types of categories that are here at play. Understood from legal and historical points of view, terms such as independence or sovereignty are very rigid and unilateral. A city, a community, a land parcel cannot belong to two countries at once. Consequently, a collective of human beings living within an area canCelebrating not, as a whole, identify itself as located within the independence, or the confines of a multitude of sovereign entities. Therefore independence, or the memory of regaining memory of regaining celebrating it, cannot be plural, at least from a legal angle. From a it, cannot be plural, sociological perspective, however, the matter at hand at least from a legal presents itself as completely the opposite. Nationhood point of view. is a much more fluid concept, and so is identity. When the two concepts mix together, it oftentimes becomes clinically impossible to single out particular national identities among members of a borderland community. Drawing on the works of Benedict Anderson, it could be argued that the imagined community of the Recovered Territories is significantly different compared to that of central, eastern and southern Poland. A similar critical decomposition can be conducted with regard to collective memory, a notion of paramount importance in the context of the independence commemorations. “Collectivities have memories, just like they have identities,” wrote the American sociologist Jeffrey Olick in his famous essay “Collective memory: The Two Cultures”. Moreover, collective memory is not only inherently plural, or,

Memory of independence, Mateusz Mazzini

History and Memory

as Richard Kravitzek put it, polyphonic, but also multidirectional. The latter term, particularly popular and prolific in the Polish school of memory studies, as illustrated in the works of Barbara Szacka and more recently Joanna Tokarska-Bakir, is perhaps the most important for the entire debate over the ways of commemorating independence. The multidirectional nature of memory allows for its development alongside numerous paths simultaneously. In simpler terms, the creation of narratives related to one particular historical event or phenomenon does not exclude a parallel creation of narratives concerning a different fragment of the collective past. From this angle, collective memory is a building under construction, of which different wings can be developed, expanded and built over at the same time. An expansion of the memory of independence therefore does not need to be synonymous with abandoning other commemorative efforts. Zero-sum memory In the Polish literature on memory – most recently exemplified by Paweł Dobrosielski’s book Spory o Grossa (The disputes over Gross), examining the shape and dominant discursive trends in the public debate following the publications of Jan Tomasz Gross’s books – a concern is frequently expressed that collective memory is a type of zero-sum game. Its expansion in one particular direction indispensably leads to negligence or even erosion of all other dimensions. However the most recent publications on the Polish memory politics, to name only Rafał Stobiecki’s works on the role of historians in debating politics of history and Marcin Napiórkowski’s book on the memory of the Warsaw Uprising, suggests otherwise. Eventually, from a more practical perspective, the last two years in Polish memory politics and the mnemonic strategy of the Law and Justice government show that the conflict over memory can be simultaneously expanded in various directions at the same time and touch upon different layers of history with comparable, if not identical, intensity. Finally, it is crucial to address the question of participation. As involvement in events such as the commemoration of a state’s independence is very much a matter of belonging – to a community, a nation or a country – how does one construct a narrative of the anniversary of regaining independence in areas that have no physical traces of that struggle? That vacuum of actual memory does not only touch upon the members of the community (since hardly any participants of the original events will be alive), but also the spatial dimension of interpretation. Technically speaking, not a single building standing today in Wrocław had been a part of in-

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dependent Poland a century ago. Any buildings in these two cities that are a hundred years old belonged to a different country. It is thus not just the community, but most of the sources of its local identities that cannot fully claim a continuous century of “Polishness”. This is, however, not to say that a memory of the struggle for independence cannot emerge there. In the field of sociology of memory, multiple theories and conceptual frameworks address the issue of memories that are somehow artificial, that is, they do not correspond to any actual historical events located within a specific time and space. One such concept is the notion of post-memory, developed by Marianne Hirsch, and it is particularly useful to understand how the century of Polish independence can be successfully celebrated even in the Recovered Territories. Postmemory refers to a phenomenon in which individuals begin to develop memories of events they have not taken part in themselves, but ones which past generations of their communities or families have. Though Hirsch’s work has been primarily centred on the families of Holocaust victims, the notion of post-memory can easily be transplanted into the debate over commemorating Polish independence. Sociology of memory gives an affirmative answer to the question of whether areas as Recovered Territories can be successfully merged into a nationwide commemorative narrative. The practicalities of such a process, however, are a completely different issue. Future-oriented Local government leaders and municipalities face a difficult and complex challenge. While the culmination of commemorative efforts is to take place on November 11th 2018, the entire year is dubbed the year in which Poland remembers its struggle for independence. As a result, various individual events leading up to the Independence Day also become worthy of exceptional commemoration. That makes it a year-long effort in which it is immensely difficult to maintain an inclusive narrative and avoid the politicisation of memory. Eventually, the historical tensions and complexities are not the only ones to be taken into consideration. Presentday compositions of the local population are also important in many cases. Such as the one in Wrocław, where over 11 per cent of the population is now made up of Ukrainians, while other minorities also begin to be deeply rooted in the city’s societal landscape. The commemorations should also account for that. Thus, the narrative should focus on the future as well. The past, present and, most likely, the future of the Recovered Territories, for instance, are marked by ethnic heterogeneity and the co-existence of members of different ethnicities, origins and identities.

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A prospective orientation of the narrative built over independence commemorations appears to be among the most constructive and useful strategies that could potentially be implemented. Some specific examples are already implemented, such as in the case of Słupsk, where the mayor, Robert Biedroń, has been very vocal about his approach to the centennial anniversary of independence. As the city has no historical continuity within the borders of the Polish State, the commemorations will focus on the future, and the central theme will be on women’s rights – an issue that is relevant to the The pre-war absence present and not just buried under pompous declara- of the Recovered tions of historical remembrance. Similar declarations Territories from were made by local governments from Sopot, Świdnica, Ostrów Wielkopolski and other municipalities from Polish statehood is the Recovered Territories. not the only identityBe that as it may, the pre-war absence from the related obstacle to Polish statehood is not the only identity-related obstacle to building an inclusive narrative of independ- building an inclusive ence. The Polish State post-1944 was not exactly a narrative of a century manifestation of a sovereign entity and numerous areas of independence. located on the Recovered Territories later became the primary deployment locations for Soviet troops stationed in Poland – Legnica in Lower Silesia and the entire area of Western Pomerania being on the forefront of this category. The German heritage of these lands, followed immediately by the overarching presence of the Red Army, successfully inhibited not only a smooth integration with the rest of the country in terms of building a coherent identity, but also labelled the areas as “not fully Polish”, or, more specifically, “not fully controlled by the Polish government” for almost half a century. Meanwhile, other parts of Poland were undergoing a complex, nation- and identity-building process, as a result of the tragic outcomes of the Second World War and the disappearance of entire classes and layers of society, including Jews, Ukrainians, Belarusians as well as large parts of the aristocracy and intellectual elite. Window of opportunity Edwin Bendyk, one of Poland’s leading social scientists and public commentators, is therefore right to point out that many of the cities located in the Recovered Territories suffer from “the curse of eternal beginning”. Forced on constantly reinventing themselves and proving their belonging, most of these communities would struggle to have their identities somehow solidified, transformed into something

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rigid and amorphous. In his essay on the difficulties of commemorating independence in the western parts of Poland (Polityka 8/2018), Bendyk rightly observes that 2018 gives room for a window of opportunity for many cities in the area to open (or, in some places, re-open) a debate on pressing issues of societal development. Issues, one might add, of which Polish urban areas are not short of by any means. Bendyk lists, among others, the post-industrial transformation, new urban identities and depopulation caused by migration to other countries and large cities. This taxonomy, however, needs to be expanded to include climate change and pollution, transnational co-operation between regions, the internationalisation of education, the integration of economic migrants and an effective response to Poland’s growing insertion into the globalised economy. All these policy-making areas not only lie within the competences of local governments, but are also dimensions in which voters do expect their politicians to act and deliver. In sum, the year in which Poland celebrates a century of its independence can present a myriad of opportunities locally. In an election year, it is a chance not to be missed. All of the above discussed scenarios will, however, prove useless or impossible to carry out if the commemorative initiative is hijacked by those who would use it as tool of exclusion. Recent initiatives in the memory of history and politics of many countries in the Central and Eastern Europe region have shown that over the past number of years, memory continues to be an issue of nationhood. As evidenced by the most recent statements on memory politics, delivered on the commemorative events of the anniversary of March 1968 by the present-day Polish government officials, subscribing to a certain, oftentimes dogmatic, monopolistic version of collective history is treated as a crucial determinant of one’s worthiness as a member of a nation. Memory becoming a tool of partisan struggle is by no means a new phenomenon. Memory as an instrument of societal exclusion, however, is not only a recent emergence but also a cause for concern. Therefore, it is crucial to remember that if Poland is to be really “infinitely independent”, it needs to recognise and celebrate each and every member of its nation equally, no matter where their roots are. Mateusz Mazzini is a doctoral candidate at the Polish Academy of Sciences, and formerly a visiting doctoral scholar at University College London. His research project focuses on the collective memory of the non-democratic past in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America.

INDEPENDENCE

BOGUSLAW WINID

(f. Permanent Representative of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations in New York)

ALEX MOTYL (Rutgers, Harriman Adjunct Professor)

ANDRIUS KUBILIUS

(f. Prime Minister of Lithuania)

ANNA BUCHMANN (curator of the Polish Museum, Rapperswil) | MACIEJ DUSZCZYK (University of Warsaw) | ALFONSAS EIDINTAS (f. Ambassador of Lithuania to Greece) | JULIE GEORGE (Harriman Institute, Columbia University) | KRZYSZTOF KALICKI (President, Deutsche Bank Polska) | STEFAN KAWALEC (President, Capital Strategy) | ZBIGNIEW KRUSZEWSKI (University of Texas, El Paso) | EDWARD LEMON (Harriman Institute, Columbia University) | MATTHEW RHODES (George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies) | RALF ROLOFF (College of International and Security Security Studies) | SŁAWOMIR SIKORA (President, Citibank Poland) | ROMAN SZPORLUK (Harvard University) | PIOTR ŚWIĘCICKI (Squire Patton Boggs Święcicki Krześniak sp.k) | IGOR ZEVELEV (George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies)

University of Warsaw June 28-30, 2018 Warsaw, Poland Information:

www.weec.uw.edu.pl

Wojnowice Castle Hotel - Restaurant - Function Halls - Concerts Just 7 kilometres outside Wroclaw www.zamekwojnowice.com.pl

EASTERN CAFÉ

178 Marcin Kaczmarski compares two recent publications on Russian andChinese relations. 182 Emre Kazim takes us through Bruno Macaes’s The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the New World Order. 188 Piotr Pogorzelski brings context to the Ukrainian cinema hit Cyborgs: Heroes Never Die. 192 Wojciech Siegień reviews Anne Applebaum’s latest book on the Holodomor famine. 196 Alin Constantin examines the role of the Romanian Orthodox Church during the Holocaust. 201 Millie Radović looks at Dimitar Bechev’s Rival Power: Russia’s Influence in Southeast Europe.

Between an axis of convenience and a return to the past M A R CIN KA CZ M A R S K I

Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience – Stable and Successful. By: Michal Lubina. Publisher: Barbara Budrich Publishers, Leverkusen Germany, 2017. A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia relationship means for the world. By: Bobo Lo. Published jointly by: Penguin Books / Lowy Institute, London/Sydney, 2017. The ChineseRussian relationship has become a contemporary issue these days. For the last two years analysts and scholars have produced volumes of publications that scrutinised recent developments taking place between Beijing and Moscow. Prior to the conflict over Ukraine, relations between Russia and China were of interest only to a handful of specialists. The multi-billion dollar gas deal, a revived

arms trade and high-level summits have brought the Sino-Russian relationship into the spotlight while observers of international politics began to discuss prospects for emergence of an anti-western bloc. Two books stand out against this background. At first glance, they could not be more different. Michał Lubina’s Russia and China: A political marriage of convenience – stable and successful

Between an axis of convenience and a return to the past, Marcin Kaczmarski is a 300-page-long volume, dense with detail. Bobo Lo’s contribution A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia relationship means for the world is three

Eastern Café

times shorter. When read together, both books offer distinct perspectives on one of the most important bilateral relations in today’s geopolitics.

Sceptics vs pessimists The western debate on the quality of post-Cold War Russian-Chinese relations used to be divided between sceptics and pessimists. Representatives of both these groups challenged the official narrative of the “comprehensive strategic partnership”, eagerly promoted by officials from the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai. Sceptics emphasised all the flaws in the Sino-Russian relationship and pointed to the possibility of a clash of interests between Moscow and Beijing. Pessimists in turn warned against China and Russia establishing a revisionist alliance, keen on overturning the liberal international order. Bobo Lo has becomeone of the most prominent representatives of the first group, having published The Axis of Convenience in 2008. His most recent contribution, published almost a decade later, argues that the Sino-Russian relationship has not transformed qualitatively. In 2008 Lo defined the relationship as based on tactical expediency and short-term interests rather than long-term strategies or shared worldviews; in other words, cynical and pragmatic rather than reflecting like-mindedness. While Lo admits that today’s ties between Moscow and Beijing have

broadened, he argues that the nature of their relations has not changed. The contours and limitations of rapprochement have been defined already in the early1990s. Lo remains sceptical. What has changed in his recent assessment is the lowering probability of a clash between the two states. As he puts it, the current shape of co-operation can be expected to stay. Still, we should not take appearances for reality, which is what – in Bobo Lo’s view – those analysts who see a post-2014 relationship as the “alliance in all but name” are doing. Michał Lubina, meanwhile, attempts to navigate between these two dominant narratives and offers an original interpretation. He argues that mutual relations – though not an alliance – go far beyond the “marriage of convenience”. For Lubina, Sino-Russian relations have undergone a deep transformation as a result of which the contemporary relationship between Moscow and Beijing resembles one of the 17th and 18th centuries, with China having gained the upper hand but remaining able to demonstrate and implement self-restraint in its policy towards Russia. Lubina uses the metaphor of the Nerchinsk/Kyakhta treaty system which allowed Russia to gain profits in

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return for the acceptance of China’s superiority. At that time, Russia, though weaker than China, still stood out as a half-equal. This model lasted until the mid-19th century when Russia joined other European powers in dominating

Lubina’s book is a very systematic compendium of the contemporary Russian-Chinese relationship. China. Nonetheless, just as three centuries ago, both states do not have much in common with each other today. This is where Lubina meets Lo. In his book, Lubina seeks to employ and adapt the existing conceptual and theoretical vocabulary of the discipline of international relations. He dismisses out of hand liberalism and institutionalism, seeing interdependence, win-win co-operation and mutual benefits as a mere “smokescreen” put on by Russia

and China. Instead, realism serves as the starting point. There is, however, some confusion when it comes to realism. Lubina uses “neorealism” and “realism” interchangeably, arguing that Russian and Chinese elites alike see the world in Realpolitik terms, regardless of ideological variations. Both states share a “philosophical understanding” of international politics. Yet, he tends to forget that neorealism emphasises structural pressures, such as the distribution of material capabilities in the international system, and does not pay attention to features of individual great powers. Using neorealism means that the main, and the only, incentive for the Sino-Russian co-operation is American predominance. Lubina points to the role of constructivism and takes another competing narrative on board – one of a peaceful power transition and Russia’s acceptance of China’s primacy. He strives to combine the pessimistic and a cautiously optimistic perspective and supplements them with the asymmetry theory and asymmetrical win-win.

Asymmetry Lubina’s book is a very systematic compendium of the contemporary Russian-Chinese relationship. The introduction sets the stage, discussing theories, the role of domestic factors and broader international roles of two main protagonists. The first part scrutinises political relations in a chronological order, sin-

gling out key moments that have transformed Russia-China relations. Among these are Boris Yeltsin’s first visit to China, the proclamation of the “strategic partnership”, the Snowden affair and the crisis over Ukraine. The second part covers economic relations, in particular energy and arms trade, and – which

Between an axis of convenience and a return to the past, Marcin Kaczmarski may come as a surprise – military relations which may be a tad misleading for the reader. A separate section discusses the Russian Far East and its place in Sino-Russian relations. The last part of the book focuses on the regional dimension, Central Asia and Asia-Pacific respectively. In the conclusion, Lubina returns to the “asymmetric win-win” concept and discusses possible futures for the relationship. Lo’s much shorter essay is divided into four parts. The notion of asymmetry in Russian-Chinese

Eastern Café

relations dominates the first part. The second part puts the relationship into a broader perspective, linking it with Russia’s and China’s foreign policies. Towards the end of the book, Lo reviews the existing interpretations and also discusses prospects for the future. Despite all the differences between the two authors, they reach a similar conclusion – current co-operation between Russia and China is here to stay. The two states benefit from good relations, even if in an asymmetrical way.

Marcin Kaczmarski is a senior research fellow with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. His expertise is on Russia’s foreign policy, Russia-China relations, and great power regionalism.

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Eurasia and geopolitical thought E M R E KA Z IM

The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the New World Order. By: Bruno Macaes. Publisher: Allen Lane, London, 2018. The notion of civilisational entities and grand, sweeping analytical concepts such as “Europe”, “the East”, “Africa”, etc., has been under sustained attack by social scientists for over two and a half decades. Indeed, within the humanities it is seemingly a sine qua non for any commentator on the “non-European” to provide a pre-emptive preface outlining why what they have written is not Orientalism (broadly, the study of the non-West, as essentialist and as a means to domination). Perhaps the best examples

of theories that have come under such attack are the geopolitical theses of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations? (1993) and Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992). Criticism of both Huntington and Fukuyama focuses on the manner in which they blithely discuss whole nations and apparent civilisations in simple and reductionist terms. Within this context, it is surprising to find the Portuguese political scientist, Bruno Macaes, pen a book on a similar subject matter.

Macro vs micro analysis One reason why accusations of orientalism or essentialism are overblown with respect to geopolitical analysis is

that we can distinguish between macro and micro analysis – where the former concerns large-scale phenomena and the

Eurasia and geopolitical thought, Emre Kazim latter concerns local phenomena. For example, a macro analysis would concern things such as the economic output, how education is organised and the mortality rate of a nation. Micro analysis concerns how specific groups or individuals operate and function. Knowing that the economy of the United Kingdom is service-oriented (macro), tells us nothing about how a particular person lives his or her life (micro). Of course, there are instances where the macro analysis can be expressed in an example of a micro phenomenon (e.g., on average Germans work longer hours than their French counterparts). The key here is to think about what mode of analysis is appropriate to the subject at hand. Although both Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s theses were wrong, I do not believe it was inappropriate for them to have concerned themselves with macro analysis. Indeed, notions such as the future of Europe and the rise of China are appropriate insofar as we are conscious that these discussions will not allow us to know concrete things about this or that European or Chinese individual. A second reason is that although the concept of grand strategy is in decline, it is nonetheless important and has profound implications. The problematic aspect of Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s theses was that they reduced their analysis largely to culture. In the clash of civilisations, what was implied was that the modus operandi of the Islamic World is rooted in a set of values which are incompatible with the values that underpin

Eastern Café the West (this thus leads to conflict, aka the clash). What the end of history concept implied is that the value and governance system of liberal democracies was the pinnacle that the rest of humanity will eventually attain. Although culture is a foundational concept, with respect

Although the concept of grand strategy is in decline, it is nonetheless important and has profound implications.

to conflict between parties and societal progress, what is by far the most important factor is economics. As Turkey’s former prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, argued in 1997 (he was then a professor of international relations), all of the (future) points of conflict alluded to by Huntington are locations of energy and security significance. Conflict is identified as likely because there are significant material and strategic benefits to be had and not because two sets of cultural values collide. This is a macro analysis; one that is surely justified. Speaking in terms of grand strategy is thus appropriate as long as the priority of causation is fully fleshed out. A third reason why accusations of orientalism or essentialism are overblown is

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that this is a particularly acute time for geopolitical discussions. It is no surprise that Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s texts were written in the early 1990s. The collapse of the bipolar world, as symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall, precipitated a new form of imagining. The triumphalism of the capitalist bloc has now given way to a world where Russia has

re-emerged and Chinese economic power looks set to take centre stage. Indeed, in addition to considering these major developments, clear European strategy and analysis is in dire need. Typified by crisis, the European Union seems to function as an accident and emergency room for injuries which they can patch up but not pre-empt.

Multiple modernities Macaes’s central thesis in The Dawn of Eurasia is that the most fruitful means by which to analyse entities such as Russia, China and Europe is to think of them as parts of the same system. He writes that “We have entered the second age of globalisation … giving rise to a permanently unstable compound of heterogeneous elements”. The Eurasian age is to be analysed through the forces of culture and economics and is to be thought of as principally dominated by three models: the Euro-model (based upon the authority of law and thereby institutional integration), the Russian-model (based upon the authority of the rulers and absolute domestic autonomy) and the Chinese-model (based upon economic penetration achieved by being part of, and thereby benefiting from, the Chinese export market). These are indeed different models and Macaes is correct in identifying the interdependency of these blocs within the proposed supercotinent. There are good economic reasons in support of Macaes’s basic thesis as

well: the rise of China as chief exporter; the United States’ move towards isolationism; and the relative dominance of Asian developing economies in contrast to those of Africa and South America. This dynamic can and most certainly will change with time; however the significant economic shift is occurring primarily within the Eurasian sphere. Unlike economics, cultural factors are more nuanced. Although Europe is still the primary model of development (in economic terms), the extent to which emulating European economic achievements translates into cultural emulation is questionable. Macaes notes that there will be multiple modernities, which reflect the cultures and imaginations of particular nations. But what does this mean: Westernisation? Europeanisation? Can piecemeal modernisation occur? Can an alternative model achieve great cultural and economic success? How is success judged? Although Macaes alludes to these issues, he does not offer a sustained discussion. He neither defines

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what is meant by multiple modernities nor does he discuss the notion of competing universalism, which can be read in terms of the macro notions of political, legal and commercial structures. Similarly, when discussing “The New Eurasian Supercontinent”, Macaes states that “[n]o society wants to think of itself as a copy. If granted the freedom to do so, we all desire to carve out our own paths on earth, a truth equally applicable to individuals and political societies.” This is all very well, but it reads more as

a platitude than as serious insight. We can think of civilisations as growing and evolving within their own traditions or we can think of a kind of race where one civilisation passes the baton to the next (e.g. Arabic civilisation passing on empiricism to Southern European). Moreover, we can think of cases where a society entirely models itself economically on a foreign model but is culturally distinct, like Japan. The Dawn of Eurasia would have been greatly enhanced by exploration of these threads.

The new Silk Road After the theoretical discussion the reader is invited to travel between Istanbul and Beijing. “Chinese Dreams” is perhaps the most significant chapter of the book, with two noteworthy points of discussion. The first is economic. Macaes describes how the Chinese are structuring their economy by “focusing on certain segments of a given value chain”. It is extremely interesting and consequential to know how China is, in effect, outsourcing lower value industry to peripheral nations from which they can import and focus on higher value export return industries. Such outsourcing requires deep political and economic strategic thinking. This highlights the Belt and Road corridor between the East and the West, a new silk road starting in Beijing and ending in London. This initiative is perhaps the most symbolic indicator for the Eurasian age.

The second noteworthy point is Macaes’s thoughts on the philosophical/psychological underpinning of Chinese political thought and how this compares to European thinking. He claims there is “a radical difference between the European and the Chinese schemas of action”, where, “Europeans conceive an ideal model … which they then try to execute… finding a way to bridge the distance between model and reality”, which is in comparison to the Chinese who react to changing events as they come along. The above is symptomatic of false thinking on Macaes’s part. For one, to summarise European and Chinese philosophy in this way is an anathema to all historians of philosophy. This is where Macaes veers closest to being cut down by the accusations of essentialism. Considering European philosophy, the tradition is far too varied to

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speak in this way. Macaes’s intuition may be salvaged if he referred to modern German philosophy and then argue that by European what we really mean is Germanic. This is viable, given the force with which German philosophy and the current economic reality is dictating Europe in terms of major policies and the political economy. However, even with this there are significant problems. Firstly, the globalist nature of European economics is surely more to do with the legacy of the merchant empires, the British being most dominant. With respect to British philosophy, we would be far safer in characterising it as empiricist (experi-

ence first) and as such Macaes’s notion is compromised. Secondly, the idea of the Chinese as pragmatists, by highlighting how they have gone about building political loyalties and investments, surely does not stand up to the remarkable manner in which the Chinese have planned and subsequently executed their world vision over a period of decades. There is a clear propensity to theorise and then work pragmatically to achieve a particular end. Indeed, it is remarkable just how deep and strategic the Chinese have been. Nonetheless, exploring the psycho-philosophical underpinnings of the particular nation-blocks is vital to understanding the notion of Eurasia.

Snapshot Macaes is at his strongest and most insightful when discussing Europe. Drawing upon his experience as minister for Europe, he shows how a curious and intelligent insider can reflect upon his or her own condition vis-à-vis the exploration of the other. Eurasia functions here as a prism and, indeed, Macaes presents quite a bleak analysis of the European project. He asserts that “automation is the genuine core of the European Union”, which can be understood in dystopian ways. He describes how in practice the EU moves from crisis to crisis. He tells us that the EU is a “precision mechanism that needs perfect environmental conditions to work well, so every significant disturbance from the outside grinds it

to a halt”. This is a perfectly apt analogy and one we see confirmed time and time again (e.g. the debt and migrant crises). Prescriptively, Macaes asserts that “[t]he EU needs to become a stronger political agent … to extend its influence outside its boundaries, manage the flows across the borderlands and work for a peaceful future Eurasia”. Although this may be what the EU needs, it is precisely because European coherence is allusive and unlikely possible in anything like its current form that the project will profoundly falter. The Dawn of Eurasia serves as a good introduction for students of politics while scholars will be interested in Macaes’s psychological insights into European

Eurasia and geopolitical thought, Emre Kazim political thinking. Indeed, non-European policy and strategic thinkers will benefit for precisely this reason. There is, of course, no substitute for historical and sustained reading. Indeed, a glaring problem in Macaes’s comments is the lack of any reflection upon the internal dynamics of non-European nations and blocs. Russia, China, Turkey, and so forth are

Eastern Café themselves going through indeterminate change and although their current political structures provide a snapshot, they do not provide us with any real insight into where they may be in 20 years’ time. As such, Macaes provides us with a picture of a moving object, without discussing the limits of drawing conclusions from a still image itself.

Emre Kazim has a PhD in Philosophy from King’s College London and is the author of the recently published book Kant on Conscience: A unified approach to moral self-consciousness.

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Ballad of a common soldier PIO T R PO G O R Z E L S K I

Кіборги: Герої не вмирають (Cyborgs: Heroes Never Die), a film directed by Akhtem Seitablaev, Ukraine 2017.

Released in December 2017, the film Cyborgs: Heroes Never Die is a breakthrough for Ukrainian cinema. The film, as the title indicates, depicts the heroic defence of the Donetsk airport by Ukrainian fighters, popularly known as the cyborgs. It is directed by Akhtem Seitablaev, a Crimean Tatar who was born in Uzbekistan. Seitablaev came to Crimea in 1989 when his fami-

ly returned to the peninsula. He studied in Crimea and Kyiv and then worked for the Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre in Simferopol. Later, he became a screen actor and then a film director. Seitablaev is previously known for the film Khaytarma (which in English means “return”) a movie that depicts the 1944 deportation of the Crimean Tatars.

Defending the homeland Cyborgs, a prime example of war cinema, is a film that is multi-layered. The first of its layers is quite obvious: the story of the 242 day-long defence of Dontetsk airport. The event took place at

the start of 2015 – though the film also includes events that occurred in September of the previous year. There are scenes that include combat, soldiers who have Russian passports, the heroic and

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often irrational behaviour of Ukrainian fighters, servicemen and interrogations of the prisoners of war. Typical for a war film, the inhuman commands are contrasted with honest (and not always subordinate) soldiers. To make the film as realistic as possible, the screenplay writer, Natalya Vorozhbyt, consulted many of the cyborg soldiers. Some of them even participated in the shooting of the film. The conversations among Ukrainian soldiers create the second layer of the film. As it could be expected, these talks, as well as the interlocutors, are deprived of psychological depth. In this regard, Cyborgs is a mainstream action movie, not a sophisticated drama. Nevertheless, there are some scenes that are very powerful from the psychological

perspective – which reveal the fighters’ motivation. As a result, we can see that while some of the cyborgs participated in the fighting or acting in the name of honour (we hear one soldier say: “I pledged an oath, thus I am defending my homeland”), others were driven by more personal matters; like the older man from outside Poltava who said he was fighting because his son had joined the army and because he had to defend his symbolic property: “a cherry orchard near his house”. In some cases, the motivations were more complex. Yet when trying to analyse them we cannot help but ask the question: how could someone defend a state that had given him nothing and whose political elite have been looting everything that was left after the collapse of the Soviet Union?

The trap The film also shows Ukraine’s generational conflict. There is a story of a young musician who gave up the chance to take part in a prestigious competition in the West, and one of a commander who calls himself a nationalist. He is confronted by the musician who blames the older generation for doing nothing for Ukraine. He accuses them of being silent for so many years and not protesting against the authorities, thereby contributing to the great tragedy that is the war in eastern Ukraine. With such deliberations, the film is at risk of falling into the trap of pathos

and simplified patriotism – something that can be said about Seitablaev’s Khaytarma. In one scene of Cyborgs, we hear a soldier jokingly say: “Oh, and now the propaganda starts”. This trick undoubtedly saves some face for the film. However it is too bad that the same cannot be said about the scene where a priest (played by the Ukrainian minister of culture Yevhen Nyshchuk) prays over the body of a fallen soldier. Here, Seitablaev falls into pathos and artificial patriotic upheaval. Importantly, Cyborgs touches upon an issue that is often disregarded by

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Ukrainian media, namely, the composition of the so-called separatist groups. In Ukraine they are often referred to as “Russian terrorist military forces”, which is to stress that Ukraine deals with an

Cyborgs is not a perfect piece of work. However, keeping in mind that Ukrainian cinema is still evolving, we can forgive Seitablaev for some flaws. external aggression and not – as the Kremlin argues – a domestic civil war. Yet Seitablaev shows that the enemy is not only Russian but also Ukrainian. This case, in turn, generates an unavoidable

question: why do these separatists support the Russian aggression? The answer is neither simple, nor to be found in the movie or reality. Non-Ukrainian viewers, who are often inundated with information on the alleged “radicalisation of Ukraine”, may be surprised that the film shows no glorification of UPA, whose leaders (Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych) could be treated as examples of freedom fighters. As a matter of fact, throughout the film the word “Banderite” is used only once. It is uttered by a pro-Russian separatist taken into captivity; he uses the phrase to describe his enemy captor. He uses it in the very same way that a Russian propagandist might call Ukrainians patriots. Tellingly, when he is finally freed, he dies from a bullet fired by a supporter of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic.

Honesty The last thing that should be addressed with regards to the film is the language used, which is often seen as the Achilles’ heel of Ukrainian cinematography. Theoretically, the state has two widely spoken languages but in reality people speak a mix of the two; it is strange to hear a protagonist speak perfect Ukrainian or Russian. Such instances, however, take place in some films and it comes across as very superficial, especially when Ukrainian is spoken. In Cyborgs the protagonists use both lan-

guages not flawlessly, but correctly. They speak more correctly here than what you would normally hear on the streets of Kyiv, Lviv or Poltava. It seems that Seitablaev found a golden middle. Cyborgs is not a perfect piece of work. However keeping in mind that Ukrainian cinema is still evolving, we can forgive Seitablaev for some flaws. Most importantly, the director avoided the risk of turning the legendary airport fighters into gods. In other words, he did not present them as undefeatable heroes

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fighting for Ukraine and thinking solely about their homeland. Seemingly, this honesty was appreciated by the viewers. When I watched the film in Kyiv during a weekday the cinema was packed with

people, including families with children. It is clear that viewing this film will certainly influence their patriotic upbringing, perhaps much more than history books. Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Piotr Pogorzelski is a Polish Radio journalist and former correspondent in Kyiv. He is the author of two books on Ukraine: Barszcz ukraiński (Ukrainian Borscht) and Ukraina: niezwykli ludzie w niezwykłych czasach (Ukraine: extraordinary people in extraordinary times).

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Russia’s wars on Ukraine W O J CIE CH SIE G I E Ń

Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine. By: Anne Applebaum. Publisher: Penguin Random House, 2017. When looking through Anne Applebaum’s most recent book Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine, readers interested in Soviet crimes will probably refer back to Robert Conquest’s The Harvest of Sorrow. This 1986 landmark book by Conquest, a British historian, was the first to analyse the collectivisation of agriculture in 1929 – 31 in Ukraine and the subsequent 1932 – 33 famine, known as Holodomor. The Harvest of Sorrow was based on the limited historical data that was becoming available to western researchers at the time. The 1990s and the political transformations that took place in Ukraine have since brought new opportunities to ac-

cess historical archives, including those related to Holodomor. As the Ukrainian archives opened up, historians of Ukraine started to organise and participate in international research projects to uncover the truth of the famine and publish their findings in academic publications. Their work largely contributed to the expansion of our knowledge of the 1930s in the Soviet Union in general and in Ukraine in particular. Applebaum’s Red Famine is one more contribution to this growing knowledge. It reflects – as we can read in the book’s preface – “a quarter-century’s worth of scholarship on Ukraine”.

Raising awareness In her attempt to tell the story of the famine, Applebaum bases her analysis

on a wide range of historical sources. Among them are monographs, archi-

Russia’s wars on Ukraine, Wojciech Siegień val materials as well as recorded conversations with the survivors collected through oral history projects. That is why Red Famine can be considered a history book. She acutely compiles the findings of the most important research on Holodomor since Ukraine’s independence. Yet, for this very same reason, Applebaum’s work should not be treated as significantly ground-breaking. Its value lies in something else. Despite being labelled by The Economist as “the history book of 2017”, Red Famine’s greatest asset is that it gives an account of the Holodomor famine in a lucid manner that will appeal to a wide audience. In this way, the book resembles Conquest’s Harvest of Sorrow, drawing the world’s attention to Ukraine and its history. Applebaum opens her analysis in 1917 with a reconstruction of Soviet policies towards Ukraine, which eventually led to the Holodomor. She traces the effects of the 1917 revolution and the Ukrainian national movement (destroyed in 1932 – 33), investigating Ukraine’s attempts to create an independent state. In this context, the author provides evidence that Stalin policies led to serious tension between the Soviet power apparatus and social groups in Ukraine. The former used collectivisation to ef-

Eastern Café fectively eliminate enemies, de-Ukrainianise the public sphere and disintegrate society. As Applebaum recounts, Stalin understood very well that without total subordination to Moscow, Ukraine would pose a threat to the whole Soviet system. She convincingly argues that the Soviet leader’s policies introduced in the early 1930s, which led the Great Famine, were both planned and brutally implemented. The overall aim was to destroy any traces of Ukrainian identity. As expected, the chapter which describes the course of the 1933 famine is gruesome and shocking at the same time. Applebaum asks the question whether Holodomor should, as it is argued by Ukrainians, be labelled genocide. If the language of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is to be applied, Holodomor does not meet the criterion of being a crime “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. Such description is applicable to the Holocaust. However, if we apply a broader interpretation of the term, as suggested by Raphael Lemkin who coined it, Ukraine’s Holodomor could then be regarded as a “classic example of Soviet genocide”.

Commentary on the present To illustrate how Red Famine contributes to drawing the world’s attention to Ukraine, it is important to take note of

the book’s last chapter, titled “The Holodomor in History and Memory”, and the “Epilogue: The Ukrainian Question Re-

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considered”. Here, Applebaum discusses memory in Russian-Ukrainian relations and makes references to contemporary events. In this way, the book does not resemble a conventional history book. In some ways it is like an anthropological or political science study, even if the author has argued against that account. Applebaum stresses that the idea of the book emerged to her in 2010, and while writing Red Famine she was not inspired by the 2013 – 14 Revolution of Dignity or Ukraine’s war with Russia that erupted afterwards; so the publication is not a commentary on the current situation in Ukraine. However, we cannot help but have the impression that the opposite is true. Applebaum herself puts this statement into question – albeit unintentionally – when she writes that the Ukrainian revolution, the early years of Soviet Ukraine, the mass repressions of Ukrainian elite and of course the Holodomor are all a “crucial backstory that underlines and explains” the current developments. The book thus shows the many parallels between historical and contemporary events. The best illustration is the phrase “hybrid war” used by Applebaum when writing about events that took

place almost a century before it was even coined. In a similar way, when describing nationalistic tendencies among Ukrainian intelligence in the 1920s, she focuses on Mykhailo Boychuk who postulated that Ukrainian culture should be protected from Russia by a wall – one that would not even let a bird fly through. Today’s Ukrainian state is erecting such a wall, literally and symbolically. Its foundations are being built on the eastern border while the widespread de-Russification of the public sphere and education shows an increasing separation from Russia’s spiritual influence. For a similar reason we can find in Red Famine a description of Mykola Skrypnyk’s tragic story. This devoted Bolshevik, who supported Ukrainianisation, was accused by the communist party of forcing Ukrainian ideas onto Russian children. Not able to handle the accusations, Skrypnyk died by suicide while the Soviets continued their fight against Ukrainian intelligentsia, all under the cover of defending the rights of Russian-speaking children. As history has showed, Russia has replicated this tactic in its relations with Ukraine on many occasions – most recently, with tragic effects.

State of denial Finally, Applebaum discusses the differences in assessment between Ukraine and Russia. She points out that the Soviet authorities systematically refused

to recognise that Stalin’s policy took the lives of millions of people. This issue was a complete taboo until the 1990s. It was only after Ukraine regained independ-

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ence that Ukrainians started to commemorate the memory of the victims, and the Holodomor became an item on the political agenda. Today’s Russia, being the successor state to the Soviet Union, equally rejects the possibility of Stalin’s responsibility for the Holodomor. The Kremlin authorities openly deny that there were millions of Holodomor victims, while anyone from Ukraine who brings this topic up is accused of being a nationalist or fascist. Here we can get to the essence of Appleabaum’s motivation for writing about the Holodomor. Stressing that her work should not be treated as an argument by any side of the current political conflict in Ukraine, Applebaum envisioned Red Famine as a study that would help readers understand what happened in the 1930s. Her conclusions, however, show that the claim of being apolitical is solely a declaration. Unquestionably, Applebaum takes a political stance, although one that refers to the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia. This conflict influences Ukrainian politics to this day: Indeed it is quite easy to point out which politicians in Ukraine are inspired by Moscow.

Thus, Applebaum’s political voice is evidently directed against the current Kremlin authorities. How else can we interpret the book’s epilogue where Applebaum writes that “Today’s Russian government uses disinformation, cor-

Red Famine is just as much about the Holodomor as it is about Russian policies towards Ukraine. ruption and military force to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty just as Soviet governments did in the past. As in 1932, the constant talk of ‘war’ and ‘enemies’ also remains useful to Russian leaders who cannot explain stagnant living standards or justify their own privileges wealth and power.” It is clearly an illustration that Red Famine is just as much about the Holodomor as it is about Russian policies towards Ukraine in their numerous historical reincarnations. Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Wojciech Siegień is a lecturer in the department of cultural and educational research at the Pedagogical Institute at the University of Gdańsk.

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Confronting the Romanian church’s cumbersome past A LIN CO N STA NTI N

The Romanian Orthodox Church and the Holocaust. By: Ion Popa. Publisher: Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana USA, 2017. In the summer of 2017, the Romanian media was rocked by a series of scandals relating to the Orthodox Church. These scandals, which were a stroke of luck for journalists who would normally be reporting on how Romanians spend their holidays, centred on acts of sexual impropriety perpetrated by figures in the upper echelons of the Orthodox Church, including one celebrity priest-cum-musical superstar. The Bishop of Huşi and Father Celestin of the Prislop Monastery of Maramureş were discovered to have engaged in same-sex sexual activities; the

bishop was even caught on video being intimate with a theology student. These revelations were compounded by the fact that the musical superstar and priest Cristian Pomohaci was accused of having abused young boys who worked on his farm. Several young men came forward testifying that they were abused at the hands of Pomohaci. The journalist who broke the story first contacted officials within the church in reference to Pomohaci but received no response. Confronted with the church’s inaction, he finally went public.

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Painful memory The Romanian Orthodox Church, which is state funded and plays an important role in politics, has opposed L GBT rights for a long time; the church sees them as a threat to traditional family values. Yet these scandals, which bring to mind an all-monk equivalent of the Castle Anthrax scene in Monty Python and the Holy Grail, contradict, at every level, the Church’s long-held claims. It responded by issuing a rather bland condemnation of paedophilia and child abuse. Yet more importantly, the church threw itself into another scandal concerning the removal of a bust of the person after whom a high school was named after. The figure in question was Mircea Vulcănescu, one of Romania’s leading theological thinkers during the interwar period, who died in prison after being sentenced by the post-war communist authorities. Vulcănescu had served in the Naziallied government of Marshal Ion Antonescu and was charged with the economic spoliation of Romanian Jewry, a task he carried out with utmost diligence. Seeing how Vulcănescu was condemned as a war criminal, the Elie Wiesel National Institute for Studying the Holocaust in Romania asked for public institutions to stop honouring his memory. After the protest of a series of nationalist and conservative personalities, wholly backed by the church, the local authorities refused to make the change, in spite of the fact that the elimination was guaranteed by law. Victorious, the church claimed it

has rescued the legacy of a martyr for Christ. But Vulcănescu was condemned for his participation within an antisemitic and genocidal regime, not for his faith. How could such a false statement be proclaimed? For all those who want to understand the contradictions which rest at the heart of such a statement, Ion Popa’s The Romanian Orthodox Church and the Holocaust will be a vital resource. Based on the author’s PhD thesis at the University of Manchester, the book consists of a careful study of the history of the Romanian Orthodox Church in the 20th century and the consequences of its actions for the 21st century. Rich in archival materials from several countries, a mastery of the existing secondary literature and a familiarity with the overall history of the Holocaust, the volume is the first of its kind to subject the church’s wartime activity up to scrutiny, beyond its selfserving myths. Popa begins his story in the interwar period when the church supported antisemitic parties such as the National Christian League and the Iron Guard. Despite its antisemitic credo, the National Christian League still stuck to a belief in parliamentary representation and democratic elections. By contrast, the Iron Guard was a fully-fledged fascist movement whose ideology combined antisemitism, anti-communism, xenophobia and support of Orthodoxy. It was openly anti-democratic and its

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members carried out terrorist attacks against politicians who criticised it. Numerous priests came out in support of the Iron Guard and many even joined

the movement. In 1923, Romania was the last European country to emancipate the Jews, an act which the Iron Guard strove to reverse.

Turbulent years Yet, in 1938, before the Iron Guard came to power and put its plan into action, Romania had a brief government run by the nationalist poet and politician Octavian Goga and the head of the National Christian League, A. C. Cuza. The Goga-Cuza government requested the re-examination of the situation of all Romanian Jews. Those who could not prove that they rightfully acquired citizenship would lose all political rights. The disapproval of Romania’s allies towards the policy led to the regime’s downfall. After King Carol II disbanded the GogaCuza government, he put in its place one that was headed by the Patriarch of Romania, Miron Cristea. Cristea not only supported the antisemitic legislation of the previous regime, he called for even more draconian measures. Cristea’s government did not last longer either, for he was ousted when Carol installed a royal dictatorship. In turn, Carol’s own authoritarian government was ousted when the country experienced massive losses of territory to Hungary in the west, and to the Soviet Union in the east. In its place came a government jointly ruled by the Iron Guard and Marshal, Ion Antonescu, a military figure who had for years built a

strong reputation in right-wing circles. It was known as the National-Legionary State. This regime was finally replaced by one solely headed by Antonescu after he failed to agree on policy with the Iron Guard. Throughout this period, however, Romania’s Jews were not spared from antisemitic bursts of violence. The Iron Guard went down by way of a pogrom in the nation’s capital, which resulted in the killing of Jewish men and the rape of women, as well as the destruction of synagogues (an impressive number of Orthodox priests joined in on the action). However, none of it compared to the scale of violence which followed Antonescu’s appropriation of power. Under Antonescu, Romania became a committed ally of Nazi Germany, becoming deeply implicated in the war against the Soviet Union. Independent of National Socialist rulings, the Romanians began a systematic campaign of persecution against the country’s Jewish population. Hundreds of thousands of Jews were deported beyond the Dniester River to a region called Transnistria (not to be confused with the breakaway region of the same name today), where many died of disease, hunger, and outright murder at the hands of Romanian soldiers and

Confronting the Romanian church’s cumbersome past, Alin Constantin German killing divisions known as the Einsatzgruppen. They were also subjected to economic spoliation, as their money and belongings filled the coffers of the Romanian state. The government prohibited conversion to Christianity in an effort to prevent it from becoming a possible source of salvation for the Jews. The Orthodox Church submitted

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fully to the will of the state that wanted to protect the purity of Romanian blood from mixing with that of Jews. The church’s support went even further: they championed the antisemitic campaigns at the time. It also acted as a cheerleader for the genocidal war against the USSR, a country that was described as “satanic”.

Whitewashed narrative After Romania switched sides in 1944 and fought alongside the Allies, the church quietly went along. With the establishment of the communist regime in 1948, the Orthodox Church again landed on its feet, collaborating in the suppression of other Christian denominations. It was at this moment the church began to actively distort its past record, portraying itself not as instigator and perpetrator of antisemitic violence, but as a loyal friend of the Jews. Benefiting from the support of the communist authorities, who realised it would be advantageous to cash in on the church’s popularity as well as the lack of free speech characteristic of a dictatorship, this new whitewashed narrative cemented itself. Romania’s Jewish community was powerfully affected not only by the devastations of the Holocaust but the continued existence of post-war antisemitism where outbreaks of violence were not uncommon. The new rabbi of Romania, Moses Rosen, entered into a pact with the communist authorities where

he hoped to obtain the best deal for Romania’s remaining Jews. He mostly succeeded, but the question whether or not it was worth the price of collaboration remains lingering to this day. Throughout Popa’s book, the Romanian Orthodox Church appears in a Machiavellian guise, always securing the best

Throughout Popa’s book, the Romanian Orthodox Church appears in a Machiavellian guise. conditions for its existence. Far from being the unitary institution it claims to be, gluing the Romanian people throughout the country, the church’s record shows it to be deeply scarred by factional infighting at the local level. While the church’s falsified past went uncontested for decades – in Romania at least – the regime change of 1989 changed this as histori-

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Confronting the Romanian church’s cumbersome past, Alin Constantin

ans starting chiselling away at the web of untruths. Importantly, not all Orthodox priests were antisemitic or passive to the violence perpetrated against the Jews, and Popa is careful to document such efforts in his book. Gheorghe I. Petre was listed as Righteous Among Nations for his efforts to help Romanian Jewry. Yet efforts such as Petre’s were done out of

individual considerations, without any institutional backing. If people such as him are unknown to Romanian Christians, it is because the church is more focused on honouring people like Mircea Vulcănescu. Sadly, and unlike Orthodox Churches in other countries, the church in Romania has largely avoided taking part in interdenominational condemnations of antisemitism.

Pioneering work Popa contends that the church’s inability to come to terms with its past, wholeheartedly condemn contemporary manifestations of nationalism which use its symbols and engage in interfaith dialogue, is due to it being stuck in the Middle Ages. From integration during the war, to the complex balancing act maintained during the years of communism, when the ruling ideology was atheistic, to the recent harnessing of internet support groups, the church appears as anything but antiquated. While terms such as “collective memory”, “repression” and “forgetting” are abound in the book, Popa pays little attention to their definitions. Historians and sociologists, in recent years, have tried to carefully distinguish the variety of memories, from social to cultural, while others have denied the existence

of memory beyond the individual altogether. Irrespective of the approach, the reader could have benefited if Popa specified his classifications more clearly. Since his analysis is multi-layered, going back and forth between the Jewish community and the Orthodox Church, a more theoretically-developed concept of memory could have helped mediate these interactions. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, Popa’s volume is a pioneering work of scholarship that is ground-breaking in its dedication to the investigation of Romanian ecclesiastical history. One can hope that the church will change its reactionary ways, but in any case, state institutions have a duty to keep in line the church’s flirtations with neo-fascist groups lest it, once again, becomes a hot bed of anti-democracy, antisemitism and xenophobia.

Alin Constantin has an MA from the Heidelberg Faculty of Jewish Studies and will begin a PhD in History at Stanford University.

Russia and the Balkans Navigating a minefield of opportunities M ILLIE R A D O V I Ć

Rival Power: Russia’s Influence in Southeast Europe. By: Dimitar Bechev. Publisher: Yale University Press, New Haven, USA, 2017. “Russia re-enacts the Great Game in the Balkans,” wrote columnist Leonid Bershidsky for Bloomberg in 2017. Comparing the Balkans to a geopolitical playground for great powers, like infamously Central Asia in the 19th century, Bershindsky insinuated that Russia has developed renewed interests and influence in the region. It is in this context that one should consider Dimitar Bechev’s recent Rival Power: Russia’s Influence in Southeast Europe, as he undertakes the task of explaining Russia’s role in this “Great Game”. Addressing the topic from a realist perspective, Bechev asks and answers some big questions, including: What has

been driving Moscow’s policy in the region? And what explains the attitude and responses of the local states to Russia? His argument is simpler than most proponents of a new Cold War between Russia and the West would suggest. Untangling the puzzle of Russia and Southeast Europe, Bechev argues that “[w]hat transpires behind the lofty rhetoric of fraternity, pan-Slavism, Orthodox solidarity and historical bonds is often crude opportunism.” Rival Power suggests that whilst Russia does rival the West in the Balkans, with no grand plans in the Balkans, it is an ultimately pragmatic and opportunist power met by locals who think in the very same way.

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Russia and the Balkans, Millie Radović Special relationships

Southeast Europe is understood in this book as the former Yugoslav states, alongside neighbouring Albania, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. That Bechev clusters all of these states together into one unit to produce his book is already telling of his overarching views and the realism that runs through his analysis. It is one of the few sources of weaknesses in an overall excellent book on a topic too often ignored in both Russian and Eastern European studies. To stress his point Bechev splits the book into two parts: Part I addresses each of the sub-regions of SEE separately (first former Yugoslavia, then Bulgaria and Romania, Greece and Cyprus and

There has been a gaping hole in Russian and Eastern European studies when it comes to the Balkans; Rival Power begins to plug that hole. finally Turkey); whilst Part II takes a thematic approach to Russian influence in the region by addressing such concepts like hybrid warfare, energy politics and Russian soft power. Finally, the book concludes with a re-evaluation of Rus-

sia’s relations with the West vis-à-vis its relations with Southeast Europe. The former head of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in Sofia, Bechev has a long record of foreign policy commentaries spanning not only academia but leading media outlets like Politico, Foreign Policy, the Economist and many others. Hence, it is no surprise that he has produced a book that collates the most exciting turns in Russia’s relationship with the region. Drawing on endless documents and speeches, with an impeccably detailed empirical analysis, Bechev successfully argues that there is not so much of a Great Game with blocs of allegiances in Southeast Europe as much as Russia has succeeded in cultivating special relationships with each of the states regardless of regional disputes. There has been a gaping hole in Russian and Eastern European studies when it comes to the Balkans; as Bechev himself notes, most scholars focus chiefly on Russia and its relationship with the former Soviet republics. Rival Power begins to plug that hole, with several commendable features. One is the attention to detail in tracing complex developments across a large region throughout a turbulent era that began with the 1990s. Bechev successfully highlights all of the key events which are essential to analysing any policy in the region. Paying close attention to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the starting

Russia and the Balkans, Millie Radović

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points of post-Cold War contention between Russia and the West, Bechev introduces Balkan-related tensions to the readers in an interesting and readable way. In just over 150 pages Bechev runs through Kosovo’s status quest, murky political murders in Serbia, coup attempts in Montenegro, the separatist Republika Srpska, Ataka (the populist

party in Bulgaria), South Stream disputes, the Agrokor crisis in Croatia, the Greek Eurozone crisis, the Cyprian missile crisis, Turkey’s Kurdish troubles, the BTC pipeline from Azerbaijan, and even the Syrian conflict. It is overwhelmingly informative on the sensational couple of decades that the region has witnessed.

Blurred lines Essential to good foreign policy analysis is continuity, and chapter by chapter Bechev successfully employs his realist theory against relations between Russia and each of the sub-regions. In fact, he discusses not only Russia’s relations to the states in questions, but how they relate to the interstate affairs in the subregion and Russia’s relations with other regions outlined in each chapter. For example, he discusses Russia’s friendship of convenience with Greece and Cyprus vis-à-vis Athens and Nicosia’s disputes with Turkey. This is also notable in the thematic chapters where Bechev maintains continuity in his analysis whilst taking into account turning points for Russia in both the post-Soviet space and the United States itself. However, a key fault of the book is that it does not encompass an analysis of the private sector as much as the public sector. This stems, as mentioned, from the wide scope Bechev takes. In order to cover the large region of the Balkan Peninsula (plus Cyprus), the author has

to narrow his analytical lens to interstate relations. This is not untypical of foreign policy analysis. International relations scholars most often take an empirical approach delineating foreign policy making as that executed officially by the government. However, post-Cold War Russia and Southeast Europe are not in the slightest usual cases, the intertwined state and private interests, in many ways, define this space. A good indicator of how the private and public sectors are entangled in Russia and Eastern Europe are seen in the West’s sanctions against Russia, which focus largely on private business interests and funds. To be fair, there is a brief mention of Mark Galeotti’s work on global corruption and Bechev quickly touches on Russian links to Agrokor, the Croatian retail giant, or failed attempts by Russian oligarchs to purchase Serbian media companies. But a full understanding of the way private businesses influences relations in Eastern Europe most certainly requires further analysis. Hence,

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Russia and the Balkans, Millie Radović

while a comprehensive account of Russia’s relations with Southeast Europe, this book’s scope leaves little room for delving into deeper connections at domes-

tic and transnational levels as opposed to the traditional international relations narratives which look at chiefly state-tostate relations.

Sober analysis Another critique of this book is that while initially Bechev shuns the commonly noted arguments of shared cultures and histories between countries in this region and Russia, he spends a lot of space briefing the reader on these. This is partly done well because he is able to explain how these are not the most important factors in Russia’s relations with Southeast Europe. However, by go-

The author weakens his initial realist argument and produces a more convincing one in that each of today’s pragmatic relationships there is a different starting point.

ing back further than the 19th century and the uprisings against the Ottomans to explain the baggage, for example, Bulgaria and Romania carry vis-à-vis Greece, Bechev provides substance to

the culture and history argument which he shuns in the beginning of the book. He weakens his initial realist argument and produces a more convincing one in that each of today’s pragmatic relationships there is a different starting point. In other words, culture and history cannot be totally ignored. Interestingly, Bechev concludes the book by taking a broader look at Russia’s complex relationship with Western Europe and discusses the repercussions of this on Southeast Europe. Dismissing heated rhetoric of a new Cold War emerging, he argues that “in the Balkans, Russia is not after the establishment of a new political order or an empire, whether formal or informal. Its goal is to undercut and upset the existing institutions and rules set by the West”. This welcome and sober analysis is a reflection of facts “as they are” as opposed to the ideologically-fuelled rhetoric that swept across literature after the annexation of Crimea. However, such an analysis can only be most sober when taking into account all of the realities of Russia and Eastern Europe. Indeed, as Bechev writes, “from Belgrade to Ankara, from Sofia to Budapest, dysfunctional democracies, state capture and the backslide to

Russia and the Balkans, Millie Radović authoritarian politics, are on the whole, home-grown ills, not an outcome of a sinister Muscovite plot.” Yet, it would be foolish to ignore that Russia also suffers from these ills and that the interaction between the corrupt political elites and murky business owners play a larger role across Eastern Eu-

Eastern Café rope than many other parts of the world. Thus, Rival Power is a great read; a superbly written analysis of interstate affairs but desperately requires a follow-up on one of the defining feature of postCold War affairs in Eastern Europe: the blurred lines between the public and the private realms.

Millie Radović is a postgraduate student at St Antony’s College, Oxford where she is currently completing her MSc in Russian and Eastern European Studies. She is also a Dahrendorf Scholar investigating free speech in the Balkans and assisting Professor Timothy Garton Ash on the Free Speech Debate Platform, as well as the book reviews editor for the student-led journal St Antony’s International Review.

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